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ABSTRACT 
ATTACKING ETHOS: 
THE RHETORICAL USE OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE 2004 ELECTION 
by Theron Allen Verdon 
May 2008 
The rhetorical use of uncertainty in political communication (and other areas) 
has many implications. Uncertainty plays a major role in everyday life. Therefore, it 
likely plays a major role in political decision-making. Research has shown that 
uncertainty about a candidate affects a voter's voting preference. Uncertainty usually 
affects voter decisions. Uncertainty was a factor in the 2004 presidential election. The 
Bush-Cheney Campaign used uncertainty to corrupt the ethos of the Democratic 
nominee, Senator John Kerry. The Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically manipulated 
information about Senator Kerry to create a perception of a leader whose actions 
revealed an unpredictable flip-flopper. A lack of clear prediction caused one major 
effect. People lacked a desired sense of certainty and consistency in a leader during 
uncertain times, and an increase in uncertainty caused a decrease in identification. In 
the 2004 presidential election the Bush-Cheney campaign used strategic uncertainty 
to attack Senator Kerry's ethos. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Humankind formed communities to assume control in an uncertain world. 
Maslow (1943) suggested that humans seek a safe and predictable environment, an 
environment that avoids uncertainty. As civilization advanced, a sensed need for the 
governance of societal uncertainties emerged. Along with forms of governance, from 
tribal to early democracies, political rhetoric developed. Political rhetoric has been 
studied at least since Aristotle (Aristotle, 1953; Hahn, 1998; Tulis, 1987). Like all forms 
of rhetorical expression, political rhetoric attempts to affect future outcomes. Future 
outcomes range from policy decisions to electioneering. The savvy politician will 
construct sound rhetorical appeals adapted to the psychology of audiences and will also 
be aware of the rhetorical situation. "Political actors must carefully assess the situation, 
calculate the appropriate action, and identify the proper roles to assume" (Denton & 
Woodward, 1985, p. 29). 
Uncertainty is a major component in human interaction (Berger & Calabrese, 
1975; Bradac, 2001; Katona, 1975, Weary & Edwards, 1996). Communication scholars 
view uncertainty as a variable in interpersonal interactions that people seek to overcome. 
There appears to be little or no research, however, that determines the rhetorical worth of 
uncertainty as a persuasive device, a strategic means of influencing political ethos or 
gaining a desired outcome. Thus, planned uncertainty or strategic uncertainty (SU) is 
insufficiently explored as an area of research. Since uncertainty is an important construct 
of human communication (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Bradac, 2001), one may be able to 
strategically manipulate it in order to gain a desired audience response. Potthoff and 
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Munger (2005) suggested "Uncertainty can be harmful to candidates" (p. 450), asserting 
that candidates who appear consistent and reliable are more likely to be elected than 
candidates depicted as uncertain. Arguably, political candidates could strategically use 
uncertainty to cast their opponents as unreliable and unpredictable. Voters may be led to 
believe that they cannot predict how a candidate will represent their interests (Hajnal, 
2003). 
Miller (2005) and Seeyle (2004) reported that the 2004 election was about values, 
the war on terrorism, conflict in Iraq, and the economy. Each issue dealt with uncertainty. 
A major contributor to the creation of political uncertainty was President George W. 
Bush's presidential campaign, which depicted Senator John Kerry as riddled with 
uncertainty, a "flip-flopper" who could not make up his mind. For example, Bush-
Cheney campaign volunteers dressed up like Flipper the flip-flopping dolphin. They 
relentlessly portrayed Kerry as elitist, untrustworthy, liberal and unpredictable regarding 
major issues (Milbank & VandeHei, 2004, p. Al). The Bush campaign successfully 
convinced voters that Senator Kerry was an uncertain leader in an uncertain world. By 
making John Kerry appear uncertain, the Bush campaign was able to use the voters' risk 
averse inclinations. As an antithesis to Kerry's uncertainty depiction, Bush was portrayed 
as a straightforward, certain individual. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to review and critique research on political 
rhetoric and uncertainty theory with the goal of generating research questions. This 
dissertation is divided into the following sections: (a) Literature Review, (b) Critique, (c) 
Rational and Research Questions, (d) Situation, (e) Method, (f) Analysis, (g) Discussion, 
(h) Conclusion, and (i) References. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Rhetoric 
People communicate to create and sustain consensus. "Indeed, through public 
speaking by our national, state, and local officials, our values and goals are defined, 
refined, and articulated" (Denton & Hahn, 1986, p. 4). Aristotle identified three 
categories of public address; forensic oratory dealt with legal purposes, epideictic oratory 
concerned celebratory events, and deliberative oratory influenced politics. Ancient 
rhetoric dealt with oral persuasion. However, the use of rhetoric has changed over time. 
Aristotle defined rhetoric as the "art of finding the available means of persuasion" 
(Aristotle, 1991, p. 36). 
Ehninger (1968), by contrast, considered modern rhetoric to be "an instrument for 
understanding and improving human relations" (p. 21). Denton & Hahn (1986) argued 
that through rhetoric we experience emotions that lead us to specific behavior. In 
addition, it can alter perceptions and assist in the formulation of beliefs. Ehninger (1968) 
argues that rhetoric is the way by which people influence each other's thinking through 
strategic use of symbols. Political rhetoric is, at its base, the strategic use of symbols to 
influence others. "Political consciousness, therefore, results from a largely symbolic 
interpretation of sociopolitical experience. To control, manipulate, or structure the 
interpretation of meaning is a primary goal of politics in general" (Denton & Hahn, 1986, 
p. 5). In a democracy voters are the politician's audience. The populace accepts or rejects 
rhetorically manipulated symbols. Voters remember symbols when recalling or 
processing political discourse. "Publics respond to currently conspicuous political 
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symbols: not 'facts'...but to gestures and speeches that make up the drama of the state" 
(Edelman, 1985, p. 172). Through the manipulation of symbols, we construct social 
reality. In the 2004 election, the Bush campaign's strategic use of symbols created a 
"reality" about Senator Kerry that many voters accepted as true that he was indecisive 
and unpredictable. 
Ethos. Credibility is a major factor of persuasion as it influences an audience's 
perception of a speaker (Aristotle, 1991; Cicero, 1913; Quintilian, 1891). "Most people 
agree that a speaker's success in a given situation depends significantly upon the opinion 
of his character" (Brandenburg, 1948, p. 23). A speaker's perceived credibility, therefore, 
is important as it affects the decisions of an audience. 
Aristotle segmented ethos into three categories. "There are three reasons why 
speakers themselves are persuasive, for there are three things we must trust other than 
logical demonstrations. These are practical wisdom [phronesis] and virtue [arete] and 
good will [eunoia] (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 120-121). For a speaker to gain confidence from 
his audience he must create the perception of competence (practical wisdom), moral 
character (virtue), and trustworthiness (good will). Aristotle (1991) argued that failure to 
exhibit one or all of those divisions of ethos creates a negative impression. 
Cicero (1913) argued that the character of the speaker moves people. However, 
character was supported mainly by knowledge. Cicero contended a speaker must be 
knowledgeable, well educated, and skilled in the liberal arts. Cicero added the idea of 
gravitas to the character of a speaker. "Possessing the quality would require a history of 
doing good deeds, giving good advice, or making good decisions" (Smith, 2003, p. 130). 
For Cicero a man must be good in his actions to be a good man and a good speaker. 
Quintilian followed Aristotle and Cicero as he stressed the importance of being a 
good man to be a good rhetor. "Let the orator, then, whom I propose to form, be such a 
good one as is characterized by the definition of Marcus Cato, a good man skilled in 
speaking.. .1 not only say that he who would answer my idea of an orator must be a good 
man, but that no man, unless he be good, can ever be an orator" (Quintilian, 1891, pp. 
391-392). Like previous rhetoricians, Quintilian suggested that persuasiveness is highly 
depended on a speaker's character. Quintilian's assertion that only a good man can be a 
good speaker exceeds the perception of character. Like Cicero, Quintilian argued that a 
speaker must do good works. 
Bradenburg (1948) stated, "The practice of rhetoricians through the years, then, 
would seem to support the belief that the task of the rhetorical critic most certainly does 
include the estimate of the moral character of the speaker" (p. 25). Character is especially 
important in a presidential election. Presidential candidates project a positive image of 
themselves to bolster their credibility. Nimmo and Mansfield (1986) proposed that the 
images candidates project are meant to convey leadership characteristics, including such 
qualities as competency, experience, and trustworthiness. Despite thousands of years, 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian's concepts of credibility are still important in modern 
American politics. 
Political Reality 
Holtgraves (2002) stated that language creates worldviews. Similarly, Blair 
(1990) said, "One of the most distinguished privileges which Providence has conferred 
upon mankind is the power of communicating their thoughts to one another. Destitute of 
this power, reason would be solitary, and, in some measure, an unavailable principle" (p. 
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30). Politics is about competing definitions of social reality. Those competing definitions 
of reality become the common consensus of social reality. 
[0]ur everyday, traditional ideas of reality are delusions which we 
spend substantial parts of our daily lives shoring up, even at the 
considerable risk of trying to force facts to fit our definition of 
reality instead of vice versa. And the most dangerous delusion of 
all is that there is only one reality. What there are, in fact, are so 
many different versions of reality; some of which are 
contradictory, but all of which are the results of communication 
and not reflections of eternal, objective truths (Watzlawick, 1976). 
People communicate social reality through the use of symbols. "A symbol, then, is a 
human invention and arises from the attributing of meaning to an object" (Elder & Cobb, 
1983, p. 29). The symbols humans create help communicate people's shared perceptions 
of social reality. Holzner (1968) stated that communication is integral to the social 
construction of reality. Symbols make up part of our social reality, they order and 
facilitate it. "Man does not live by symbols alone, but man orders and interprets his 
reality by his symbols, and even reconstructs it" (Firth, 1973, p. 20). Social reality is a 
fabrication of humankinds' ability to give meaning to objects and to communicate that 
reality to others. Political reality is part of social reality. Political reality is entered into 
the national dialogue rhetorically (Nimmo & Combs, 1983), relying upon the acceptance 
of and communication between individuals. The populace either adopts that dialogue or 
seeks another. Communication therefore facilitates the spread of social reality through the 
messages of the populace (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Holzner, 1968; Potter, 1996). 
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A particular population communicates that acceptance or rejection through the 
community. "Group members frequently talk to one another, thus socially validating their 
shared view of things" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 218). For instance, prior to the 2004 
election, particular groups accepted and rejected a reality about the war in Iraq. "Despite 
the report of the 9/11 Commission saying there is no evidence Iraq was providing 
significant support to al Qaeda, 75% of Bush supporters believe Iraq was providing 
substantial support to al Qaeda (30% of Kerry supporters), with 20% believing Iraq was 
directly involved in 9/11. Sixty-three percent of Bush supporters even believe that 
evidence of this support has been found, while 85% of Kerry supporters believe the 
opposite" (Kull, Ramsay, Subias, Weber, & Lewis, 2004, p. 4). Social reality had been 
split into two competing political realities, a Bush supported and a Kerry supported one. 
Each defined the campaign to conform to their reality. 
Political realities are communicated through various means. Political realities can 
be articulated by a politician, by their campaign staffs, and subsequently through mass 
media to the public. A campaign is designed to communicate specific messages to the 
public. Political reality is communicated to voters through rhetoric. "Language should be 
viewed as the medium for the generation and perpetuation of politically significant 
symbols" (Denton & Woodward, 1985, p. 31). We have our world views shaped and 
created by rhetoric. Rhetoric also helps shape our perceptions of individuals. 
Visual Rhetoric 
The study of rhetoric has often been limited to the analysis of verbal arguments. 
"Rhetoric and arguments have been associated since antiquity, and in that connection 
arguments have traditionally been thought of as verbal phenomena" (Blair, 2004, p. 41). 
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However, visual rhetoric may be said to function as an argument as well (Birdsell & 
Groarke, 1996; Blair, 2004; Blair, 1996). Surprisingly, visual rhetoric has been relegated 
to a subordinate status in the hierarchy of research. A strong case can be made for the 
study of visual arguments. Blair (1996), for example, argued that images can be 
influential in affecting attitudes and beliefs. Foss (2004) cited "three exigencies" to 
support the study of visual images: "One is the persuasiveness of the visual symbol and 
its impact on contemporary culture. Visual artifacts constitute a major part of the 
rhetorical environment, and to ignore them to focus on verbal discourse means we 
understand only a miniscule portion of the symbols that affect us daily" (p. 303). A 
grammar of visuals in political rhetoric has evolved over time (Jamieson, 1992). Indeed, 
Erickson (2000) argued that politics has made a visual turn. Visual rhetoric is important 
to modern political rhetoric because it relies on television (Kaid, 2005). Because visual 
symbols create social reality, they are an important part of political communication. 
Political Communication 
Political rhetoric communicates particular realities to voters. By doing so, 
political communication helps foster democracy. People communicate shared ideals and 
build consensus in a democracy. Rhetoric is vital, therefore, for transmitting the norms of 
a democratic culture, and for vitalizing political engagement among citizens. For a 
political reality to be accepted, voters must recognize the symbols and myths associated 
with that reality. "The democratic citizen is expected to be well-informed about political 
affairs. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the 
relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the 
likely consequences are" (Berelson, Lazarfeld, & McPhee, 1954, p. 308). Each party 
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constructs a reality around important issues. Each political actor and group attempts to 
incorporate their narrative into the broader societal narrative. 
Political Campaigns 
It is hard for presidential campaigns to appeal to a broad audience. Thus, 
campaigns target specific audiences in order to establish political realities. "One of the 
most important and difficult communication tasks is to reach the right audience with the 
right message" (Johnson, 2001, p. 149). Holbrook (1996) said that campaigns are large-
scale efforts to reach voters, to structure a desired outcome (see Alvarez, 1997; Gelman 
& King, 1993; Holbrook, 1996; Joslyn, 1990; Popkin, 1991). Considerable research helps 
explain why citizens are swayed by political campaigns (Berleson, Lazarfeld & McPhee, 
1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979). 
Most campaigns are designed to persuade voters to accept a particular political 
reality. "Elections depend upon voters.. .a primary function of campaigning is that of 
stirring previous voters, cross-over voters, and non-voters on the Tuesday of an election" 
(Gronbeck, 1978, p. 269). When individuals enter the voting booth, the desired outcome 
is to have them express a given political reality in the form of a vote. By accepting a 
specific reality as the "correct reality," a citizen will vote for the candidates that 
represents that "correct reality." "The assumption that the purpose of election campaigns 
is to win votes principally by altering attitudes lies at the base of much of the research 
about campaign effects" (Nimmo, 1970, p. 165). Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) 
found citizens respond to campaign information. A response is the product of steps 
conducted by a campaign. Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) listed how campaigns 
work: (1), propaganda gets the interest; (2), increased interest increases exposure to 
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information; (3), the attention becomes selective; and (4) support for the candidate. 
Gronbeck (1978) stated that campaigning is not only about getting voters to vote but to 
create "second-level or meta-political images, personae, myths, association" (p. 271). 
Campaigns create an image for a candidate that is designed to inform citizens about 
various aspects of the candidate's values, beliefs, and attitudes. Nimmo (1970) indicated 
that a politician's image is an aggregate of a variety of qualities: "Image consists of the 
qualities, traits, attributes, and views displayed for the voters" (p. 34). A campaign 
communicates an image of the candidate to create a strong perception of credibility. They 
also tear down an opponent's credibility. 
Political campaigns have a limited period. That period is broken up into specific 
campaign stages. Each stage disseminates specific information that may be accepted or 
rejected by the populace. 
Stages of a presidential campaign. Electoral campaigns are conducted in a specific 
time frame. Kessel (1988) stated there are strict time limits on electoral political 
campaigns. Trent and Friedenberg (2004) identified four stages of the presidential 
campaign process: (1) Surfacing, interest is shown and images are beginning to be built; 
(2) primaries, party members select who will be the candidate; (3) nominating 
conventions, parties make official presidential and vice presidential nominations; (4) the 
general election, once nominated candidates resume campaigning (pp. 21-63). The first 
stage Trent and Friedberg (2004) identify is surfacing. "Surfacing begins with the 
candidates' initial efforts to create presidential interest and image themselves in the 
public imagination (Trent, 1978, p. 282). During the surfacing period, the party 
nomination is open to anyone. 
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Trent and Friedenberg (2004) stated there are five functions to the primary's 
stage. The first function is the "source of feedback for candidates" (p. 39), providing "a 
chance for repositioning in terms of stands on issues, themes, images, and over all 
campaign strategies" (p. 39). The second function is that primaries act as a source of 
information for voters. "The information they receive aids in determining or readjusting 
their opinions (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004, p. 43). The second function allows the 
campaign to disseminate political reality to the public. "The third function of the primary 
period is that it involves many citizens in the democratic process" (Trent & Friedenberg, 
2004, p. 44). The actions citizens take define the process, from holding signs on street 
corners to the placement of bumper stickers. It identifies who has accepted the 
campaign's definition of reality and subsequently communicates it to others. The fourth 
function identified by Trent and Friedenberg (2004) is the promises function. It provides 
an outlet for candidates to "make promises about what they will do if elected" (p. 47). 
Promises shore up voters' acceptance of a candidate's political reality. During these 
stages, there are competing definitions of reality as defined by other candidates; the final 
function reveals whose reality is acceptable to the majority of citizens. The final function 
of the primary stage is to identify frontrunners. "The voters have a chance to determine 
the 'real' front-runners or leading contenders for the nomination" (p. 47). As the lead 
candidate is revealed to the voting population, so too is the candidate revealed to the 
incumbent. Subsequently, the incumbent has time to circulate a counter-reality. After the 
front runner selection, the process moves on to the nominating convention. Usually by 
that time the candidate is officially selected, incumbents have manipulated symbols and 
constructed myths to create a specific reality around themselves and their opponents. 
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Televised political advertisements. In almost every election, campaigns run televised 
advertisements. "Many campaigns are waged essentially through advertising, primarily 
over radio and television" (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004, p. 339). The political ad has 
become a ritual for the election process. "A ritual is simply a series of acts that for the 
most part are regularly and faithfully performed time and time again" (Nimmo & Combs, 
1983, p. 49). Televised political advertisements have been a major part of presidential 
elections for five decades. They enable candidates to bring themselves to the attention of 
the people and to define political reality. Political advertisements communicate a 
candidate's perception of political reality while myths ally the candidate with values and 
norms that hold society together. Denton and Woodward (1985) refered to such myths as 
the "us versus them" myth and the "pseudo-myths." "Us versus them" myths "focus on 
social structure or collectivities" (p. 39). The "pseudo myth," according to Denton and 
Woodward (1985), are myths that create the "hero" and "common man" image. These 
two myths are designed to attach the candidate to communal norms and values. By 
identifying the candidate with communal norms and values, citizens believe they can 
predict a candidate's values, attitudes, and actions. Political advertisements in an election 
are designed to broadcast to a mass audience a candidate's values and norms with 
calculated effect. "The rituals of political activity are not spontaneous. They are usually 
planned for particular effect. Press conferences, speeches, bill-signings, proclamations, 
heated exchanges in debates, are rhetorical constructions designed to secure the attention 
and support of an audience" (Denton & Woodward, 1985, p. 151). Political 
advertisements inform the population about a candidate's attitudes, beliefs, and actions. 
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Rhetoric and Uncertainty 
The history of rhetoric is man's attempt to practice uncertainty reduction. The 
early sophists believed certainty or absolute truth was unobtainable by humans. Sophists 
created uncertainty by asserting that "truth" did not exist. Sophists likewise generated 
uncertainty regarding the hierarchy of Greek society. Athenian citizens deferred to the 
wisdom of elders and those considered socially superior. The sophists taught anyone who 
wished to learn the art of public speaking. "Hence the traditional privileges of the 
aristocracy were undermined" (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 22). This created uncertainty 
for the powerful and privileged. Learning the art of rhetoric gave citizens the power to 
persuade. With the ability to persuade the population could question the privileged class' 
right to power. Indeed, uncertainty is situated in much of human history. 
Some argue that uncertainty has been a major part of 20th century history. Fiddle 
(1980) concluded that: 
The twentieth century has been colored by the principle of 
uncertainty, taken both in its original Heisenberg meaning 
of 1927, to refer to a fundamental incommensurable, and in 
its broadest sense, as a general characteristic of the life of a 
modern man since Einstein's miracle year of 1905 and the 
killing of the archduke in 1914. Along with relativity, 
uncertainty is a sort of charismatic concept, exciting those 
who filter conventional concepts and data through its 
perspective (p. 3). 
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There is a link in history between uncertainty and rhetoric. There is a link between 
uncertainty and much of human decision-making. 
Importance of uncertainty 
Uncertainty plays a major role in everyday life (Berlyne, 1962; Festinger, 1954; 
Kagan, 1972; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; Weary & Edwards, 1996). Therefore, it likely 
plays a major role in political decision-making. Research has shown that uncertainty 
about a candidate affects a voter's voting preference (Bartels, 1986, 1988; Potthoff & 
Munger, 2005; Vavreck, 2001). 
Uncertainty conceptualization. Conceptualizing uncertainty aids an understanding of 
its rhetorical implications. Uncertainty is when a person lacks the knowledge to predict a 
person's, attitudes, beliefs, and actions (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Uncertainty is 
influenced by the perception of quality and quantity of information. A receiver may 
perceive that they lack sufficient information to predict a person's attitudes, beliefs, or 
actions. Voting for a candidate often revolves around determining whether a candidate 
matches a voter's attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, will a candidate constitute a good 
representation of a voter's attitudes and beliefs? Uncertainty is found in the perception of 
the voter. Rhetoric manipulates those perceptions. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume 
that rhetoric can manipulate the perception of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is a construct that people generally avoid (Katona, 1975). Therefore, 
uncertainty about a particular person or political candidate can create a negative 
perception. If a voter is uncertain about a candidate and cannot get information to 
alleviate that uncertainty, the voter might avoid supporting a candidate. As Berger and 
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Calabrese (1975) noted in their initial study of uncertainty, people want and need 
confirmable, accurate information to formulate relationships. Gudykunst (2005) stated 
that uncertainty affects the way we think about people. If a person is uncertain about a 
candidate, it is safe to assume that this will affect their vote. 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is a powerful factor in human perceptions and actions. 
"Uncertainty is one of the fundamentals in life" (Knight, 1921, p. 347). That is why it is 
important to study uncertainty. Berger and Calabrese (1975) developed uncertainty 
reduction theory to examine initial interaction and attraction between strangers. 
Numerous disciplines have studied the effects of uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; 
Berlyne, 1962; Burden, 2003; Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Fiddle, 1980; Hoagland & Shepard, 
1980; Katona, 1975; Knight, 1921). Uncertainty research has generated considerable 
attention. "Interest has expanded far beyond these boundary conditions to include 
examination of uncertainty in ongoing personal relationships, organizational settings, 
health care interactions, and interactions among individuals from different socio-cultural 
backgrounds" (Goldsmith, 2001, p. 514). Despite the expanding boundary of uncertainty, 
the basic concepts remain. Bradac (2001) stated that uncertainty refers to an interactant's 
sense of a number of predictions about a person's actions. Berger and Bradac (1982) 
defined uncertainty as the number of alternatives that occur in a situation and the relative 
likelihood of their occurrences. Shannon and Weaver's (1949) information theory also 
held that the possible number of alternatives determines uncertainty. Berlyne (1962) 
noted that knowledge is the only way to ease uncertainty. Fundamentally, uncertainty 
constitutes a lack of knowledge. Perceiving a lack of knowledge could be related to a 
person's specific situation. That lack of knowledge leads to tension, reduced only by the 
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gathering and evaluation of information. Uncertainty has a lot of influence over people 
and their decisions. There are different forms of uncertainty that affect decisions. 
Political uncertainty. "Political decisions have the potential to affect a wide group of 
people and institutions" (Burden, 2003, p. 7). The political decisions made in a 
democracy are very uncertain. "Politics, at least for those invested in it, have even greater 
(negative) consequences, including policy decisions that could lead to such unpleasant 
consequences as an increase in crime.. .economic recession or even depression, or 
heightened racial tensions" (Burden, 2003, p. 13). Research regarding political 
uncertainty focuses on a variety of issues. Dickinson (2003) looked at how the growth of 
the White House Staff curbs uncertainty. "What explains variations in White House staff 
size since 1940? One explanation is rooted in changing contextual circumstances that 
have collectively increased the political uncertainty associated with presidential 
bargaining" (Dickinson, 2003, p. 44). A president's staff is designed to provide 
information to reduce uncertainty. O'Toole and Meier (2003) suggested that 
governmental bureaucracies are designed to deal with uncertainty in the interest of stable, 
equitable, and predictable public action. Vanden Bergh and de Figueiredo, Jr (2003) 
argued, "Uncertainty leads to the insulation of government agencies through structure" 
(p. 67). Information sources are created to alleviate uncertainty in the citizenry. Even as 
government is designed to lessen uncertainty, Geer and Goorha (2003) proposed that 
uncertainty is dynamic. We may be "uncertain" about the political landscape, but 
probably less uncertain than in the past. Like communication, uncertainty is dynamic and 
situational. "Uncertainty... is especially acute in the political realm. This is because 
politics is largely about making decisions, and decisions are seldom certain" (Burden, 
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2003, p. 5). Largely because uncertainty is so powerful it becomes advantageous for 
political campaigns. Generating uncertainty about an opposition candidate could 
potentially influence voters. A candidate who is relatively unknown, for example, 
generates considerable uncertainty among voters. 
Environmental uncertainty. The majority of environmental uncertainty research 
involves how organizations deal with external uncertainty (Spekman & Stern, 1979; 
Thompson, 1967). According to Weary and Edwards (1996), uncertainty research has 
dealt with an organism's relationship with its environment. Environmental uncertainty 
creates many possibilities in politics. Scarcity of resources has a dramatic effect on 
political decision-making. "Politics of scarcity almost always involves a zero-sum gain in 
which one person's group or group's gain requires the equivalent loss" (Zald, 1970, p. 
227). The scarcity of resources creates an uncertain future where decisions made in the 
present must alleviate uncertainty generated in the future. Distribution of resources is a 
focal point in racial politics (Feagin & Feagin, 1994; Hajnal, 2003). 
Societal uncertainty. Considerable research regarding societal uncertainty has dealt 
with intercultural communication. Kagan (1972) stated that the reduction of uncertainty 
was a constant concern, and research has investigated intercultural uncertainty 
(Gudykunst, 1985; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984), showing that uncertainty plays a large 
role in intercultural relations. In a multicultural democratic society, politicians must reach 
a diverse group of stakeholders. Communicating with diverse cultures involves 
misunderstandings. As Hall (1959, 1966) pointed out, we encounter considerable 
difficulty in trying to interact with persons from different cultures. We often fail to 
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recognize that other people employ a different set of communication conventions and 
norms. Gudykunst and Hammer (1988) developed the anxiety/uncertainty management 
(AUM) theory of intercultural adjustment to account for the inherent uncertainty of 
dealing with other cultures. Gudykunst (2005) suggested that the AUM theory can be 
applied in several ways to improve communication between cultures. Alleviating 
uncertainty, they claim, may lead to better communication. 
Economic uncertainty. In a free market society individuals are afforded choices. With 
more choices there come more possibilities, and with more possibilities uncertainty is 
generated. "Uncertainty is determined by the number of alternatives that occur in a given 
situation, and the relative likelihood of their occurrence" (Berger & Bradac, 1982, p. 6). 
In an economy that provides a multitude of alternatives, uncertainty becomes a major 
factor in economic decisions. Milton Friedman (1977) in his Nobel lecture discussed how 
important uncertainty is to the economy, and how it can stall economic activity. This 
becomes important because the economy affects politics, and politics affects the 
economy. "There is an intimate connection between economies and politics that on 
certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible..." (Friedman, 
1967, p. 8). In a market economy economic uncertainty can have an effect on societal 
uncertainty. Consider one of the major planks in the Democratic platform opposing; 
outsourcing of jobs. To affect cost and profit many organizations moved jobs overseas. 
Outsourcing alleviated market uncertainty but it increased job insecurity in the United 
States. 
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Uncertainty and communication. Communication is a common denominator among 
political, environmental, societal, and economic uncertainty. Three theories of 
uncertainty elaborate its communication consequences. Uncertainty Reduction Theory 
(Berger & Calabrese, 1975) holds that there is a human drive to reduce uncertainty about 
our own and others' beliefs and attitudes. "Uncertainty refers to an interactant's 
subjective sense of the number of alternative predictions available when thinking about a 
partner's future behavior..." (Bradac, 2001, p. 458). Berger and Calabrese (1975) 
focused their research on the initial interactions among strangers. 
Another theory of uncertainty is uncertainty management. Brashers (2001) 
described uncertainty management as occurring "when making decisions, planning 
events, and interaction with others, people experience uncertainty" (p. 477). Decisions 
are contingent upon how much information one has regarding a situation. The need to 
alleviate uncertainty becomes the stimulus for communication. To make a decision one 
must gather an appropriate amount of confirming or disconfirming information. 
A third theory of uncertainty is problematic integration theory. Bradac (2001) 
described this theory as encapsulating the standard reasoning such that one would think 
about another: "He is probably dishonest' (because I caught him lying twice). They also 
evaluate the more or less probable possibility: 'A tendency to lie is a negative attribute'" 
(p. 460). People will assess the uncertainty of a person and gather additional information 
to alleviate that uncertainty. In Bradac's description, one evaluates the ethos of an 
individual. 
Uncertainty is a perception that one lacks sufficient information to make a proper 
prediction. Various situations lead to specific perceptions of uncertainty. 
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Critique 
This section critiques uncertainty research as well as the rhetorical uses of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty research has commonalities: (1) its importance to 
communication, (2) how people alleviate uncertainty, and (3) the quantification of 
uncertainty. The last two commonalities create research questions. Insofar as uncertainty 
is an important aspect of human interaction and affects human decision making (Berger 
& Calabrese, 1975; Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Fiddle, 1980; Potthoff & Munger, 2005; 
Sorrentino & Roney, 2000), perhaps it is rhetorically beneficial in situations. Geer and 
Goorha (2003) proposed that much of the research addresses how uncertainty poses a 
stumbling block for good, or efficient, decision making. The majority of uncertainty 
research analyzes how people lower their perception of uncertainty. What if in certain 
situations it would benefit a rhetor to generate uncertainty? If rhetoric can generate 
uncertainty perhaps it constitutes an effective rhetorical strategy. 
Battels (1988) argued uncertainty has three effects: (1) voters do not support a 
candidate if they do not know anything about him; (2) voters prefer known quantities 
over unknown quantities; and (3) levels of information available to the public influence 
the voter's evaluation. If uncertainty is something people avoid it would seem they would 
migrate to that which is certain. Avery and Zemsky (1998) found that uncertainty 
correlates with short-term herd behavior. Pfaffenberger (2000), for example, suggested 
that uncertainty is used as a tactic in the technology market. It seems reasonable that the 
rhetorical use of uncertainty creates a specific response by an audience. If a campaign 
could make an opponent appear unpredictable and their candidate predictable voters 
might align with certainty. 
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Analysis of uncertainty in communication and politics is not new. Research 
investigating political uncertainty examines how voters alleviate uncertainty. Much of 
that scholarship uses quantitative methods. Expanding the scholarship of uncertainty 
would expand our knowledge base. A rhetorical perspective, I argue, is called for. 
In summary, much of U.S. politics is about voter decision-making. Uncertainty 
plays a role in voter decisions. The less a voter perceives they know about a candidate the 
less likely they will vote for that candidate (Vavreck, 2001). Uncertainty is lowered as 
one learns about a candidate's values, beliefs, and actions. If a voter perceives he can 
make a positive prediction of a politician's attitudes, beliefs, and actions he feels greater 
confidence in his voting decision. Therefore, it would benefit a campaign to generate 
uncertainty about an opposing candidate. 
Rationale and Research Questions 
Rhetorical use of Uncertainty 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 imbued Americans with fears, 
emotions, and various symbolic meanings. Terrorists violently established their political 
reality; it became a part of American consciousness and national discourse. Many 
symbols created a rallying cry to fight terrorism, a "Remember the Alamo!" for the 
twenty-first century. For example, images of Osama bin Laden or the ruins of the World 
Trade Center were symbols used quite often. The symbols of "9/11" could also mean an 
uncertain future. "The unprecedented terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 
caused massive casualties and damage and ushered in an era of great uncertainty" 
(Karolyi & Martell, 2005, p. 1). The average American citizen could not conceive of such 
an attack. After the attacks, "9/11" reminded the population of world instability. "Most 
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people saw the 9/11 tragedy as a horrible terrorist attack, and while economists saw it as 
that too, they also saw it as an economic shock" (Liesman, 2005, p. 77). The attacks 
affected politics as well. "The Bush Administration pledged war not only against al 
Qaeda, but also against global terrorism writ large and any state that dare support it" 
(Kitfield, 2005, p. 68). 
The attacks reminded the U.S. of its dependency on a scarce resource-oil. "Today 
America is importing 60 percent of its oil—roughly one-fourth of this coming from the 
Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia providing 14.5 percent and Iraq about 8 percent. We 
were importing only 33 percent of our daily oil needs in 1973 when the Arab embargo 
sent our economy into a tailspin" (Mann, 2001, p. 55). Uncertainty generated by these 
symbols is powerful and persuasive. As stated, political reality is constructed through the 
use of symbols. Symbols were used to generate uncertainty in order to affect decision-
making. Sorrentino and Roney (2000) argued that uncertainty is a major factor in 
decision-making. The uncertainty generated was used to manipulate voter decision 
making in a presidential election. Uncertainty is also found in financial markets and 
affects consumer decisions. 
The effects of uncertainty can be seen in the U.S. financial markets and marketing 
strategies. Avery and Zemsky (1998) found a correlation between uncertainty and a 
short-term behavior referred to as "herd behavior" in financial markets. "Herding 
behavior is often said to occur when many people take the same action" (Graham, 1999, 
p. 237). Herding behavior has been linked to earning forecasts (Trueman, 1994), fads and 
customs (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, & Welch, 1992), and investment recommendations 
(Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Avery and Zemsky (1998) found that with an atmosphere of 
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exaggerated uncertainty market investors tend to herd towards a specific investment due 
to perceived certainty. In the political market that herding behavior could be designed to 
steer the population to a specific candidate. Marketing tactics also use uncertainty to 
create specific results. Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD) is a marketing strategy IBM 
and Microsoft use when faced with competition (Pfaffenberger, 2000). The FUD 
marketing strategy generates fear, uncertainty, and doubt in market segments to keep 
people from purchasing a competitor's product or service. Pfaffenberge's (2000) article, 
"The rhetoric of dread: Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) in information technology 
marketing," explained: 
FUD is a marketing technique that a.. .firm employs to 
blunt a competitor's first-to-market advantage. Typically, a 
FUD campaign employs a variety of techniques, including 
warning to customers concerning the risks of moving to an 
unproven new product, a barrage of press releases designed 
to confuse customers concerning the merits of the new 
product... (p. 79). 
Those forms of uncertainty are found in financial markets. In politics also, people make 
decisions that affect their lives. Uncertainty is likely as powerful in politics as it is in the 
financial markets. Uncertainty, therefore, may be a powerful rhetorical device. 
Perhaps one of the most notorious uses of strategic uncertainty was the 1964 
Lyndon Johnson political attack ad. The ad produced for the Johnson campaign 
"juxtaposed a child plucking the petals from a daisy with the explosion of a bomb as 
Lyndon Johnson extolled the value of loving one another" (Jamieson, 1992, pp. 54-55). 
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As the nuclear bomb exploded, Johnson's voiceover stated: "These are the stakes. To 
make the world in which all of God's children can live. Or go into the darkness. We must 
either love each other. Or we must die." The commercial ends with "Vote for President 
Johnson on November 3. The stakes are too high for you to stay home." (Jamieson, 1992, 
pp. 54-55). During the Cold War people were uncertain whether a war with the Soviet 
Union was likely. The Johnson campaign was able to use societal uncertainty for political 
purposes. 
In the 1972 presidential campaign, President Richard Nixon and Vice President 
Spiro Agnew campaigned against Senators George McGovern and Thomas Eagleton. In 
that campaign, Thomas Eagleton created uncertainty that led to his withdrawal from the 
race. A news conference was held to discuss Eagleton's mental health issues (Eagleton 
had sought treatment for nervous exhaustion.) Senator Eagleton's mental health issues 
had created uncertainty amongst the population. After the revelation, news sources called 
for Eagleton's withdrawal from the campaign. The Eagleton Affair evolved to the point 
where the Democratic national chairperson wanted Eagleton to withdraw. The people of 
the U.S. and the Democratic Party had become uncertain about the mental health of 
Senator Eagleton. They could no longer "predict" his beliefs, attitudes, and actions. A 
decision was made to ease the uncertainty in the public's mind. Eagleton withdrew from 
the race. The uncertainty about Eagleton's mental health adversely affected Senator 
McGovern. "Portrayed first as stoutly supportive of Eagleton, the hero of New Politics, 
McGovern was soon labeled indecisive, wishy-washy" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 53). 
The Eagleton Affair was a case of societal uncertainty evolving into political uncertainty. 
Initially, people were uncertain about Eagleton's mental health. The uncertainty about 
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mental health created uncertainty about his ability to represent the people. Societal 
uncertainty caused Eagleton to withdraw, which in turn developed uncertainty regarding 
McGovern. The Nixon campaign did not intentionally generate uncertainty regarding 
Eagleton, but it did benefit from it. 
In the 1988 presidential election, vice President George Bush's campaign used 
strategic uncertainty. The Bush campaign was able to link Dukakis's stance on crime to a 
rape and murder. Uncertainty about and the fear of crime affects voter decisions 
(Jamieson, 1992). Candidates announce they are tough on crime to alleviate the 
uncertainty of crime. In one political advertisement the Bush campaign raised doubts 
about Dukakis being tough on crime. "The ad tied Michael Dukakis to a convicted 
murderer who had jumped furlough and gone on to rape a Maryland woman" (Jamieson, 
1992, p. 17). The fear of crime was used to generate uncertainty about Governor 
Dukakis's attitudes and actions about handling crime. 
Strategic uncertainty has played a role in modern presidential elections. That role 
is no more apparent than in the 2004 Presidential election. The months preceding the 
2004 election was a period of "dynamic uncertainty" (Geer & Goorha, 2003). Corporate 
scandals, the economic recession, and job loss were on the minds of the U.S. population 
(Newport, Saad, & Carroll, 2004). The war on terrorism, the war in Iraq, and the plethora 
of terrorist alerts created an atmosphere of uncertainty. No one knew what would happen 
next. No one possessed the information necessary to make an educated prediction. 
Because of those events, the Bush campaign was able to label the Democratic opponent, 
Senator John Kerry, as unpredictable. The Bush campaign generated enough uncertainty 
to make the citizens of the United States uncertain about Kerry. "Cheryl Utley, 43, of 
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Lowell, Mich., seems to be exactly the kind of voter Kerry is targeting this week. 'I have 
more of a sense of where he stands on things than Kerry,' she said" (Morin & Deane, 
2004, p. A01). People believed they knew what Bush stood, for even if they did not agree 
with it. "In supposed contrast to Kerry, Bush presents himself as the immutable 
politician, a man of fixed, firm beliefs who sticks to them not because they are popular 
but because they are right" (Cohen, 2004, p. A19). Strategic uncertainty about Senator 
Kerry had influenced voter decisions to vote for Bush. 
Uncertainty plays a role in voters' decisions. Low uncertainty about a candidate 
may influence a voter's favorable disposition. Uncertainty regarding a candidate affects 
voter choices (Vavreck, 2001); usually uncertainty about a candidate negatively affects 
voter decisions (Potthoff & Munger, 2005). Therefore, one would avoid voting for that 
individual. Because of uncertainty's importance to politics, it generates a research 
question in light of the most recent presidential election: 
RQ1: What rhetorical functions does strategic uncertainty serve in a presidential election? 
Situation 
A cliche about presidential campaigning suggests that the next campaign begins 
the day after one's inauguration. The 2004 election did not stray from this observation. 
"Within minutes after the inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001, the passion for taking 
his job as a result of running and winning the 2004 election beat wildly in the hearts of 
many Democrats" (Trent, 2005, p. 4). The Bush campaign strategy was established 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. "The Bush presidency changed, of 
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course, on September 11, 2001, in ways that defined the incumbent's campaign for 
reelection" (Smith, 2005, p. 136). The terrorist attacks' effects permeated every aspect of 
American society. The U.S. embarked on an invasion of Afghanistan, a worldwide war 
on terror, and eventually attacked Iraq. The American free market was jumpy and 
uncertain long after "9/11." "The U.S. economy has been hit hard in the past few years by 
a number of unexpected developments, including the tragic attacks of September 11, 
2001, the corporate governance and accounting scandals of 2002" (United States 
Congress, 2004, p. 37). The citizens of the United States were told to resume everyday 
life. However, normal life was difficult to resume given terror alerts and the build up to 
war. "War causes uncertainty" (Liesman, 2005, p. 77). Moreover, the corporate scandals 
"contributed to a climate of uncertainty" (United States Congress, 2004, p. 37). 
Strategic uncertainty does not always work because uncertainty is dynamic (Geer 
and Goorha, 2003). George H. W. Bush was a known "commodity" during the 1992 
election. Bill Clinton, as challenger, ran on a platform of change. Apparently, Bill Clinton 
and change did not seem to constitute a risk to the voting population. Strategic 
uncertainty could work best when there is a climate of uncertainty. A climate of 
uncertainty can make people risk averse. Edelman (1988) theorized that people in a 
crisis-ridden world seek reassurance. An incumbent leader can be perceived as giving 
such reassurances. When a population becomes risk averse they can more easily be led to 
a desired outcome (Avery and Zemsky, 1998). Avery and Zemsky (1998) noted that the 
perception of multiple forms of uncertainty creates an atmosphere for short-term "herding 
behavior." The 2004 election had a multitude of phenomena that generated uncertainty in 
the population. 
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The War on Terrorism 
The war on terror began in 2001. War rhetoric defines enemies, what Ivie (1980) 
referred to as the us vs. them. War rhetoric first appeared in Bush's 2002 State of the 
Union address. Bush's address identified the "Axis of Evil" as Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea. The "Axis of Evil" harkens to both World War II and the cold war. Axis reminds 
the populace of the Axis Powers of World War II. The Evil in the Axis of Evil evokes 
memories of the Cold War and President Reagan's reference to the Soviet Union as the 
Evil Empire. After "9/11," and given the State of the Union address definition of the 
enemy, President Bush declared war on terrorism. Bush's rhetoric quickly transformed 
the attacks into a war on evil in a way that asserted his personal mastery of the situation, 
exclusivity of sources of information, embodiment of expertise, and his "compact with 
the people" (Smith, 2005, p. 136). President Bush's "expert information," "expertise," 
and "compact with the people" projected an ethos of certainty. During war, certainty 
impacts election outcomes. The war on terrorism became the major issue for the 2004 
election cycle. "Bush has made his post-9/11 leadership in the war on terror a center 
piece of his reelection bid" (Kitfield, 2005, p. 65). 
The war on terrorism transcends boundaries of uncertainty because it is mercurial. 
It lies within political uncertainty because it affects the politics of America. The war on 
terrorism affects economics because it bolsters the economy. "The heightened focus on 
security at home, together with the determined efforts against terrorism around the world, 
have required some types of government spending" (United States Congress, 2004, p. 
37). Spending went into the military and security industries. War may increase 
productivity in certain sectors of the economy but in others it generates uncertainty. "War 
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creates uncertainty - a condition dreaded by businesses" (Liesman, 2005, p. 77). The war 
on terrorism affects social uncertainty, as people are not sure if there will be another 
attack, or when and where it will take place. Because of such uncertainty consumer 
confidence fell sharply in early 2003 (United States Congress, 2003). The war on 
terrorism in part affects environmental uncertainty, which in turn affects the economy. 
"One source of this uncertainty was the potential effect of the conflict on the capacity for 
producing and transporting in the Persian Gulf, and thus the future supply and price of 
oil" (United States Congress, 2004, p. 37). 
Ironically, despite being rife with uncertainty, the term "war" can lower 
perceptions of uncertainty. The "war on terrorism," for example, creates a perception of 
certainty. In a war there is a perception of good guys and bad guys (Ivie, 1980), there are 
nations with clear borders fighting, and more importantly there is an end. Having an end 
to a war lowers probabilities and possible outcomes. War rhetoric is about certainty, 
about instigating action. Ivie (1980) argued that in American history the justifications for 
war are boiled down to an argument of force vs. freedom, irrationality vs. rationality, and 
aggression vs. defense. "The usual strategy is to construct the image indirectly through 
contrasting references to the adversary's coercive, irrational, and aggressive attempt to 
subjugate a freedom loving, rational, and pacific nation" (Ivie, 1980, p. 284). There is a 
clear duality in the war, light against dark. President Bush's rhetoric was no different than 
previous presidents. War rhetoric appeared in his campaign rhetoric, too. "President 
Bush's focus on 'evil doers' created an enthymeme of evil in which Americans opposed 
those who pursued acts defined by the president as evil" (Smith, 2005, p. 13). Rhetorical 
focus on the war on terrorism worked well with campaign rhetoric. Smith (2005) 
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identified strategies incumbent presidents use in an election: "The second approach is to 
argue that despite the incumbent's efforts the nation faces terrible problems that can not 
be entrusted to others. This approach requires the careful use of alarmist rhetoric to 
heighten voters' sense of imminent danger and to underscore their need for their 
incumbent president in such troubled times" (p. 133). This strategy worked well since a 
majority of likely voters perceived President Bush as a decisive leader (Kenski & Kenski, 
2005; Newport et al., 2004). Bush could use another strategy identified by Smith (2005). 
Incumbents can "polarize the nation around an issue in which the incumbent president 
has obvious support" (2005, p. 134). Bush asserted that he was the only candidate able to 
handle national issues (Smith, 2005). Bush rhetorically cast himself as steadfast in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty. The rhetoric of war creates a perception of certainty regarding 
leadership. However, the war on terror did not conform to the old concepts of war 
between nation states. The name, war on terror, reveals the ambiguities that lie within 
war. Terror is a tool used by people. Governments in the past attempted to manage terror, 
not wage war upon it. 
In an attempt to manage terror, the government created the Terror Alert System. 
The terror alert system informs the population if a terrorist attack is imminent and what to 
expect from the government. This is very important because the population requires 
adequate information to alleviate uncertainty. By contrast, they cannot anticipate the 
actions of terrorists. Eventually a multi-colored, multi-leveled terror alert system was 
designed. Each color and each level denotes a threat level and specific information 
regarding government responses. 
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Green, or low condition, signifies the lowest risk of 
terrorist attack. Blue, or guarded condition, signifies a 
general risk of terrorist attack. Yellow, or elevated 
condition, indicates a significant risk of terrorist attack. 
Orange, or high condition, indicates a high risk of terrorist 
attack. Red, or severe condition, indicates the highest state 
of alert. (NewsMax.com, 2002, n.p.). 
At specific levels of alert, U.S. citizens are provided with information. Terror 
alerts alleviate minor uncertainty. Reminders of the threat levels provides an alleviation 
of some uncertainty. Sorrentino and Roney (2000) suggested that ritual and routine help 
lessen uncertainty (p. vii). The ritual and routine of terror alerts help people to cope with 
the uncertainty of a terrorist attack. However, the alerts do not communicate what 
terrorists will do. Instead, alerts can create more uncertainty by failing to inform 
regarding the who, what, where, when, and how of terrorism. Designed to manage the 
uncertainty of terror attacks, the terror alert system does not sufficiently answer questions 
so as to lower uncertainty. 
Terror alerts affect political certainty. The ritual and routine of the alerts create a 
perception of government protection. The ethos of the government helps foster a 
perception of protection. That, in part, played to the perception of President Bush as 
steadfast and caretaker. Fear makes people look to their leader, especially during 
wartime. 
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War in Iraq 
Soon after the 2001 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan. In 2002, talk 
of invading Iraq began to circulate in the national discourse. "By August of 2002 the 
President's job approval ratings and popularity were still sky-high, and the debate over 
whether or not to invade Iraq was in full swing" (Cameron, 2005, p. 60). There was a fear 
of terrorism financed and armed by Saddam Hussein. "On September 2002 Bush cited a 
report by the international Atomic Energy Agency that, he said, proved that the Iraqis 
were on the brink of developing nuclear weapons" (Rampton & Stauber, 2003, p. 86). 
Saddam's army of unmanned aircraft would deliver the attack. Bush communicated 
messages designed for specific segments of the American population. Rhetoric was 
designed to appeal to people who experienced the Cold War. The Cold War created an 
atmosphere of uncertainty over whether or not there would be a nuclear war. 
The Bush Administration referred to the Cold War when Condoleeza Rice stated, 
on CNN, that the Bush administration did not "want the smoking gun to be in the form of 
a mushroom cloud" (CNN, 2002, September 8). The fear of a mushroom cloud called up 
memories of the Cold War. No one was certain if terrorists had access to weapons of 
mass destruction. "Of all the Bush administration's arguments in support of war with 
Iraq, the strongest was its claim that Iraq possessed or might acquire weapons of mass 
destruction" (Rampton & Stauber, 2003, p. 80). Due to fears of Saddam Hussein and/or 
terrorists possessing weapons of mass destruction, President Bush sought and gained 
special authority. The Congress gave President Bush authorization to use the U.S. 
military. Assured that American troops would be greeted as liberators, war was declared 
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on Iraq March 19, 2003. It did not take long for Baghdad and all of Iraq to fall to 
coalition forces. 
On May 1, 2003, President Bush landed a Navy jet on the aircraft carrier the USS 
Abraham Lincoln. He delivered a speech in front of a banner that announced "Mission 
Accomplished." Shortly thereafter, the situation in Iraq began to unravel. "This is the 
mess we find ourselves in 6 months after the president pranced about in a flight suit on 
the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. American-led coalition forces sustained 122 
combat deaths before May 1 - the day Bush declared major combat operations over - but 
over 3000 deaths since then" (Tucker, 2003, p. A13). The perception of the U.S. and 
coalition forces was not one of liberators. "A leaked CIA report contended] that the 
majority of the Iraqis now view U.S. soldiers as occupiers rather than liberators" (Tucker, 
2003, p. A13). Outside forces augmented the Iraqi insurgency. Jihadists from Muslim 
countries flowed into the Iraqi war zone. "Rumsfeld also said money and people 
channeled from Iran were fuelling the insurgency in Iraq" (Coorey, 2004, p. 23). The 
Iraqi insurgency was no longer made up of Iraqi citizens; it became an international 
insurgency. The U.S. government and citizenry could no longer properly predict who was 
responsible for the mayhem in Iraq. 
The war in Iraq had a dramatic effect on the economy. "Uncertainty increased 
during the period leading up to the war in Iraq" (United States Congress, 2004. p. 37). 
The future prospects of oil production and transportation became uncertain (United States 
Congress, 2004, p. 37). Consumers reacted to uncertainty, which affected the consumer 
confidence. "Consumer confidence fell sharply in early 2003, raising concerns that the 
consumer demand that has supported thee economy over the previous could of years 
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might falter" (United States Congress, 2004, p. 37). Uncertainty generated by the war 
affected oil futures, consumer confidence, and the job market. 
Americans and business feared Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction.. .that it would use to retaliate against America 
for invading the country. The fear of another terrorist attack 
in the United States affected citizens. Faced with all these 
uncertainties, many businesses decided to determine the 
impact of the shock before hiring workers, building 
factories, or starting new business ventures. Without these 
types of economic decisions, the economy simply does not 
grow, or grows slowly (Liesman, 2005, p. 77). 
The war in Iraq had not only affected economic uncertainty but social uncertainty as well. 
The United States Institute of Peace (2003) generated a report on global terrorism 
after the Iraq war. It reported that "The U.S.-led coalition's defeat of Saddam Hussein rid 
the Middle East of a brutal regime and eliminated a potential source of state-sponsored 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but continuing instability in Iraq may make 
the country a breeding ground for anti-U.S. terrorism" (p.l). The fact that the war in Iraq 
was not stabilizing fed an atmosphere of uncertainty. The fear of a terrorist attack added 
to the sense of uncertainty. Uncertainty is a weapon in the hands of terrorists because it is 
that uncertainty of who, what, where, when, and how that breeds much of the fear. Daniel 
Benjamin (2003) in the report went on to state, "The greatest windfall for Bin Laden's 
forces comes in the realm of propaganda, not a small issue for a movement that views 
establishing itself as the undisputed champion of Islam as a primary goal. By occupying 
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Iraq, the United States has given al Qaeda a major opportunity to drive home its argument 
that the 'leader of world infidelity' seeks to destroy Islam and subjugate its believers" (p. 
4). 
President Bush was able to project himself as the antidote to the climate of 
uncertainty. "According to Bush, under his leadership the nation was safer from the 
external threats posed by terrorists and safer from the internal threats to the economy and 
the social order posed by Democrats" (Stuckey, 2005, p. 156). 
The Spread of Global Uncertainty 
By February 2004 it became clear that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father of the 
Pakistan nuclear bomb" was involved with a nuclear black market. He admitted to 
transferring "sensitive nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea" (Albright & 
Hinderstein, 2004). Nuclear secrets were sold to countries with a history of anti-
Americanism. Those anti-American countries were getting nuclear secrets from a 
supposed "ally" of the United States in the war on terror. With Pakistan as an ally, it 
further complicated international matters. "Nearly a year after Dr. Khan's arrest, secrets 
of his nuclear black market continue to uncoil, revealing a vast global enterprise. But the 
inquiry has been hampered by discord between the Bush administration and the nuclear 
watchdog, and by Washington's concern that if it pushes too hard for access to Dr. Khan, 
a national hero in Pakistan, it could destabilize an ally" (Broad & Sanger, 2004, n.p.). 
The pursuit of Dr. Kahn would create even more uncertainty. Despite trying to fight a 
war on terrorism to stabilize the world it appeared that the world was becoming 
increasingly unstable. World instability added to atmosphere of the 2004 Presidential 
election. 
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The United States Economy 
According to Trent (2005), in 2004 "the country was trying to recover from the 
surprise and devastation of 9/11, and the issues on peoples' minds were global issues -
Iraq, al Qaeda, homeland security, the doctrine of preemptive war, questions about WMD 
and the future of America's allies" (p. 23). Though national security was a major issue in 
the 2004 election, the economy was an important issue too. Newport et al. (2004) 
reported that Gallup found the economy was a very important issue in battleground states. 
After the events of September 11, 2001 and corporate scandals, the American economy 
went through an adjustment. "The U.S. economy made notable progress in 2003. The 
recovery was still tenuous, as continued fallout from powerful contractionary forces- the 
capital overhang, corporate scandals, and uncertainty about the future economic and 
geopolitical conditions.. .still weighed against the stimulus from expansionary monetary 
policy and the Administration's 2001 tax cut and 2002 fiscal package" (United States 
Congress, 2004, p. 88). The economy was adjusting to the ever-expanding scope of 
globalization. Trent (2005) stated that not only was the American populace thinking 
globally but considered "as well as economic issues- the jobless recovery, federal budget 
deficits, tax policy and the loss of employment to overseas competitors" (p. 23). There 
was a sense of uncertainty about national and economic security. 
Prior to the 2004 election season corporate scandals, like Enron and WorldCom, 
affected the market negatively. Liesman (2005) argued that scandal can cause significant 
damage to the American economy as Americans become reluctant to invest in the stock 
market. The government attempted to alleviate investor uncertainty by making CEOs sign 
forms attesting to the reliability of their reports. September 11, 2001, however, affected 
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society and the economy like nothing else before. "Most people saw the 9/11 tragedy as a 
horrible terrorist attack, and while economists saw it as that too, they also saw it as an 
economic shock" (Liesman, 2005, p. 77). Another area of importance to the 2004 election 
was job loss due to outsourcing. 
Globalization is an umbrella term for economic interaction between nation states. 
Though globalization was not a main issue in the 2004 election, some of the effects of 
globalization were outsourcing and joblessness. "Outsourcing is when a company 
relocates a whole process, a piece of a process, a function, or a discrete piece of work 
outside of its own corporate boundaries" (ManufacturingNews.com, 2004). 
The loss of jobs to cheaper markets has been an ongoing issue for the American 
public. In 2004 it was a plank on both President Bush's and Senator Kerry's party 
platform. President Bush needed to run on a record of job creation while Kerry needed to 
run on the jobless economic recovery. "Central to the 2004 presidential campaign will be 
the issue of job creation - or lack thereof over the last four years" (Liesman, 2005, p. 74). 
The outsourcing of jobs had created an atmosphere of economic uncertainty with "2 
million jobs... lost" (Liesman, 2005, p. 74). While job loss was an issue in the economy 
so too was the economics of scarcity. 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Resource scarcity generates uncertainty (Boyd & Caporale, 1998). Its scarcity 
drives up prices, which affects consumers, which affects politics. Scarcity of resources, 
like oil, tends to create material inequalities and intensify internal and international 
conflict (Gurr, 1985). Under the guise of energy independence, uncertainty about oil 
futures became an issue in the 2004 election. Though both candidates espoused a need for 
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energy independence (VandeHei, 2004, p. A01) they approached that need in different 
ways. Kerry attacked the Bush administration saying Bush's plan would benefit the 
wealthy. He also promised America that they would be independent of foreign oil in ten 
years, but did not provide a plan. The Bush-Cheney campaign launched a counter-
offensive with a commercial that suggested Kerry voted to increase the gas tax by fifty 
cents. After the counter attack Kerry began to backpedal on his statements (Collier, 2004, 
p. Al). Kerry's backpedaling added to uncertainty. Despite attacking the Bush 
administration Kerry did not provide a plan for energy independence. Consequently, 
people could not predict Kerry's actions as a president dealing with oil scarcity. Kerry's 
backpedaling created uncertainty about his values and beliefs. He did not hold strong on 
his values or beliefs in the perception of the voters. 
Social Uncertainty 
One of the major social issues in the 2004 election was same sex marriage. The 
Bush-Cheney campaign used the same sex marriage issue as a cultural weapon to divide 
people (Kennedy, 2004, p. B5). By making same sex marriage an issue the Bush-Cheney 
campaign made each candidate take a stand. The issue worked well in establishing 
certainty with respect to Bush and Cheney, and uncertainty regarding Kerry. Bush 
proclaimed a need for an amendment to the Constitution to ban same sex marriage. 
President Bush took a clear stand on the subject, thus appealing to his conservative base 
and two thirds of the population (Roth & Reinert, 2004, p. 1). As the opponent, Kerry 
was thrust into an awkward rhetorical dilemma. With a portion of his base either pro-
same sex marriage (or at least tolerant of it) he had to appeal to that audience while 
simultaneously appealing to those two thirds of the population who did not. That division 
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in the Kerry audience created a problem for the Senator. Kerry had to strike a balance 
between his base and the larger population. 
This created a situation where Kerry had to nuance the subject without 
suppressing his base vote or alienating the larger vote. "Kerry's stance on gay marriage is 
not a secret; he has said he opposes it, but also opposes a constitutional ban" (Milligan, 
2004, p. Al). With the atmosphere of uncertainty and Kerry's perceived "flip-flops" his 
nuanced approach created uncertainty. "Independent pollster John Zogby point[ed] to a 
recent focus group in St. Paul, Minn., in which two black men mentioned gay marriage 
over and over as their reason for hesitating to support Kerry. It's not even that they 
believed Kerry supports gay marriage, which he does not. Kerry's problem, said Mr. 
Zogby, is that he's from Massachusetts, famous for having legalized gay marriage last 
year, and that his opposition to gay marriage is less than absolute" (Feldmann, 2004, 
October, p. 02). By contrast, President Bush's stance became clearer and more certain. 
"At every opportunity, Bush restate[d] his opposition to gay marriage, a position strongly 
supported in the polls" (Feldmann, 2004, October, p. 02). With voters questioning 
Kerry's position, uncertainty developed. Voters opposing same sex marriage could not 
predict Kerry's values and his actions. On the other side, Bush was clear with respect to 
his beliefs. 
Social issues like abortion and gun rights were factors in the 2004 election. "They 
are the hot-button topics that many Americans avoid in polite company - stem-cell 
research, gay marriage, abortion, and gun rights. And they are lurking on the edge of the 
2004 presidential campaign, their small but vocal constituencies poised to make the 
difference in a down-to-the-wire election" (Feldmann, 2004, October, p. 02). However, 
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these were issues in prior elections. Those issues tend to fall in line with party consensus, 
which becomes a certainty. A Republican candidate affirms belief in pro-life, pro-gun, 
anti-stem cell research issues. A Democratic candidate affirms belief in pro-choice, pro-
gun control, and pro-stem cell research. These issues become less of a questionable factor 
because of the public's perception of certainty. 
Political Uncertainty 
The 2004 election was not just a referendum on President Bush, which re-
elections often are. It was also about the Democratic Party rebuilding its ethos. The 
Democratic Party had to create a perception there was certainty in a Democratic 
president. In order to bolster party ethos Senator John Kerry was selected as their 
presidential candidate. The defining issue, as defined by the Bush administration and 
Bush-Cheney campaign, was war — terrorism, and Iraq, and to a lesser degree 
Afghanistan. By selecting a "war hero" as its nominee, Democrats believed they had a 
viable candidate (Holloway, 2005, p. 49). As pointed out by speeches during the national 
party convention, Senator Kerry chose to serve in Vietnam. His service positioned him 
as a perfect candidate "to unseat a war president." Since "9/11," the Republican Party 
and Bush administration had been creating the perception of President Bush as a war 
president. This was important to the campaign because a President's ethos is tied to the 
nation's welfare. 
The Bush administration, with the help of the Republican-controlled congress was 
able to create the perception that President Bush had more power than he actually 
wielded. A climate of uncertainty permeated the United States. Political reality seemed 
uncertain. Except for President Bush, people felt like they knew where he stood on the 
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issues (McKinnon, 2006). Early on in the war on terrorism, President Bush made his 
worldview apparent when he uttered, "You are either with us or against us." Suggesting 
there were but two worldviews reduced alternate realities. A single worldview was 
formed. That worldview meshed well with war rhetoric's use of us vs. them, good vs. 
bad. Suggesting that the war on terror was more complex would raise probabilities, and 
raising probabilities raises uncertainty. 
A sense of certainty in an uncertain world became a major factor in the 2004 
presidential election. The Bush-Cheney Campaign had a plan to use uncertainty to 
corrupt the ethos of the Democratic nominee, Senator John Kerry. Matthew Dowd (2006) 
chief campaign strategist for the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign, in the book Electing the 
President 2004: The insider's view, stated "We wanted to put John Kerry in the position 
where if he said something about us, people would question it. People would say 'Wait a 
second, I don't know if I can believe that, I don't know if that's true. This is a guy who 
has a tendency to flip-flop'" (p. 25). Importantly, is that the strategy was not to make 
people say, "I don't believe a word he says." Instead, it was to make them "uncertain" 
about whether or not they could believe Senator Kerry. 
The 2004 Presidential Election 
By March 2003, the 2004 Presidential election surfacing stage was fully formed. 
Ten people sought the Democratic nomination: (1) Senator Carol Mosely Braun, (2) 
General Wesley Clark, (3) Vermont Governor Howard Dean, (4) Senator John Edwards 
of North Carolina, (5) Dick Gephardt of Missouri, (6) Senator Bob Graham of Florida, 
(7) Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, (8) Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, 
(9) Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, and (10) Reverend Al Sharpton of New York. 
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Trent and Friedenberg (2004) identified four stages of the political campaign 
process: (1) Surfacing, interest is shown and images are established; (2) primaries - party 
members select who will be the candidate; (3) nominating conventions - parties make 
official presidential and vice presidential nominations; (4) the general election -
candidates resume campaigning (pp. 21-63). 
An incumbent president does not participate in the first two stages, surfacing and 
primaries. However, during that time an incumbent president defines his campaign. Smith 
(2005) argued that the incumbent has two choices: should voters support the incumbent 
because conditions are good, or because conditions are bad? (p. 133). One of those 
suggests, "The nation is doing so well that we cannot afford to change leaders" (Smith, 
2005, p. 133). The other "is to argue that despite the incumbent's efforts, the nation faces 
terrible problems that cannot be entrusted to others. This approach requires the careful 
use of alarmist rhetoric to heighten voters' sense of imminent danger and to underscore 
their need for their incumbent president in such troubled times" (Smith, 2005, p. 133). 
Clearly, because of the war on terror uncertainties were more prevalent, making it easier 
for President Bush to argue, "the nation faces terrible problems that cannot be entrusted 
to others" (Smith, 2005). The Bush campaign strategy was set early on. "The Bush 
presidency changed, of course, on September 11, 2001, in ways that defined the 
incumbent's campaign for reelection" (Smith, 2005, pp. 135 - 136). While the incumbent 
worked on his strategy, there was the race for the Democratic nomination. 
Surfacing. An incumbent president, of course, does not need participate in name 
recognition rhetoric. "During the surfacing stage the president has little need to establish 
name recognition.. .whereas the challengers must start from scratch" (Smith, 2005, p. 
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132). Trent (2005) identified the first stage, surfacing, as the "rhetorical transactions of 
surfacing - organizing in early primary states, building their campaign staff, and fund 
raising (Trent, 2005, p. 11). Examining the surfacing stage for the challengers allows an 
understanding of the political climate. 
Not long after the election of George W. Bush the campaign for the next election 
began. Due to the attacks on "9/11" politicians rallied around the president. Around 
February or March of 2002, contenders began to resurface: "Thus after a five-to-six-
month hiatus the 2004 surfacing stage was once again in full swing" (Trent, 2005, p.7). 
Each contender for the Democratic nomination created an exploratory committee. 
Surfacing relies on a candidate's rhetorical skills to build support. Candidates' messages 
are communicated, responded to, and refined. Smith (2005) stated that the surfacing stage 
along with the primary stage "attracts and alienates supporters and refines arguments, 
themes, and personalities" (p. 135). Surfacing not only attracts, alienates, and refines, but 
winnows candidates. First, to drop out was Senator Graham: "Long before any votes 
would be cast the senator apparently decided that the presidential waters needed no more 
testing and officially dropped out of the race" (Trent, 2005, p. 10). The other contender to 
leave the race was Senator Braun. Senator Braun entered with the announcement of the 
formation of an exploratory team in February 2003 and dropped out of the race January 
2044. Because of the emergence of Senator Kerry as the front runner this dissertation will 
focus on the primary stage. 
Primaries. Primaries are designed to reduce uncertainty regarding contenders. On 
January 19, 2004, the Iowa Caucus began. The caucus signaled the end of surfacing and 
the beginning of the primaries. Only voter-designated nominees head to convention. 
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Primaries set the agenda for the party in the nominating convention stage. "Primaries 
define issues, identify groups, and test the fabric of the individual candidates" (Denton & 
Woodward, 1985, p. 77). Officially, the primaries run from January until June. Usually 
by then, a nominee has been determined. Going into the 2004 primaries Vermont 
Governor Howard Dean led the Democratic hopefuls. The Dean campaign had raised 
$14.8 million in campaign funds. Along with a large war chest, the Dean campaign 
received considerable media attention. While Lieberman and Kerry were using centrist 
rhetoric, Dean appealed to the liberal base of the Democratic Party. "Vermont governor 
Howard Dean and advisor Joe Trippi took a different tack. Their strategy was to energize 
and activate the politically alienated and disaffected to take the Democratic Party back 
toward its liberal base" (Smith, 2005, p. 138). The Dean campaign also "energized" the 
base. Using the internet the Dean Campaign was able to work from the ground up. "Soon 
we had people volunteering to work on the ground in their own communities, and by 
spring, a campaign that had no national structure had volunteers stepping up in all fifty 
states - more of them attracted not by television, the old flaccid warhorse of political 
campaigns - but via the sleep hungry Internet" (Trippi, 2004, p. 88). Early on, Dean's 
campaign faltered and lost momentum. Senator Kerry won the majority of the primaries. 
The Bush- Cheney campaign identified Kerry as the frontrunner and began to generate 
uncertainty about him. 
The flip-flop. Elder and Cobb (1983) gave three reasons why a symbol is created. 
First, there is a human need for psychic economy; second, the need for efficient 
communication; and finally, to distinguish candidates and establish social identities (pp. 
31-32). Flip-flop became a symbol of uncertainty about Kerry. Elder and Cobb (1983) 
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suggested the first factor of a symbol is psychic economy. Humans need to summarize, 
capsulize, and index knowledge and experiences. The term flip-flopper, describing one 
who flip-flops, summarized Kerry's stand on the issues and encapsulated his twenty years 
in the Senate. It indexed "knowledge" and "experiences" about Kerry. The flip-flop label 
worked well in a presidential race between an incumbent and the challenger. As the 
challenger, Kerry was an unknown. "Some Democratic strategists worr[ied] that Mr. 
Kerry is still an unfamiliar figure to many voters, and that the early attacks show[ed] just 
how vulnerable he is to being defined by the Republicans as indecisive or politically 
expedient" (Halbfinger, 2004, p. 1). To get a head-start the Bush administration needed to 
define Senator Kerry. By rhetorically defining him with the flip-flop symbol, the Bush-
Cheney campaign created an accessible perception of the unfamiliar Kerry. "New 
symbols are therefore likely to be created when people find themselves in novel 
situations or confronted with unfamiliar circumstance" (Elder & Cobb, 1983, p. 31). 
Kerry was an unknown quantity in an uncertain situation. By labeling Kerry a "flip-
flopper" the Bush-Cheney campaign were able to affect the perception of voters. People 
knew he changed his opinion often. The label also attaches uncertainty to Kerry. "Bush 
mocked Kerry - and at the same time tried to paint the Democrat as an uncertain leader 
who's wrong for the post-9/11 era" (Blomquist, 2004, p. 8). Flip-flopper characterizes 
Kerry's traits as an uncertain individual who changes his values at will and who may not 
have the publics' best intentions. The symbol flip-flop became shorthand a means by 
which people evaluated Kerry's character. 
The second impetus for symbol creation as identified by Elder and Cobb (1983) is 
efficient communication. Flip-flop provided a common reference point for voters. Flip-
flopper summarized and condensed Kerry's twenty years of service in the Senate, and 
was able to summarize strategic uncertainty into one symbol. Republicans had only to 
call him a flip-flopper. Rhetorical arguments were unnecessary. The flip-flop symbol was 
adopted by the media and used to summarize Kerry's experiences. 
Elder and Cobb (1983) stated that a symbol is created to distinguish between 
people by establishing or affirming social identities. Flip-flop indicated differences 
between President Bush and Senator Kerry. The term flip-flop helped foster social 
identities with Bush supporters. "As Kerry made his case to voters that he is better suited 
than George W. Bush to lead the nation, he was bedeviled by accusations that he lacks a 
clear vision, that he drowns his positions in nuance, and that he frequently contradicts 
himself. On the campaign trail, protesters chide[d] him by applauding with flip-flop 
sandals" (Boston Globe, 2004, p. Al). In the Republican convention people sang chants 
of flip-flop when someone mentioned Kerry's name. The use of the sandals or the term 
flip-flop signaled to the outside world one's support for President Bush. 
The concept of "flip-flop" as a rhetorical symbol had weight in the 2004 
primaries. Therefore, it is important to identify its use throughout the election. 
January to March, 2004 
After Howard Dean lost his lead, it had become apparent to the Bush-Cheney 
campaign that Kerry was going to win the primaries. "Sen. John Kerry won only a 
fraction of the 2,162 delegates he need[ed] to take the Democratic presidential 
nomination, but Republicans had placed him in their sights as the party's most likely 
opponent in November" (Feldmann. January, 30, p. 01). Entering the election as a 
relatively unknown challenger enabled the Bush-Cheney campaign to redefine Kerry. 
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They were intent on defining him as a liberal. "On a basic level, just about any of the 
Democratic contenders would face the same story line from the Republicans: that the 
nominee was a liberal, out of touch with the American mainstream" (Feldmann. January, 
30, p. 01). Instead of defining Kerry as a liberal early on, Republican Strategist Arnold 
Steinberg suggested that the GOP label Kerry a man of inconsistency. '"Probably the best 
[Republican] argument against Kerry would seek to depict him as a man of contradiction 
and flip flops, who is all things to all people, who is really mixed up on foreign policy 
and defense, [and] appears to be a grand statesman and strategist, when in fact his views 
go whichever way the wind blows'" (Feldmann. January, 30, p. 01). Clearly, this was not 
a new idea for the Bush-Cheney campaign. 
Preparations for that moment had been underway for many 
months, part of a carefully designed Republican effort 
coming out of the Democratic primaries to pounce on 
contradictions in Senator John F. Kerry's message. And the 
strategy dates back nearly a decade to the 1996 Senate race 
against former Massachusetts Governor William Weld, 
when strategists now advising Bush first began studying 
Kerry's weaknesses and honed in on fickleness as a 
potentially devastating line of attack (Kornblut, 2004, 
September, p. Al). 
Though it may have been old, it was revived because it worked well with the overall 
strategy of generating uncertainty. It was a term that was easily adopted and reminded 
voters that Kerry was uncertain as a candidate and leader, an individual who changed his 
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values for political gain. The media and public eventually embraced the term. By 
convention time "flip-flopping" had become Kerry's defining character fault. 
The term flip-flop began as a Republican strategy to interject a specific political 
impression about Senator Kerry. "Campaign propaganda aims at mediating two closely 
related overlapping fantasies. First propaganda constructs fantasies about the candidate, 
his qualities, qualifications, program, and destiny. Second, propaganda mediates realities 
about the nature of the world, the array of forces, dangers, threats and enemies that must 
be confronted and vanquished. Linking the two fantasies is essential for the "destiny of 
the candidate becomes the destiny of the political world" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 
63). The Bush-Cheney reality relied on President Bush maintaining consistency. "Steady 
meant steady convictions or principles, which we knew people believed about the 
president. We wanted to articulate the idea that, even if you didn't like the guy you knew 
where he stood, you knew what he believed, you knew where he was headed" 
(McKinnon, 2006, p. 40). In other words you could predict his values, his beliefs, and his 
actions. The Bush-Cheney campaign needed to reinforce Bush's ethos. The Bush-Cheney 
campaign also needed to reinforce the publics' perception of an uncertain world 
populated with terrorists. Terrorists, Bush argued, needed to be brought to justice. 
Republicans maintained that in an uncertain world change was risky. In particular, 
Senator Kerry was a great risk because he was unpredictable. The "flip-flop" symbol 
communicated that uncertainty. A voter cannot predict a person who changes values, 
beliefs, and actions mid-stream. 
Strategic uncertainty thrives in the media. Nimmo and Combs (1983) argued that 
the news media builds a black and white narrative. Reporters look for ways to simplify a 
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story and to give an audience short-hand access to information. Symbols simplify 
complex situations. "They are rather, the only means by which groups not in a position to 
analyze a complex situation rationally may adjust themselves to it, through 
sterotypization, over simplification, and reassurance" (Edelman, 1967, p. 40). "Flip-flop" 
simplified a complex Senate career. Reassurance was found in the symbol of a steadfast, 
resolute, certain leader juxtaposed to a "flip-flopper." Edelman (1988) argued that in 
times of crisis and complexity people look to a leader. In February of 2004 the 
Republican Party began to argue that Kerry "flip-flops." '"We can begin to focus on the 
Kerry record,' said Wisconsin Republican Party Chairman Rick Graber, who accused the 
Massachusetts senator of 'flip-flop hypocrisy' on Iraq, national security and improving 
public schools" (Walters, 2004, p. 01A). Republicans began to use Kerry's record to 
legitimize the symbol "flip-flop." 
U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Janesville) listed what he said was 
another example of a Kerry flip-flop. Ryan said the 
Democrat was one of 14 senators to vote against a Senate 
bill to give states authority to legalize or prohibit gay 
marriages. By saying he supports civil unions but believes 
marriage should be between a man and a woman, Kerry is 
"trying to have it both ways on that issue," Ryan said. 
(Walters, 2004, p. 01 A) 
Later in February, President Bush generated uncertainty about Senator Kerry, but did not 
use the term flip-flop. Instead the term was used by reporters to describe the president's 
attack on Kerry's inconsistencies. "President Bush lampooned Sen. John Kerry for policy 
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flip-flops and said if America elects a hesitant leader in the terror war, 'the world will 
drift toward tragedy'" (Blomquist, 2004, p. 8). Blomquist referred to the president's 
accusations of "flip-flopping" towards Senator Kerry. "The other party's nomination 
battle is still playing out. The candidates are an interesting group with diverse opinions -
for tax cuts and against them, for NAFTA and against NAFTA, for the Patriot Act and 
against the Patriot Act, in favor of the liberation of Iraq and opposed to it. 'And that's just 
one senator from Massachusetts,' Bush said, getting a roaring response from the 
Republican crowd" (Blomquist, 2004, p. 8). The term flip-flop was supported with 
examples. Blomquist used it to refer to Bush's joke about Kerry's change of stance on 
issues. In the speech, Bush used strategic uncertainty by casting himself as steady and 
Kerry as uncertain. '"So far all we hear is a lot of old bitterness and partisan anger' from 
them. Bush mocked Kerry - and at the same time tried to paint the Democrat as an 
uncertain leader who's wrong for the post-9/11 era" (Blomquist, 2004, p. 8). The label 
flip-flop was gaining recognition as a symbol that characterized Senator Kerry. 
The term flip-flop signaled Kerry's change on issues. Those "flip-flops" had 
become news. No longer was it just Republicans who used flip-flop. Reporters, too, 
reported Kerry's inconsistencies. "When Senator John Kerry was speaking to Jewish 
leaders a few days ago, he said Israel's construction of a barrier between it and Palestinian 
territories was a legitimate act of self-defense. But in October, he told an Arab-American 
group that it was "provocative and counterproductive' and a "barrier to peace'" 
(Halbfinger, 2004, March, p. 1). Reports of flip-flops on social issues also emerged. "On 
Feb. 27, Kerry quietly told a group of unhappy gay donors that he would work to confer 
full federal benefits, including Social Security survivor benefits, the right to file taxes 
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jointly, and more than a thousand others, on gay couples joined by any state-sanctioned 
union ~ which would of course include marriage. So while wishing to forbid gay 
marriage in his own state, he is promising to reward it in others" (Williams, 2004, p. 
B07).The Republican Party no longer had to load the symbol flip-flop with examples. 
Reporters were doing the work for them. "Wearing sandals would hardly do John Kerry's 
presidential campaign much good, and, at 60, he is long past the days when a backward 
handspring is something he could sensibly contemplate. He is, however, proving to be a 
master of the 'complete change of opinion'. The Republicans are noting his flip-flopping 
with glee" (McElroy, 2004, p. 21). 
The symbol flip-flop caught fire when reporters started to report them. It then 
chained out (Bormann, 1972) to opinion pieces. "And I've labored to turn my eyes from 
his career-long opportunism, the knowledge that Bay State political junkies trade their 
favorite Kerry flip-flops like baseball cards" (Williams, 2004, p. B07). The knowledge of 
his flip-flops had suddenly become an issue with conservative journalists. "I've tried, 
really I have. As a charter member of the ABB Society — Anybody But Bush —.. .It was 
especially difficult, but I worked to achieve a kind of amnesia about Kerry's incoherent 
and changing explanation of his position — no, his positions — concerning the crucial 
issue of Bush's war in Iraq" (Williams, 2004, p. B07). Not only did Kerry flip-flop but 
also those flip-flops made him unelectable in the eyes of someone who did not want to 
reelect Bush. 
The flip-flop term became a part of the 2004 political lexicon. As a rhetorical 
device, it was used to target specific audiences. "A search of the Bush campaign website 
turns up no references to a 'Massachusetts liberal' at all, yet its top headlines yesterday 
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included a statement by Senator Norm Coleman, Republican of Minnesota, accusing 
Kerry of 'Flip-flops on Israel'" (Kornblut, 2004, March, p. Al). Kerry's flip-flops could 
affect a specific audience's area of interest. Iraq was a strong issue with the Bush-
Cheney, campaign making it important to cast Kerry as uncertain with respect to it. "Vice 
President Dick Cheney ripped into Democratic nominee John Kerry as a weak waffler 
with poor judgment who'd have left Saddam Hussein in power, and insulted Great 
Britain... Cheney contended that 'the senator from Massachusetts has given us ample 
doubts about his judgment and the attitude he brings to bear on vital issues of national 
security"' (Orin, 2004, p. 7). 
The label flip-flop had been given life by the Republican campaign then used for 
efficient communication to distinguish the candidates by the press and citizenry. Flip-flop 
was evolving as a symbol of strategic uncertainty; it was also used to establish social 
identities. 
April to May, 2004 
The primaries ran from January to May. By late March and early April it had 
become clear that John Kerry was going to receive the Democratic nomination. The term 
flip-flop had been successfully interjected into the national dialogue. Strategic 
uncertainty soon surfaced in Republican attack ads. "In a blitz of ads and speeches, the 
Bush campaign claims that John Kerry has flip-flopped on several issues" (Shepard, 
2004, April, p. A4). Republican attack ads affected likely voters' perception of Kerry. "A 
month-long blitz of Republican campaign ads defining his Democratic challenger as 
someone who flip-flops on issues and increases taxes appears to have had a greater 
political effect. A Gallup poll this week shows that Senator John Kerry has lost a 52-44 
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lead he had three weeks ago, just after he secured the Democratic nomination, and now 
trails Mr. Bush 51-47 among likely voters" (O'Clery, 2004, April, p. 15). Flip-flop had 
become a potent symbol of strategic uncertainty. It was soon to receive a powerful boost. 
March 16, 2004, Kerry visited West Virginia to speak to a veterans group. Kerry, when 
questioned about a vote on an $87 billion supplemental bill, remarked: "I voted for the 
$87 billion before I voted against it" (Gibbs, 2004, p 2). That statement helped cement 
the legitimacy of the flip-flop label. 
Whereas the flip-flop charge originally attacked Kerry's consistency on political 
policies, the term now attacked Kerry's good will and character. "In the heat of a 
campaign, the flip-flop charge can be devastating as part of a larger theme: that a 
candidate is changing positions for political expediency and therefore cannot be trusted. 
That is the message Bush sent to voters, beginning with a speech in which he offered a 
wry critique of the Democratic presidential field as Kerry emerged the favorite" 
(Shepard, 2004, April, p. A4). Flip-flop had additional rhetorical implications. It now 
suggested that Kerry lacked steady values. 
The whole concept of 'character' is an important one to 
American voters," said John Zogby, an independent 
pollster. "They want to know that their president is 
principled, grounded and has leadership skills." He added: 
"It is one thing for a candidate to have grown or changed 
his or her mind earlier in a career.. .But for a candidate to 
change on issues in the heat of a campaign denotes the 
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opposite: weakness, a lack of principle... (Shepard, 2004, 
April, p. A4). 
Strategic uncertainty had affected Kerry; he contradicted himself. It even generated 
questions about his personal life. "The latest headline maker: John Kerry flip-flops on 
whether he owns an SUV. He says he doesn't own one, but then has to admit that his wife 
has a Chevrolet Suburban" (Sciacca, 2004, p. 012). When Kerry was accused of flip-
flopping regarding his car, the symbol had saturated the political landscape. Details affect 
a candidate's ethos. If he is taking a pro-environmentalist stance and misrepresents 
ownership of an SUV, his good will and character will likely be questioned. Reporters 
"pointed to his response two weeks ago when reporters asked him if he owns an SUV, 
while also advocating higher automobile fuel economy standards. He said his 'family has 
it. I don't have it,' a reference to the Chevrolet Suburban his wife drives at their home in 
Ketchum, Idaho'" (Xiong et al., 2004, p. 12A). Strategic uncertainty, and a symbol of it, 
had generated uncertainty about Kerry. 
Flip-flopping helped Bush supporters form a uniform argument against Kerry. 
Flip-flopping was given animate expression. "Flipper the Dolphin was dragged into the 
political fray Monday as demonstrators waved inflatable dolphins and chanted anti-John 
Kerry slogans outside the Minneapolis Convention Center, where the Democrat was 
scheduled to speak. About 50 supporters of President Bush had one thing to say: Kerry is 
a flipper - he flip-flops" (Xiong, McKinney, Smith, & Schmickle, 2004, p. 12A). By 
April and May the flip-flop symbol was reproduced in a variety of ways. '"John Kerry 
stands on both sides of the issues,' said Jake Grassel, state chairman for College 
Republicans, as he gripped one of several.. .sticks festooned with a.. .yellow flip-flop 
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sandal. 'Nobody really knows where he's going to stand'" (Xiong et al., 2004, p. 12A). 
Flip-flop sandals were used to argue Kerry was a flip-flopper. 
Going into June and July, the month of the convention, the Bush-Cheney 
campaign continued to attack Kerry's ethos using strategic uncertainty including the flip-
flop symbol. 
June to July, 2004 
By June, the Bush-Cheney campaign had defined Kerry. He was known primarily 
as a flip-flopper. "Whenever he appears in the media he's being harassed by two little 
words: 'flip' and 'flop'" (Nevius, 2004, p. Bl). Despite being relatively unknown, there 
was a perception that Kerry flip-flopped on policy and values. Once a symbol has 
integrated into the popular culture and has been adopted by a large portion of public it 
can be rhetorically manipulated. One of the more powerful ways this done through 
humor. 
The term "flip-flop" emerged in popular culture, including comedy. Jay Leno, for 
example joked that Kerry "would be a perfect president because he could 'deliver both 
the State of the Union and the rebuttal.' 'When they start making jokes about you, it's a 
problem,' Payack said. 'You knew when Johnny Carson started joking about Watergate 
that Nixon was doomed" (Nevius, 2004, p. Bl). The perception of Kerry as someone who 
flip-flops had become "common knowledge," as people comprehended the humor 
(Morreall, 1983). When a political symbol becomes humorous it can have a dramatic 
effect on the person attached to the symbol. "Aristotle points out its heavenly source; his 
contemporaries characterize its joyfully liberating nature.. .Homer seems to say that 
philosophical talk about laughter is fine, but look what happens to laughter in practice, 
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look at the enormous power in that flamethrower called laughter" (Sanders, 1995, p. 83). 
Humor has a subversive affect; it can undermine a person's ethos. The act of using flip-
flop sandals and inflatable dolphins requires a leap of faith that people have the 
appropriate knowledge to appreciate the inference. 
The symbol flip-flop had become such a success because the Republican Party 
had carefully monitored Kerry for more attachment opportunities. "Every comment and 
gesture Kerry made was monitored on a bank of televisions in the Republican war room 
in Arlington, Virginia. Bush campaign aides watched particularly for equivocation or 
flip-flops" (O'Clery, 2004, July, p. 10). The use of strategic uncertainty, found in the 
term flip-flop, had done damage to Kerry's ethos. Kerry thus had to reinforce his ethos by 
lowering uncertainty about his values. "In every speech he used the word "values" so 
many times it makes listeners cringe" (O'Clery, 2004, July, p. 10). The use of strategic 
uncertainty and flip-flop was even used when Kerry selected Senator John Edwards as his 
vice-president running mate. "Less than an hour after Senator John F. Kerry made his 
final phone call about the decision, Republicans declared it a flip flop pointing out that 
Kerry had questioned his new running mate's experience during the primaries" (Kornblut, 
2004, July, p. A10). 
In an effort to keep control of the flip-flop symbol, the Republican Party 
continually reminded voters about how Kerry had "voted for the $87 billion before I 
voted against it." In many instances, Republican Party members would remind audiences 
of the statement even when it had nothing to do with the subject. '"John Kerry was 
against John Edwards before he was for him," read a statement by the Republican 
National Committee, mocking Kerry's past statement" (Kornblut, 2004, July, p. A10). 
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During the 2004 Democratic convention, former Mayor of New York Rudy Giuliani 
spoke to an audience and reminded them of Kerry's famous flip-flop (Rennie, 2004, p. 
A6). 
The challenger's convention is designed to introduce the candidate to the 
American population, and, as it does, reduce uncertainty about the challenger. This is 
accomplished by establishing his practical wisdom, virtue, and good will. 
Nominating conventions. According to Denton and Woodward (1985), "Political 
conventions really serve three functions. They, of course, officially nominate the party's 
candidate. Conventions also unify the party for both local and national candidates. And 
perhaps most importantly, conventions provide a free forum to present the candidate's 
issues and image to those watching the proceedings on television" (p. 80). Trent and 
Friendenberg (2004) suggested the nominating conventions were no longer about 
pragmatic communicative functions, but about symbolic or ritualistic functions (p. 49). 
Though nominating conventions are heavily symbolic and ritualistic, they are also a 
forum to reduce uncertainty and to establish the party and nominee's ethos. The show of 
unity signals to the broader population party competence and trustworthiness. The issues 
and image of the nominee establish competence and trustworthiness. Campaign 
convention communications are designed to reduce uncertainty and increase ethos. 
Nominating conventions were given less time on television. "As conventions 
became more controlled, predictable and thus less newsworthy television news 
executives reduced network coverage of what they considered elaborate infomercials for 
each party" (Holloway, 2005, p. 31). This negative view of the conventions caused the 
major networks to announce that "they would air only three hours of each convention, 
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one hour each of the three nights" (Holloway, 2005, p. 30). Each speech, therefore, had to 
be on message. Speeches went through a screening process to make sure they matched 
Kerry's points (Halbfinger, 2004, July, p. 3). 
For years, the Republican Party whittled away at the public's perception of the 
Democrats' credibility. Wishing to rebuild their ethos, the Democratic convention was 
held in a place tied to American history. "Boston offered some symbolic opportunities to 
tie the Democratic Party to the founders and to the values of the Revolution, to celebrate 
the democratic process, and to the glory in national process" (Holloway, 2005, pp. 31-
32). Each day of the convention consisted of speeches from Democratic Party leaders. 
According to MSNBC's website on Monday, July 26, the theme was "The Kerry-
Edwards Plan for America's Future." Six different speakers educated the convention 
audience and the American audience on Kerry and Edwards's domestic plan for America. 
Though the theme was "The Kerry-Edwards Plan for America's Future" many speeches 
talked about the negative impact of the Bush administration (Holloway, 2005). 
Introduced by his wife Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bill Clinton was a major part of 
the convention. Former President Bill Clinton delivered a speech of "carefully crafted 
dichotomies and contrasts, all couched in the theme of unity" (Holloway, 2005), p. 34). 
Clinton's speech called for unity. He opened by stating how he was honored to have 
shared the stage with his wife, former President Jimmy Carter, and former Vice President 
Al Gore. He suggested he was but a foot soldier fighting for the future, tied into John 
Kerry's evocation of his Vietnam experience. He called forth the names of former 
presidents from the New England area, John Adams and John Kennedy. Clinton followed 
a unity theme. "My friends, we are constantly being told that America is deeply divided. 
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But all Americans value freedom and faith and family. We all honor the service and 
sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout the 
world" (Clinton, 2004, n.p.). To alter the perception of the party as being non-
mainstream, Clinton pointed out other similarities between themselves and Americans. 
He created, therefore, a sense of trust in the Democratic Party. He followed with 
"carefully crafted dichotomies" "Therefore, we Democrats will bring to the American 
people this year a positive campaign, arguing not who is a good or a bad person, but what 
is the best way to build a safe and prosperous world our children deserve" (Clinton, 2004, 
n.p.). By contrast, one could only infer how Republicans define the qualities of a good 
person and who is a bad person. Clinton continued to reinforce the trustworthiness of the 
Democratic Party, while sabotaging the Republican's ethos. 
We Democrats want to build a world an America of shared 
responsibilities and shared benefits. We want a world with 
more global cooperation where we act alone only when we 
absolutely have to... And we think everybody should have 
that chance. On the other hand, the Republicans in 
Washington believe that America should be run by the right 
people - their people... leaving ordinary Americans to fend 
for themselves (Clinton, 2004, n.p.). 
Clinton rhetorically pushed the Bush administration and Republican Congress out 
of the mainstream. He listed how the two "chose to" take the country far right, walk away 
from allies, and other issues that removed themselves from the international community 
(Clinton, 2004, n.p.). Steering the audience away from international affairs, Clinton 
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brought them back to domestic issues. Despite a theme of unity, Clinton's speech divided 
the population between the wealthy and the not wealthy. "Clinton's approach created a 
clear contrast, appealing directly to middle - and lower - class voters who had significant 
concerns about the economy, jobs, and a range of domestic issues" (Holloway, 2005, p. 
37). Using a common man appeal, Clinton signaled commonalities between all 
Americans and the Democratic Party. He discussed his 1992 campaign: "For all the 
strategic appeals to undecided and independent voters, the first night of the Democratic 
convention offered loyal Democrats and delegates in the hall a reminder of better days" 
(Holloway, 2005, p. 37). Invoking the wins of the Democratic Party not only reminded 
loyal Democrats and delegate of "better days" it also reminded the population of the 
competence of the Democratic Party. 
Clinton continued to bolster the Democratic ethos. He explained how the 
Democrats seek to protect Americans. The discussion of Democratic attempts to secure 
national safety signals likewise competency in the party. "On homeland security, 
Democrats tried to double the number of containers at ports and airports checked for 
weapons of mass destruction. It cost $1 billion. It would have been paid for under our 
[Homeland Security] bill by asking the 200,000 millionaires in America to cut their tax 
cut by $5,000. Almost all 200,000 of us would like to have done that, to spend $5,000 to 
make all 300 million Americans safer" (Clinton, 2004, n.p.). 
Nominating conventions also endorse the Presidential nominee. In endorsing the 
nominee, speakers affirm the ethos of the nominee. Bill Clinton did this addressing 
Senator Kerry's commitment to duty. Since the major issue of the 2004 presidential 
campaign was the war on terror and war in Iraq, Senator Kerry's past duty in Vietnam 
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seemed appropriate. Clinton highlighted not only Senator Kerry's service but his sense of 
duty. Citing Kerry's background of privilege, Clinton recounted how Kerry selected not 
to defer service, but to serve in Vietnam. "During the Vietnam War, many young men, 
including the current president, the vice president and me, could have gone to Vietnam 
and didn't. John Kerry came from a privileged background. He could have avoided going 
too, but instead, he said: Send me" (Clinton, 2004, n.p.). Clinton continued to describe 
how Senator Kerry served the United States during his presidency. "When I was 
president, John Kerry showed courage and conviction on crime, on welfare reform, on 
balancing the budget, at a time when those priorities were not exactly the way to win a 
popularity contest in our party" (Clinton, 2004, n.p.). Clinton also reifies Kerry's 
trustworthiness by establishing his strength of conviction. Clinton's endorsement speech 
accomplished two things; first, he was able to supplement the party ethos. The 
Democratic Party had fallen on hard times and required reaffirmation. By highlighting 
the positive actions of the Democratic Party, he affirmed the party's ethos. By contrast, 
he created a negative perception of the Republican Party and President Bush. 
Even though the former frontrunner Howard Dean delivered an upbeat speech, 
Barack Obama presented what was considered the highlight speech. "Obama rivaled 
Clinton in his ability to capture the convention hall" (Holloway, 2005, p. 38). Obama did 
not directly reinforce the Party ethos, but appealed to unity instead. His speech kept with 
the convention's purpose of uncertainty reduction and ethos building. He began by 
establishing credibility. Obama recollected his diverse and humble family beginnings. 
Both parents came from hardworking people. Obama told his father's story. "My father 
was a foreign student, born and raised in a small village in Kenya. He grew up herding 
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goats, went to school in a tin-roof shack. His father - my grandfather ~ was a cook, a 
domestic servant to the British" (Obama, 2004, n.p.). By referencing his father, Obama 
told an immigrant's story. "Through hard work and perseverance my father got a 
scholarship to study in a magical place, America, that shone as a beacon of freedom and 
opportunity to so many who had come before" (Obama, 2004, n.p.). The story 
personalized the immigrants' experience even as it calls attention to our heritage. After 
viewing the "magical place, America" through his father's eyes, Barack took the 
audience to the heartland of America, Kansas. He told his mother's story. "She was born 
in a town on the other side of the world, in Kansas. Her father worked on oilrigs and 
farms through most of the Depression. The day after Pearl Harbor my grandfather signed 
up for duty; joined Patton's army, marched across Europe. Back home, my grandmother 
raised a baby and went to work on a bomber assembly line" (Obama, 2004, n.p.). With a 
patriotic grandfather, Obama emerged as a patriot as well. Throughout the speech Obama 
also scattered allusions to religious beliefs, thus communicating his values and beliefs. 
After establishing his credibility, Barack Obama endorsed Senator Kerry, thereby 
reducing uncertainty. "John Kerry understands the ideals of community, faith, and service 
because they've defined his life. From his heroic service in Vietnam, to his years as a 
prosecutor and lieutenant governor, through two decades in the United States Senate, he's 
devoted himself to this country. Again and again, we've seen him make tough choices 
when easier ones were available" (Obama, 2004, n.p.). By stating his ideals Obama seeks 
to establish a sense of trust in the audience. Obama further reduced uncertainty by 
bolstering Senator Kerry's ethos. 
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His values and his record affirm what is best in us... John 
Kerry believes in the Constitutional freedoms that have 
made our country the envy of the world, and he will never 
sacrifice our basic liberties, nor use faith as a wedge to 
divide us. And John Kerry believes that in a dangerous 
world war must be an option sometimes, but it should never 
be the first option. (Obama, 2004, n.p.). 
Obama referred to Senator Kerry's military record to reinforce Kerry's competence as a 
potential Commander-in-Chief. 
The keynote presentations establish the nominee's ethos reducing uncertainty in 
the audience. Barack Obama highlighted Senator Kerry's beliefs and values with regard 
to the election issues. Though Obama spent a good part of the speech establishing his 
own credibility, he helped reduce uncertainty regarding the Democratic nominee. 
Vice-Presidential nominee John Edwards spoke to the convention attendees, 
delegates, and national audience on Wednesday. Edwards began his speech by relating 
values instilled in him by his parents. "You taught me the values that I carry in my heart: 
faith, family, responsibility, opportunity for everyone. You taught me that there's dignity 
and honor in a hard day's work. You taught me to always look out for our neighbors, to 
never look down on anybody, and treat everybody with respect" (Edwards, 2004, n.p.). 
He proceeded to attribute similar values to John Kerry. "Those are the values that John 
Kerry and I believe in" (Edwards, 2004, n.p.). By relating their values to the audience, 
Edwards not only lowered uncertainty but established trustworthiness. If people can 
predict a person's values and feel they have values in common, they can perceive that 
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person as trustworthy. Edwards not only referred to his parents as the base of his values 
but his geographical culture. "You know, we hear a lot of talk about values. Where I 
come from, you don't judge somebody's values based upon how they use that word in a 
political ad. You judge their values based upon what they've spent their life doing" 
(Edwards, 2004, n.p.). The values and beliefs Edwards espoused are very broad and 
positive values that people could relate to, and thus they could more likely predict those 
values. 
Edwards, too, mentioned Senator Kerry's military history to establish the 
nominee's competence. "When John Kerry graduated college, he volunteered for military 
service, volunteered to go to Vietnam, volunteered to captain a swiftboat, one of the most 
dangerous duties in Vietnam that you could have. As a result, he was wounded, honored 
for his valor" (Edwards, 2004, n.p.). Since Edwards was a part of the ticket he must also 
bolster his competency by discussing their social and economic plans, including a plan to 
provide health care to the American population. "We have a plan that will offer all 
Americans the same health care that your senator has. We can give you tax breaks to help 
you pay for your health care. And when we're in office, we will sign a real patients' bill of 
rights into law so that you can make your own health care decisions" (Edwards, 2004, 
n.p.). 
By revealing a plan he signaled to the audience that they can predict the actions of 
a Kerry-Edwards administration. Edwards also reduced uncertainty about their 
competency in education reform: "Our plan will reform our schools and raise standards. 
We can give our schools the resources that they need. We can provide incentives to put 
our best teachers in the subjects and the places where we need them the most. And we 
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can ensure that three million children have a safe place to go when they leave school in 
the afternoon" (Edwards, 2004, n.p.). Since job security was an issue, Edwards presented 
a plan to assure job security, thus reducing uncertainty. "First, we can create good-paying 
jobs in this country again. We're going to get rid of tax cuts for companies who are 
outsourcing your jobs and, instead, we're going to give tax breaks to American companies 
that are keeping jobs right here in America. And we will invest in the jobs of the future 
and in the technologies and innovation to ensure that America stays ahead of the 
competition. And we're going to do this because John and I understand that a job is about 
more than a paycheck; it's about dignity and self- respect" (Edwards, 2004, n.p.). Each 
plan communicates to the audience an expectation of the Kerry-Edwards administration. 
John Kerry's acceptance speech was meant to conclude the convention. "He 
needed to establish himself as a strong, optimistic, and capable leader" (Holloway, 2005, 
p. 45). The convention had established his beliefs, values, and competency. After a series 
of introductions from family members, a biographical video was shown. Narrated by 
Morgan Freeman, the video followed Kerry from birth, to primary school, college, and 
his decision to volunteer for duty in Vietnam. A significant part of the video established 
his military ethos. The video concluded by covering his 1984 election to the United 
States Senate. After a brief "lull," the hall fell silent and Senator Kerry entered the hall. 
When he got to the podium he announced "I'm John Kerry and I'm reporting to duty" 
(Kerry, 2004, n.p.). 
Kerry's speech revealed his beliefs, values, and competency. He proceeded to 
establish the foundations of his beliefs and values by telling his family history. He talked 
about his father (a military man) and mother. "She gave me her passion for the 
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environment. She taught me to see trees as the cathedrals of nature. And by the power of 
her example, she showed me that we can and must complete the march toward full 
equality for all women in the United States of America" (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). He explained 
to the audience that he learned a specific lesson from his father when he worked at the 
State Department. He related how he rode his bike in Soviet East Berlin, and of the 
lasting impression it left on him. "But what I learned has stayed with me for a lifetime. I 
saw how different life was on different sides of the same city. I saw the fear in the eyes of 
people who were not free. I saw the gratitude of people toward the United States for all 
that we had done (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). He stated that he learned what it meant to be an 
American, and that he found inspiration in his family to serve his country. 
Senator Kerry explained his experiences and knowledge to create the perception 
of competency and to lower uncertainty about his ability to act. "I ask you, I ask you to 
judge me by my record. As a young prosecutor, I fought for victims' rights and made 
prosecuting violence against women a priority. When I came to the Senate, I broke with 
many in my own party to vote for a balanced budget, because I thought it was the right 
thing to do. I fought to put 100,000 police officers on the streets of America. And then I 
reached out across the aisle with John McCain to work to find the truth about our POWs 
and missing in action and to finally make peace in Vietnam" (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). Kerry 
establishes his ethos by telling of his fight for victim's rights, as well as his ability to 
relate to Republicans. These qualities, be asserted, qualified him to be president. 
To establish his competency with respect to Iraq he cited his military history. "I 
know what kids go through when they're carrying an M-16 in a dangerous place, and they 
can't tell friend from foe. I know what they go through when they're out on patrol at night 
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and they don't know what's coming around the next bend. I know what it's like to write 
letters home telling your family that everything's all right, when you're not sure that that's 
true" (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). Relating to present-day soldiers suggests his empathy as 
Commander-in-chief. Senator Kerry explained how, as president, his administration 
would fight the war on terror. "We will double our Special Forces to conduct terrorist 
operations, anti-terrorist operations, and we will provide our troops with the newest 
weapons and technology to save their lives and win the battle" (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). He 
also discussed homeland security. Like Senator Edwards, Senator Kerry laid out plans to 
deal with social and economic problems. 
Near the end of the speech Senator Kerry revealed his values. He noted that: "I 
don't wear my religion on my sleeve, but faith has given me values and hope to live by, 
from Vietnam to this day, from Sunday to Sunday." (Kerry, 2004, n.p.). He followed that 
with a call to faith, ending with a sense of optimism by using a rising sun metaphor. 
However, while the Democratic Party introduced Senators Kerry and Edwards, the 
Republican Party continued to use strategic uncertainty to attack Kerry's ethos. 
The Democratic nominating convention was designed to introduce Senator John 
Kerry and his running mate Senator John Edwards to the American people. The 
convention was designed to reduce uncertainty about the candidates even as it raised 
candidates' ethos. That reduction was shown by a post convention bump in the polls. The 
voting public had learned about the party and its nominees, allowing them to predict their 
beliefs, values, and attitudes. By contrast, the Bush-Cheney campaign attempted to 
diminish Kerry's ethos. "The most notable strategic move by President Bush during the 
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primary was to wait for the Democrats to settle on John Kerry as their nominee and then 
quickly launch an attack" (Smith, 2005, p. 143). 
Having initiated an attack on Senator Kerry's credibility early, the Bush 
Campaign tried different strategies to negatively "define" Kerry. By convention time, the 
Bush Campaign had branded Kerry as uncertain in a climate of uncertainty. As an 
antithesis to President Bush, Kerry was framed as an uncertain candidate. "The key tactic 
in the convention attacks was to brand Kerry as a 'flip-flopper' who changed positions in 
contrast to Bush's clear, and simple, and familiar positions" (Smith, 2005, p. 147). 
At the Republican national convention the first day's theme was "A Nation of 
Courage" which translated into "Much of the evening would focus on the events of 9/11 
and their meaning for the nation and Bush's campaign" (Holloway, 2005, p. 50). This 
was apparent in Senator John McCain's speech. A veteran of the Vietnam War, McCain's 
ethos with respect to war lent credibility to the Bush-Cheney campaign. Senator McCain 
began his speech by claiming that millions of Americans supported President Bush and 
Vice President Cheney. He then reminded the audience of September 11, 2001. McCain 
described the war on terrorism as a hard struggle filled with sacrifice. He took the 
audience back to the day when President Bush stood on the rubble of the World Trade 
Center and how he promised the enemies they would hear from us. "He ordered 
American forces to Afghanistan and took the fight to our enemies, and away from our 
shores, seriously injuring al Qaeda and destroying the regime that gave them safe haven" 
(McCain, 2004, n.p.). 
McCain discussed next the war in Iraq. "After years of failed diplomacy and 
limited military pressure to restrain Saddam Hussein, President Bush made the difficult 
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decision to liberate Iraq. Those who criticize that decision would have us believe that the 
choice was between a status quo that was well enough left alone and war. But there was 
no status quo to be left alone" (McCain, 2004, n.p.). By reminding the audiences of the 
two wars, McCain not only stayed with the Bush-Campaign strategy of running as a war 
president, but helped foster certainty. McCain discussed President Bush's actions as 
evidence of direct action. The audience could conceptualize Bush as predictable. With 
Senator Kerry, one could only speculate. 
The second night of the Republican convention was entitled "A Nation of 
Compassion." The keynote speaker was Arnold Swartzenegger. An immigrant from 
Austria and action movie star, Swartzenegger had been elected governor of California in 
October of 2003. A naturalized citizen, he had special appeal for the Republican Party 
who sought to expand its party's base. "Schwarzenegger is the one to watch....He will 
recast the American dream of immigrant makes good for the twenty-first century, even 
though as a foreign-born citizen he can never go all the way to the White House" (Rowat, 
2004, p. 7). 
Swartzenegger opened his speech with three jokes that referenced his movie 
career. The first was a self-deprecating joke, followed by one at the expense of the 
Democrats, and finally another self-deprecating joke. Swartzenegger bolstered his ethos 
while appealing to the sense of the American dream. "To think that a once scrawny boy 
from Austria could grow up to become Governor of the State of California and then stand 
here — and stand here in Madison Square Garden and speak on behalf of the President of 
the United States. That is an immigrant's dream! It's the American dream" 
(Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). Governor Swartzenegger's story relates how he looked to 
America as the land of the free. "You know, I was born in Europe and I've traveled all 
over the world, and I can tell you that there is no place, no country, that is more 
compassionate, more generous, more accepting, and more welcoming than the United 
States of America" (Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). To give a sense of where he came from 
he contrasted the American dream to his life in a former Soviet occupied section of 
Austria. "When I was a boy, the Soviets occupied part of Austria. I saw their tanks in the 
streets. I saw communism with my own eyes. I remember the fear we had when we had 
to cross into the Soviet sector" (Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). 
Swartzenegger also detailed the lack of material possessions of a typical family. 
"Now my family didn't have a car — but one day we were in my uncle's car" 
(Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). His story about his family not having a car signaled to his 
audience his humble upbringing. It also signaled to the American audience the failure of 
Communism to provide transportation. The governor told his tale of coming to America. 
"I finally arrived here in 1968. What a special day it was. I remember I arrived here with 
empty pockets, but full of dreams, full of determination, full of desire. The presidential 
campaign was in full swing. I remember watching the Nixon and Humphrey presidential 
race on TV. A friend of mine who spoke German and English translated for me. I heard 
Humphrey saying things that sounded like socialism, which I had just left. But then I 
heard Nixon speak. He was talking about free enterprise, getting the government off your 
back, lowering the taxes and strengthening the military" (Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). 
This bit of history Swartzenegger established his values and created identification with 
other ethnic groups who otherwise might have not identified with the Republican Party. 
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For the 2004 election, the Republican Party wanted to create the perception of 
being inclusive. "Ethnic, gay-friendly and feminist. Say hello to the modern Republican 
Party as it will be presented to voters tonight" (Rowat, 2004, p. 7). Swartzenegger's 
speech presented the Republican Party as an organization open to immigrants, as its 
members admired the hard work of immigrants. Swartzenegger explained that he learned 
first hand of the benefits of hard work. "If you believe that government should be 
accountable to the people, not the people to the government, then you are a Republican. If 
you believe that a person should be treated as an individual, not as a member of an 
interest group, then you are a Republican. If you believe that your family knows how to 
spend your money better than the government does, then you are a Republican. If you 
believe — If you believe that our educational system should be held accountable for the 
progress of our children, then you are a Republican. If you believe — If you believe that 
this country, not the United Nations, is best hope for democracy, then you are a 
Republican. And ladies and gentlemen — And ladies and gentlemen, if you believe that 
we must be fierce and relentless and terminate terrorism, then you are a Republican" 
(Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). Swartzenegger created an atmosphere of acceptance for the 
party's core beliefs. 
Swartzenegger spent most of his time reinforcing his and the party's ethos. He 
did, however, attempt to create the perception of President Bush as a steady leader who 
sticks to his convictions. "The President did not go into Iraq because the polls told him it 
was popular. As a matter of fact, the polls said just the opposite. But leadership isn't 
about polls. It's about making decisions you think are right and then standing behind 
those decisions. That's why America is safer with George W. Bush as President" 
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(Swartzenegger, 2004, n.p.). Swartzenegger suggested that President Bush is a man of 
certainty whose actions are predictable, thereby bolstering the president's credibility. 
The political climate had changed by the third day of the convention. The theme 
was "A Nation of Opportunity." The two key note speakers, Zell Miller and Vice 
President Dick Cheney, used their time to attack the Kerry-Edwards campaign. The use 
of strategic uncertainty had taken hold. In his speech Democrat Zell Miller said, "For 
more than 20 years, on every one of the great issues of freedom and security, John Kerry 
has been more wrong and more wobbly than any other national figure" (Reinhard, 2004, 
p. C5). That "wobbly" nature belied an uncertainty that could not be predicted. Zell 
Miller continued to create uncertainly about Senator Kerry. "From John Kerry, 
(terrorists) get a 'yes-no-maybe' bowl of mush that can only encourage our enemies and 
confuse our friends" (Reinhard, 2004, p. C5). Miller suggested Kerry's uncertain nature 
not only encourages terrorists but our allies may become uncertain themselves. The 
uncertainty issue did not stop with Zell Miller. Democratic Mayor Randy Kelly of Saint 
Paul, Minnesota, stated that '"We need unequivocal leaders with resolve because it's a 
very dangerous world out there. We cannot have a leader who can in any way be seen as 
equivocating when a tough decision is required,'"(Reinhard, 2004, p. C05). Zell Miller 
led the attack on the Kerry campaign. Vice-President Cheney followed it with an attack 
of his own. 
Though Vice-President Cheney's speech was to be an acceptance speech, he used 
his time to attack the ethos of Senator Kerry even as he shored up President Bush. He 
began his speech by accepting his party's nomination. He pledged to the people. "I will 
give this campaign all that I have, and together we will make George W. Bush president 
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for another four years" (Cheney, 2004, n.p.). He followed this pledge with a self-
deprecating joke, and then reinforces his credibility through narratives, first relating his 
birth story. "My grandfather noted that the day I was born was also the birthday of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And so he told my parents they should send President 
Roosevelt an announcement of my birth. Now my grandfather didn't have a chance to go 
to high school. For many years he worked as a cook on the Union Pacific Railroad, and 
he and my grandmother lived in a railroad car. But the modesty of his circumstances 
didn't stop him from thinking that President Roosevelt should know about my arrival. My 
grandfather believed deeply in the promise of America, and had the highest hopes for his 
family. And I don't think it would surprise him much that a grandchild of his stands 
before you tonight as vice president of the United States" (Cheney, 2004, n.p.). By telling 
his history, Vice-President Cheney established his values. He concentrated next on 
Bush's credibility and Kerry's uncertainty character flaw. 
Cheney also discussed the education system, followed by a discussion of the 
economy. "As President Bush and I were sworn into office, our nation was sliding into 
recession, and American workers were overburdened with federal taxes. Then came the 
events of Sept. 11th, which hit our economy very hard. So President Bush delivered the 
greatest tax reduction in a generation, and the results are clear to see. Businesses are 
creating jobs. People are returning to work. Mortgage rates are low, and home ownership 
in this country is at an all-time high. The Bush tax cuts are working" (Cheney, 2004, 
n.p.). By referencing economic actions, Cheney demonstrates the president's hands-on 
ability to resolve economic problems. 
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After discussing social issues, Cheney focused on the Bush-Cheney campaign, the 
war on terrorism, and Iraq. He pointed to actions taken by the President. "The fanatics 
who killed some 3,000 of our fellow Americans may have thought they could attack us 
with impunity because terrorists had done so previously. But if the killers of Sept. 11 
thought we had lost the will to defend our freedom, they did not know America and they 
did not know George W. Bush. From the beginning, the president made clear that the 
terrorists would be dealt with and that anyone who supports, protects, or harbors them 
would be held to account. In a campaign that has reached around the world, we have 
captured or killed hundreds of al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, the camps where terrorists 
trained to kill Americans have been shut down, and the Taliban driven from power. In 
Iraq, we dealt with a gathering threat, and removed the regime of Saddam Hussein" 
(Cheney, 2004, n.p.). Cheney showed the audience clear and certain outcomes of the war 
on terror while linking the war in Iraq to the war on terror. "From the beginning, the 
president made clear that the terrorists would be dealt with and that anyone who supports, 
protects, or harbors them would be held to account... President Bush does not deal in 
empty threats and half measures, and his determination has sent a clear message... But as 
the President has made very clear, there is a difference between leading a coalition of 
many, and submitting to the objections of a few... Fellow citizens, our nation is reaching 
the hour of decision, and the choice is clear" (Cheney, 2004, n.p.). Cheney effectively 
compared and contrasted President Bush and Senator Kerry with respect to predictability. 
Cheney compared and contrasted President Bush and Senator Kerry by talking 
about what they had done and said militarily. 
75 
Senator Kerry... takes a different view when it comes to 
supporting our military... he voted to authorize force 
against Saddam Hussein, he then decided he was opposed 
to the war ... The other candidate in this race is a man our 
nation has come to know... I have seen him face some of 
the hardest decisions that can come to the Oval Office and 
make those decisions with the wisdom... Americans expect 
in their president (Cheney, 2004, n.p.). 
By describing Bush as a leader with knowable convictions, values, and beliefs, voters 
could assess his credibility. By contrast, Cheney's interpretation of Kerry's record creates 
uncertainty. Cheney concluded by stating. "When this convention concludes tomorrow 
night, we will go forth with confidence in our cause, and in the man who leads it. By 
leaving no doubt where we stand, and asking all Americans to join us, we will see our 
cause to victory" (Cheney, 2004, n.p.). 
Today, biographical films play a major role in political campaigns. For the 2004 
conventions, films were used to introduce the candidates. According to Strachan and 
Kendall (2004) the biographical film was designed to appeal to a larger, less attentive 
audience (p. 118). A brief film was aired the last night of the Republican convention. 
Bush's film told the story of America led by Bush. The film focused mainly on "9/11." 
"The campaign film itself focused entirely on Bush's baptism by fire in the wake of 9/11" 
(Edwards, 2005, p. 85). The "9/11" tragedy was the focus of the film and President 
Bush's acceptance speech. 
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President Bush began his speech by recalling "9/11" and the effects of the attack. 
He used that tragedy to emphasize the perseverance and heroism of the American people. 
"Since 2001, Americans have been given hills to climb, and found the strength to climb 
them. Now, because we have made the hard journey, we can see the valley below. Now, 
because we have faced challenges with resolve, we have historic goals within our reach, 
and greatness in our future. We will build a safer world and a more hopeful America and 
nothing will hold us back" (Bush, 2004, n.p.). Bush proceeded to invoke a sense of 
family values by discussing his fortuitous life with his wife, two daughters, brothers, 
sisters, and parents. Each, he claimed, had instilled values and experiences in him. Bush 
then listed his beliefs and the actions committed in the name of those beliefs. 
I believe — I believe... every school must teach, so we 
passed the most important federal education reform in 
history... I believe in the energy and innovative spirit of 
America's workers... so we unleashed that energy with the 
largest tax relief in a generation.. .1 believe the most solemn 
duty of the American president is to protect the American 
people. If America shows uncertainty or weakness in this 
decade, the world will drift toward tragedy. (Bush, 2004, 
n.p.) 
Bush laid out plans for the following four years. "To create more jobs in America, 
America must be the best place in the world to do business. To create jobs, my plan will 
encourage investment and expansion by restraining federal spending, reducing regulation, 
and making the tax relief permanent. To create jobs, we will make our country less 
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dependent on foreign sources of energy. To create jobs, we will expand trade and level 
the playing field to sell American goods and services across the globe. And we must 
protect small business owners and workers from the explosion of frivolous lawsuits that 
threaten jobs across our country" (Bush, 2004, n.p.).A common thread through the Bush 
acceptance speech is life changing times. 
The times in which we live and work are changing 
dramatically... In this time of change, government must 
take the side of working families.... In this world of 
change, some things do not change: the values we try to 
live by, the institutions that give our lives meaning and 
purpose. Our society rests on a foundation of responsibility 
and character and family commitment. (Bush, 2004, n.p.) 
Bush reaffirmed that he was steadfast and resolute in uncertain times. 
President Bush recounted for the audience the changes he had initiated to protect 
the country. In defense of his actions he generated uncertainty about Senator Kerry. 
Again my opponent and I have different approaches. I 
proposed, and the Congress overwhelmingly passed, 87 
billion dollars in funding needed by our troops doing battle 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. My opponent and his running mate 
voted against this money for bullets, and fuel, and vehicles, 
and body armor. When asked to explain his vote, the 
Senator said, "I actually did vote for the 87 billion dollars 
before I voted against it." (Bush, 2004, n.p.) 
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People who accept a political reality show support by adopting its symbols. 
Symbols give definition to political cultures (Elder & Cobb, 1983). This was apparent in 
the Republican convention. Conventioneers adopted the use of various symbols to convey 
the message that Kerry was untrustworthy and uncertain. "Swift Boat Veterans for 
Truth," an anti-Kerry group, had accused Senator Kerry of lying to get his purple heart in 
Vietnam. "Delegates who were wearing Band-Aids, mocking the Kerry injuries that 
earned him his Purple Hearts" (Dauber, 2004) signaled to those in attendance and those 
viewing that they did not believe Senator Kerry. That uncertainty about his past was also 
conveyed in the term flip-flop. Flip-flop had become a symbol of uncertainty. Flip-flop's 
symbolism was transferred to different symbols used by conventioneers. "Republican 
delegates cheered attacks on Kerry, waving flip-flop sandals and chanting 'flip flop'" 
(Shepard, 2004, September, p. 1A). The term flip-flop was used in a variety of ways. 
"During Vice President Cheney's speech on Wednesday night, an address devoted in 
large part to defining Mr. Kerry as a 'flip-flopper' who wants to have it both ways, 
hundreds of delegates held aloft pairs of flip-flops" (Reid, 2004, p. 18). "Although Kerry 
exceeded many analysts' expectations, his ethos was narrowly defined at the convention 
and would be the source of doubts over the course of the campaign" (Holloway, 2005, p. 
69). The conventions had set the tone for the general election, which Trent and 
Friendenberg (2004) described as the time when the nominees start campaigning. 
The convention months, late July to early September, 2004.The convention for a 
presidential challenger introduces them to the broader American public. The conventions 
lower uncertainty about the challenger. During the convention his values are revealed, his 
beliefs are espoused and his past and future actions are discussed. The revelation of his 
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values, beliefs and actions establish his ethos. After conventions, candidates usually 
receive a bump in the polls. The Bush-Cheney campaign had to suppress that bump. 
Suppressing the bump affects perceptions. News reports of a lower than usual bump in 
the polls created a perception of a weak candidate. In this case, it helped the Bush-
Cheney campaign to generate uncertainty about Kerry. Senator Saxby Chamblis held a 
news conference to generate uncertainty. "The Republican senator from Georgia was part 
of a Republican 'truth squad' that held a news conference across the street from the 
FleetCenter, where the Democrats are holding their convention, to counter their political 
message and screen a video detailing Sen. John Kerry's alleged 'flip-flops' on the Iraq 
issue, with the theme from the TV show "Flipper" in the soundtrack" (Baxter, 2004, p, 
10A). Referring to themselves as the truth squad, they used pop cultural references to 
generate uncertainty. 
Strategic uncertainty was used to attack Kerry's competency. The Bush-Cheney 
campaign questioned Kerry's twenty years in the Senate, especially his inconsistent 
voting record, and Kerry's values as well. Both frames attacked Kerry's position on the 
war in Iraq. 
President Bush accused Sen. John Kerry on Tuesday of 
shifting positions on the war with Iraq... At a rally in 
Pensacola, Bush noted that his Democratic rival has 
criticized the war but said Monday that he still would have 
voted to give Bush the authority to go to war even if he had 
known that no weapons of mass destruction would be 
found (Keen, 2004, p. 8A). 
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The accusations rhetorically painted Kerry into a corner. He had to explain his 
position on the war in Iraq. Kerry was trapped. He equivocated, which subsequently 
generated uncertainty. 
It took a direct challenge from President Bush, who asked 
if Kerry would still have voted to authorize the use of force 
against Saddam Hussein if he knew that no weapons of 
mass destruction would be found... Still, Kerry's answer 
likely will raise some eyebrows among people who 
believed the Democratic nominee when he agreed that he 
was one of the "anti-war candidates (Fettman, 2004, p. 31). 
By forcing Kerry to equivocate, Bush generated uncertainty. One of the benefits 
of strategic uncertainty is the suppression of voters within the party. If party faithful 
perceive a candidate as uncertain, they will be less likely to vote. The Kerry-Edwards 
campaign had generated uncertainty with respect to their leadership credibility. One 
instance was when the Kerry campaign sent out two letters from the senator, one was 
targeted to anti-war constituents and the other emphasizing his support for President 
Bush's response to the crisis and the policy goals he established (Fettman, 2004, p. 31). 
Strategic uncertainty had not only generated uncertainty in the American 
electorate but it was affecting Kerry's supporters. Kerry's uncertainty made him appear 
incompetent to fight the war on terror or war in Iraq. It also created an image of a 
political opportunist. Kerry's practical wisdom and good will were hurt by strategic 
uncertainty. Kerry did not get much of a bump following the convention. "Not only had 
Kerry failed to energize the electorate, the convention raised issues and vulnerabilities in 
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the Kerry-Edwards ticket without providing a clear attack on the Bush-Cheney record" 
(Holloway, 2005, p. 49). Strategic uncertainty had blunted Kerry's uncertainty reduction 
and thus lowered his ethos. Kerry's credibility was severely damaged. 
General election. The general election period began immediately after the last day of 
the Republican convention. The general election period signals the lead up to election 
day. "However, once the final stage begins, the campaign communication is at once more 
intense, less interpersonal, but more direct and certainly more important" (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 2004, p. 61). Candidates attempt to frame the main issues for the election. 
"Democratic Kerry began the fall campaign on the defensive and faces the urgent 
necessity to make the race about the economy and other domestic concerns, after 
President Bush used his convention to say this election is all about keeping the country 
safe" (Broder & Balz, 2004, p. A01). It is also the stage where well-received campaign 
strategies are reinforced. Presidential debates are an important part of the general 
election. Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) argued "In politics, debating reveals problem-
solving abilities, habits of mind, and electoral appeal" (p. 37). 
Trent and Friedenberg (2004) suggested that every campaign tactic prior to the 
general election is a "dress rehearsal." The campaign solidifies campaign rhetoric for the 
run up to the election. Gronbeck (1978) argued that presidential campaigns accomplish 
three things: reinforce the party faithful; activate new voters, and convert by attracting 
undecided voters and other party faithful. Voters reveal their reinforcement, activation, or 
conversion through the adoption of campaign symbols. It could be an "I like Ike" button 
or someone just saying "I like Ike." Elder and Cobb (1983) argued that symbols are the 
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currency of political communication. Buttons, posters, words, and other forms of political 
reality symbols signal which political "currency" a voter should accept. 
In the 2004 election Bush supporters adopted pairs of flip-flops sandals to 
symbolize John Kerry's flip-flopping. Flip-flops communicated a code to people, that 
John Kerry changes his mind, that voters cannot predict his values, beliefs, or actions. 
The flip-flop sandal was a recognizable sign. Kerry's inconsistency and uncertainty were 
associated with the sandals, they had become politically charged. President Bush, for 
example, did not have to mention them; just bringing up Kerry's name would stir the 
audience to chant flip-flop. "At virtually every rally, Bush supporters interrupted] the 
stump speech whenever Kerry was mentioned to chant in a mocking sing-song tone: 
"Flip-flop! Flip-flop!" Senior Bush advisers revel in the refrain, and have used it as the 
basis for at least three advertisements since the end of the primaries" (Kornblut, 2004, 
March, p. Al). 
The term flip-flop had emerged from political think tanks. Flip-flop, referred to 
John Kerry's past as well as his future. Going into the 2004 general election the idea of 
Kerry being "'unsteady' as in 'not consistent, politically'" (McKinnon, 2006, p. 39) and 
"an uncertain leader who's wrong for the post-9/11 era" (Blomquist, 2004, p. 8) chained 
out (Bormann, 1972) from Bush-Cheney campaign communication to media pundits. By 
contrast, the Bush-Cheney campaign worked to create the perceptions of trustworthiness, 
competence, and predictability. "One advantage I think we had from the president's 
perspective is that voters might disagree on some policies but they always said, 'at least I 
know where this guy comes from and at least I know where he stands on this.'" 
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(McKinnon, 2006, p. 26). Campaign communication, social interaction and the 
presidential debates bolstered Kerry's uncertainty and Bush's certainty. 
September. Not long after the convention, Bush traveled to Wisconsin. The state was 
an important one. "As Bush spoke, his chief political aide, Karl Rove, emphasized in an 
interview how intense the Bush campaign in the state will be, saying, 'He (Bush) is going 
to treat Wisconsin like he's running for governor.'" (Borsuk & Carlson, 2004, p. 01A). 
When President Bush mentioned Kerry's name the crowd would chant flip-flop. The use 
of strategic uncertainty had become a common tactic by September. The chanting of 
"flip-flop" by Republican crowds became a ritual. The chant acted rhetorically as an 
enthymeme. Just the mention of the Kerry $87 million vote signaled Kerry's 
inconsistency. 
Two articles on the same day referred to Senator Kerry's issues positions as flip-
flops. In Deborah Orin's article, "Rivals at war over John's Flip-flop," the journalist 
suggested Kerry flip-flopped regularly. The use of flip-flop was the result of statements 
President Bush had made. "Just a few weeks ago, Kerry said he'd have voted for the war 
in Iraq even if he knew then what he knows now - that Saddam Hussein apparently didn't 
have weapons of mass destruction. Bush shot back, 'After voting for the war but against 
funding it, after saying he would have voted for the war even knowing everything we 
know today, my opponent woke up this morning with new campaign advisers and yet 
another position - suddenly, he's against it again.'" (Orin, 2004, September, p. 6). Having 
never mentioned the term flip-flop, Orin now used the term. In an article for the Boston 
Globe Sasha Talcott (2004) stated "Republicans who led chants of "Flip-flop!" at the 
GOP convention in New York last week say they have new ammunition against 
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presidential candidate John F. Kerry, who is on record as being both for and against a 
provision prohibiting Medicare from negotiating lower prices with drug companies" (p. 
Fl). Talcott reinforced the term. Talcott agreed that the Republicans who chanted "flip-
flop" held a correct perception of Kerry. Consequently, the term flip-flop gained 
rhetorical weight in the media. 
Throughout September the term flip-flop was used to describe Kerry's statements 
(Bishop, 2004, p, 6; Borsuk & Carlson, 2004, p. 01A; Byron, 2004, p. 39; Jones, 2004, p. 
10; Kornblut, 2004, March, p. Al; Orin, 2004, September, p. 6; Reinhard, 2004, p. B09; 
Stevenson, 2004, p. 18; Straub, 2004, p. 006; Talcott, 2004, p. Fl). The use of the term 
reinforced the Bush-Cheney use of strategic uncertainty. Voters read or heard the term 
and it became synonymous with John Kerry. Thus, they linked strategic uncertainty to 
Kerry's credibility. Because voters perceived Kerry as an uncertain candidate, they 
cannot predict his values, beliefs, or actions. When uncertainty is raised trustworthiness 
and competence decreases. 
The debates for the 2004 presidential election began at the end of September and 
ran through October. Debates are an important part of presidential elections. They are 
means of communicating values, beliefs, and competency. They also legitimate the 
democratic process. "Since 1976, debates have taken place in every presidential 
election.. .In order to lend some order and structure to the general election debates 
between presidential contenders, the Commission on Presidential Debates was created in 
1987" (Hollihan, 2001, p. 165). Debates give candidates a chance to formally introduce 
their political positions to the electorate. It is also an opportunity to attack an opponent's 
credibility. However, research suggests that debates only reinforce party and candidate 
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loyalty (Pfau & Kang, 1991; Zhu, Milavsky, & Biswas, 1994). However, the 2004 
election was different; the campaigns targeted undecided voters. "Bush targeted a 
national audience of undecided voters, largely with a single message — that he is a better 
bet to keep the country safe" (Broder & Balz, 2004, p. A01). Debates provide an 
opportunity to reach undecided voters. "Dowd said that unlike the partisans, the 
undecided voters pay attention largely to big events in the campaign, such as the 
conventions, and that the upcoming debates will play a crucial role in their decision-
making" (Broder & Balz, 2004, p. A01). The debates gave the Bush-Cheney campaign 
another opportunity to generate uncertainty about Senators Kerry and Edwards, while 
creating certainty about Bush. 
In the first debate on September 30, 2004, Bush bolstered his ethos and attacked 
Senator Kerry's ethos, using strategic uncertainty. The war on terror and the war in Iraq 
dominated the debate. The two issues were what the Bush-Cheney campaign ran on. The 
Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically maintained that the President was decisive, resolute, 
and strong. "The Bush approach was simple and repetitive, and it was to endorse Bush as 
a wartime president and decisive commander who stood for traditional values and whose 
reelection campaign message was national security and the war on terrorism" (Kenski & 
Kenski, 2005, p. 305). President Bush consistently appealed to what Aristotle called 
practical wisdom, wisdom and expertise, or competency. Practical wisdom demonstrates 
expertise, which "asserted his personal mastery of a new situation, the exclusivity of his 
expert information, his personal embodiment of that expertise, and his compact with the 
people" (Smith, 2005, p. 136). Bush described the achievements of his administration, 
including funding for the war on terror, Iraq, and homeland security. To appeal to his 
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practical wisdom and good will Bush used The Department of Homeland Security as an 
example. He told audiences that his efforts had bolstered the southern border. He also 
noted his financial support for fire and police ($3.1 billion) (Bush, 2004). By revealing a 
dollar amount President Bush establishes his practical wisdom, a desire to protect the 
people. Bush appealed to his practical wisdom regarding the war in Iraq by allying 
himself with its Prime Minister. He argued that they were "ready to fight for their own 
freedom" (Bush, 2004). This affirmed his leadership and military expertise. It also 
created the impression that he had formed a democratic nation. 
Bush also reminded the audience that Osama bin Laden is "isolated. Seventy-five 
percent of his people have been brought to justice" (Bush, 2004). With Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda being the primary enemy in the war on terrorism, Bush appealed to his 
military leadership and the interests of a now free people. President Bush also reminded 
the electorate of the world's uncertainty. President Bush discussed that his administration 
in conjunction with over 60 nations set in place the Proliferation Security Initiative. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative disrupts "trans-shipments of information and/or weapons 
of mass destruction materials" (Bush, 2004). He constantly affirmed that his expertise 
and actions work for the best interests of the people. Bush provided an example of how 
the Proliferation Security Initiative operates: "We busted the A.Q. Khan network. This 
was a proliferator out of Pakistan that was selling secrets to places like North Korea and 
Libya. We convinced Libya to disarm. It's a central part of dealing with weapons of mass 
destruction and proliferation" (Bush, 2004). President Bush also appealed to practical 
wisdom and good will by noting that the Libyans, a one-time terrorist harboring nation, 
were peacefully dismantling its weapons programs. 
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President Bush supported his practical wisdom and good will mainly through 
well-known examples. Examples provide for the audience proof of Bush's leadership and 
how that leadership leads to safety. However, to appeal to his character, Bush compared 
himself to Senator Kerry. Bush argued that the best way to defeat terrorists is to "never 
waver." After months of establishing Kerry as a flip-flopper the implication was that 
Kerry would be incapable of defeating terrorism. Twice Bush referred to his refusal to 
change his core values. President Bush explicitly referred to uncertainty and certainty. He 
argued that if America shows uncertainty, the world would drift into chaos. The president 
complements Kerry on his years of service but contends that world leaders only trust 
certainty. Bush suggests throughout the speech that the only way to win the war is to 
remain steadfast. He uses the steadfast and resolved issue as his final argument. Bush 
asserted Senator Kerry's core values change to suit politics: his by contrast, do not. Bush 
argued that he is reliable and predictable. Uncertainty, he maintained, cannot lead a 
nation, does not have the nation's best interest in mind, and is immoral. 
Throughout the debate, President Bush attacked Senator Kerry's ethos and his 
lack of certainty. Bush used two messages to generate uncertainty. Bush maintained that 
Kerry sent mixed messages. President Bush argued that a president needed to speak 
clearly and not send mixed messages to our troops, allies, or the Iraqi citizens. Though 
not directly naming Kerry, Bush enthymematically indicted Kerry for sending mixed 
messages. As a part of the "mixed-messages" tactic Bush repeatedly reminded audiences 
of Kerry's statement that the war in Iraq was the "wrong war, at the wrong time, in the 
wrong place." If Kerry believed the war was wrong, it begs the question could Kerry 
lead? In a time of war, voters do not want to risk finding an inappropriate answer. By 
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creating doubt regarding Kerry, people perceived him as being uncertain regarding the 
war in Iraq. 
To foster additional uncertainty regarding Kerry, Bush argued that the only thing 
consistent about Kerry is inconsistency (Bush, 2004). Throughout the debate Bush 
contended people will not follow someone who constantly changes positions on the 
issues. President Bush frequently repeated that Kerry had seen the same intelligence 
reports on Iraq as he. Upon seeing that intelligence, Kerry had voted to give Bush the 
authority to declare war. A rhetorically devastating perception of Kerry was created. He 
was seen as someone who says one thing and then another. His inconsistency raised the 
question whether or not he was wishing to say anything in order to be elected. This called 
into question his good will. Such behavior does not reflect the core values of Americans. 
"Bush's commercials had made Kerry's remark that he voted for the eighty-seven-
billion-dollar supplement appropriation for the war before he voted against it perhaps his 
best known statement about the war, at least in the battleground states where the clip of 
Kerry's remark was being played repeatedly in Bush commercials" (Friedenberg, 2005, 
p. 105). Kerry's quote was linked with the term flip-flop in large part due to the Bush-
Cheney campaign. 
Sixty-four million people watched the first debate, an increase from previous 
presidential debates (Friedenberg, 2005). With a large audience, this gave the Bush-
Cheney campaign a chance to rhetorically communicate their message of strategic 
uncertainty. President Bush's strategy was to generate uncertainty about Kerry while 
supporting his own ethos as a predictable, competent candidate. He accomplished this in 
a variety of ways. Bush laid out specific numbers for the plans he had implemented, 
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creating the perception of competency. He was able to create uncertainty about Kerry's 
good will and character. "The American people had come to know him [Bush] as 
someone who was very credible, who was going to deal straight with them" (Cheney, 
2006, p. 127). 
The second presidential debate took place on October 8, 2004 on the campus of 
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. "This was the town hall debate in which 
an audience of 140 undecided voters, identified by the Gallup Organization, asked 
questions" (Friedenberg, 2005, p. 113). Whereas in the first debate the contenders mainly 
discussed foreign policy, the second debate included domestic issues. Bush's tactic was 
to steer discussion to the war on terrorism and Iraq. The first question posed to Senator 
Kerry exemplified how the use of strategic uncertainty had taken hold. "Senator Kerry, 
after talking with several co-workers and family and friends, I asked the ones who said 
they were not voting for you, 'Why?' They said that you were too wishy-washy. Do you 
have a reply for them?" (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2004, October 8). The 
opening question immediately suggested that people perceived Kerry as uncertain. This 
allowed Bush to contrast Kerry to that. He reminded the audience of September 11, 2001 
and that through his actions, seventy-five percent of Al Qaeda has been brought to 
justice. He also explains how the Taliban are no longer in power in Afghanistan. He later 
appealed to his sense of expertise in handling the war on terror when he explained to the 
audience "I fully understand the threat" (Bush, 2004) and followed by explaining the 
certainty of his war plans. Bush recounted the Iraq finance minister's optimism, told of 
the reconstruction efforts and argued that everything was better than portrayed in the 
media. Bush bolstered his practical wisdom giving examples of positive events and plans 
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unfolding in Iraq. "Casting himself as a strong and resolute wartime leader" (Friedenberg, 
2005, p. 118). He later bolstered his good will and character by explaining how his 
decision to invade Iraq may have been unpopular but that it was the right thing to do. 
"Bush was effective in presenting himself as a leader who would make an unpopular 
decision if he believed it was right" (Friedenberg, 2005, p. 116). 
For domestic issues, Bush used the same strategy. He maintained that his policies 
were working. He pointed to tax cuts and environmental plans. His domestic policies, he 
suggested, benefit the people. Bush briefly contrasted his ethos with Senator Kerry's. 
Regarding the war on terror, he explained that increased spending on homeland security 
had helped secure our borders. He maintained that the war on terror will be long, 
requiring of us steadfast determinism. Bush argued that Kerry's plan for the war in Iraq 
was, in fact, Bush's plan, suggesting that Kerry could not create his own plan. On 
domestic issues, he questioned Kerry's accomplishments in bettering Medicare. Another 
uncertainty-generating tactic was risky when Kerry answered a few questions, Bush's 
initial response was to suggest that he did not understand Kerry's answer. After Kerry 
answered a question about abortion, Bush initially responded with "I'm trying to decipher 
that" (Bush, 2004). When Kerry asserted that Bush was benefiting from tax cuts through 
his timber business, Bush jovially responded that he did not know he had a timber 
company. By not responding to what Kerry said and calling into question Kerry's 
answers, Bush generated uncertainty about Kerry. If it is hard to understand Kerry's 
answer now, it will be hard to understand him as President. 
President Bush engaged strategic uncertainty as an offensive for the second 
debate. He attacked Kerry's ethos in the two main areas of the debate, foreign policy and 
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domestic issues. "On both foreign-policy and domestic issues, Bush claimed that the 
senator constantly changed positions to secure political advantage" (Friedenberg, 2005, p. 
118). Kerry's willingness to change positions deteriorated Kerry's practical wisdom and 
character, while the charge of political gain lowered Kerry's good will. 
In response to the first question about Senator Kerry being "wishy-washy," 
President Bush launched a strategic uncertainty assault. "I can see why people at your 
workplace think he changes positions a lot, because he does. He said he voted for the $87 
billion, and voted against it right before he voted for it. And that sends a confusing signal 
to people" (Bush, 2004). Bush then drew attention to Kerry's original statements that the 
senator thought Saddam Hussein was a grave threat to the United States. Later, for 
political reasons, Kerry thought it was a mistake to remove Saddam Hussein. Bush 
attributed that change in position to political gain within the Democratic Party. By citing 
Kerry's inconsistencies Bush was able to bolster the questioner's uncertainty and adding 
to the "charge that he was a political opportunist who flip-flopped on issues according to 
the prevailing political sentiment" (Friedenberg, 2005, p. 118). President Bush's opening 
statement previewed later uses of strategic uncertainty. 
Bush attacked Kerry's agreement with military intelligence justifying the war in 
Iraq. He repeated the rhetorical attack multiple times. He also relied on using Kerry's 
"wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time" quote to attack Kerry's practical 
wisdom as commander-in-chief. It did not help that "Senator Kerry was never able lay 
out a coherent position on the war on terror or the war in Iraq" (Cheney, 2006, p. 128). In 
other areas of foreign policy, Bush continued questioning Kerry as a world leader. He 
brought up Kerry's use of a "global test" from the first debate. In the first debate, Senator 
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Kerry referred to the U.S. passing a global test before it invaded another country. The 
Bush-Cheney campaign began to use the term "global test" as a way to generate 
uncertainty. "(Kerry wants) some sort of global test before we can use our troops to 
defend ourselves," Bush said" (Guarino, 2004, p. 006). "Global testing" generated 
uncertainty, creating the impression that Kerry would consult the U.N. rather than the 
people of the United States. It chained out into the media and generated uncertainty about 
Kerry. "Each premise of Kerry's terminal strategy is filled with contradictions. Kerry 
speaks now of the necessity to assuage our allies have U.N. approval and meet a 'global 
test.' Yet as recently as 2002, before 1,000 Americans had been killed in Iraq and when 
going to war against terrorists and their sponsors was a popular strategy, Kerry took a 
different position" (Gurwitz, 2004, p. 3H). Kerry's uncertainty was not just a liability but 
also a threat. Bush informed the audience that Kerry had advised the U.S. to establish 
bilateral relations with North Korea. Bush then argued that Kerry was accusing Bush of 
not acting multilateral with North Korea. President Bush generated uncertainty about 
Kerry's ethos on foreign affairs, as well as handling domestic issues. 
Friedenberg (2005) stated that in the second debate Bush seemed to be the 
aggressor when it came to domestic issues. Because Kerry had 20 years in the Senate 
President Bush was able to juxtapose Kerry's past with his present. Although he claimed 
to support domestic issues, Bush noted that Kerry seldom voted for them. "And what are 
his health programs? First, he says he's for medical liability reform, particularly for 
OB/GYNs. There's a bill on the floor of the United States Senate that he could have 
showed up and voted for if he's so much for it" (Bush, 2004). Bush pointed out Kerry's 
inconsistent voting record regarding domestic issues. His remarks were designed to 
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generate uncertainty regarding Kerry's good will and character. Bush also attacked 
Kerry's practical wisdom. "Secondly, he says that medical liability costs only cause a 1 
percent increase. That shows a lack of understanding. Doctors practice defensive 
medicine because of all the frivolous lawsuits that cost our government $28 billion a 
year" (Bush, 2004). Arguing that Kerry lacked an understanding of medical liability 
suggests that he lacks expertise in domestic issues. Bush ended the debate thusly: "He 
complains about the fact our troops don't have adequate equipment, yet he voted against 
the $87 billion supplemental I sent to the Congress and then issued one of the most 
amazing quotes in political history: 'I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted 
against it'" (Bush, 2004). Kerry's statement once again returned to haunt him. 
Even Kerry's responses to Bush generated uncertainty. "The sort of gymnastics 
that they continued to see with Senator Kerry's position I think raised their discomfort 
level to the point that they didn't feel comfortable voting for Senator Kerry" (Cheney, 
2006, p. 128). He could not correct for his inconsistent voting record or position-stands. 
The final debate was hosted on October 13, 2004 on the Arizona State University 
campus. The debate focused on domestic issues. It did not cover new issues. Friedenberg 
(2005) stated the last debate was the least important because candidates would use new 
questions to repeat comments from previous debates. President Bush used new questions 
to bolster his ethos and lower uncertainty. He referred to plans and past programs he had 
initiated. However, Bush's strategic uncertainty remarks attacked Kerry's 
unpredictability. 
Bush attacked Kerry on the usual issues. He assailed Kerry's practical wisdom, 
suggesting that the senator did not have the wisdom nor the expertise to lead the country. 
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Bush accomplished this by using Kerry's voting record against him. The voting record 
tactic called into question Kerry's good will, virtue, and practical wisdom . In the final 
debate, Bush introduced a new tactic. Cheney (2006) argued that it was clear that Kerry 
did not have a plan for the war on terrorism or the war in Iraq; which, translated into lack 
of vision. A plan or a vision is essential for a presidential candidate (Strachan & Kendall, 
2004). Bush also brought up Kerry's failure to plan for Medicare, social security, and 
health care. 
Bush generated uncertainty about Kerry's abilities as a leader, good will, and 
virtue by pointing to inconsistencies in Kerry's 20 year voting record, fluctuating 
positions, lack of vision, and inconsistency with respect to core values. In the meantime, 
Bush envisioned himself as a strong, resolute leader with a clear vision and a proven 
record of accomplishment. That clear vision and proven record of accomplishment 
created a perception of certainty and credibility. 
The term flip-flop now symbolized Senator Kerry. Bush supporters used it both 
humorously and as a symbol of support for President Bush. No longer was the symbol 
limited to Senator Kerry; it became a means of recognizing Bush's stalwartness. "At one 
such event, a veteran questioned whether Bush would permit him 'the honor of giving 
our Commander in Chief a real Navy salute, and not a flip-flop'" (Allen, 2004, p. A09). 
The term flip-flop soon chained out to other campaign attacks. Politicians began to add 
their own embellishments to the term, as in the Colorado Senate race. "Pete Coors' Senate 
campaign charged Sunday that Democratic rival Ken Salazar has 'flip-flop-flipped' on 
his position on Iraq" (Barrels, 2004, October 11, p. 20A). Clearly, as a rhetorical device it 
was used in a negative way to attack good will and/or practical wisdom. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
In an effort to advance knowledge about uncertainty and its relationship to 
political rhetoric, this study investigated the conditions, situations, strategies, advantages 
and disadvantages of uncertainty as a rhetorical strategy. The study was constructed a 
framework upon which a future theory may be built. The method of analysis was 
rhetorical generative criticism. Foss (2004) describes generative criticism as generating 
"units of analysis or an explanation from your artifact rather than from previously 
developed formal methods of criticism" (p. 411). Given the scope of the study and its 
research questions, rhetorical generative theory is an appropriate critical tool. According 
to Foss (2004), rhetorical generative theory can be used to analyze verbal and visual 
texts. It is also suited for framing future theory (Foss, 2004). 
This study is made up of four stages. The first stage identified, collected, and 
transcribed the Bush-Cheney 2004 presidential election television commercials. The 
second stage analyzed and coded 59 Republican television ads that attacked John Kerry's 
ethos. The third stage interpreted data and answered the research questions. Finally, the 
viability and risks of uncertainty as a rhetorical strategy will be discussed. 
The researcher first identified and collected artifacts, in particular the Bush-
Cheney campaign commercials aired on television in select media market-places from 
January to October of 2004. The ads were produced and financed by the Bush-Cheney 
2004 campaign. Candidate ads were analyzed as opposed to ads aired by private interest 
groups. Analysis of the commercials should reveal the evocative power of the television's 
visual grammar (Jamieson, 1992). Television invites strong reaction because it is a part 
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of everyday life in the US (Brummett, 1994, p.21). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, 
political television ads impact voters (National Public Radio, October 31, 2006). This 
study examined 59 ads financed and produced by the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign, 
archived at Stanford University's Political Communication Lab website. The 
advertisements are archived in the order of the months they appeared (between January 
2004 until October 2004). The months were January to March, April to May, June, July, 
August, September, and October. Fifty-eight of the commercials are thirty seconds long. 
According to Trent and Friedenberg (2004), the thirty second spot became dominant 
because research showed that they were just as effective as longer spots. One of the 
commercials is a two minute and twenty-eight second spot featuring Laura Bush, which 
contains an embedded thirty-second political ad. Each commercial has a statement of 
approval by George W. Bush. To assure code reliability a set of coding rules were 
designed and followed. The researcher conducted all of the coding. 
A first viewing analyzed each commercial for a general assessment of its content. 
Each commercial was assigned to one of three major categories and one minor category. 
The three major categories include: Attacking ethos, Bolstering ethos, and Miscellaneous. 
A minor category is "Generating situational uncertainty." An advertisement that "attacks 
ethos" has signs and symbols meant to generate uncertainty about a candidate's 
credibility. "Bolstering ethos" ads contain signs and symbols that reinforce, remind, or 
reveal a candidate's credibility. "Miscellaneous" is a commercial that does neither. The 
minor category is a commercial that contains signs and symbols designated to generate 
situational uncertainty. 
97 
A second inspection transcribed the verbal text. In order to transcribe verbal texts 
each video was played absent images. In the case of a non-identifiable person, only their 
sex will be identified. In some commercials, the identity of the people speaking is easily 
recognized. For instance, President Bush, Laura Bush, and John McCain appear in some 
commercials. 
A third viewing of a commercial coded referential and condensation symbols in 
the video. According to Edelman (1967) "Referential symbols are economical ways of 
referring to the objective elements in objects or situations....Such symbols are useful 
because they help in logical thinking about the situation" (p. 6). Images in the 
commercials depict who or what, which in turn likely supports the verbal text. Images in 
political commercials serve as arguments that support verbal assertions (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 2004). The other symbol assessed will be the condensation symbol. 
According Edelman (1967) a condensation symbol condense into one symbolic event, 
sign, or act. For example, in commercials dealing with the economy condensation 
symbols of stock market numbers and people working are used to support the commercial 
is about the economy. 
The fourth viewing aligned the verbal text with the video images. To accomplish 
this each image will be described separately and in the order of their appearance. Each 
description of the images was assigned an "Image 1" or "Image 2" category. To align the 
image with the verbal text, images assigned " 1 " were indicated in the verbal text with 
regular font. Images assigned "2" were indicated in italics. The aligning of the images 
with text allows for a clearer look at where the visuals support the verbal text. 
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The second stage of analysis examined each Bush-Cheney commercial and coded 
it for strategic uncertainty appeals. This stage of the analysis was conducted in six steps. 
Three steps interpreted verbal texts, and three examined images. The first step coded a 
commercial's central features. According to Foss (2004), the first part of coding is to 
discover the central features of the artifact. Three codes constitute the central features of 
Bush-Cheney commercials. First, Attacking ethos, Second, Bolstering ethos, and 
Miscellaneous. Situational uncertainty works in tandem with the strategies of attacking or 
bolstering so it will be identified if present in the commercial. 
The next step analyzed the verbal texts. The verbal text is essential to create 
strategic uncertainty in a commercial. For attacking and bolstering ethos, ethos will be 
broken into the following sub-categories identified by Aristotle: "Practical wisdom, 
virtue, and good will" (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 120-121). The verbal text was analyzed for 
statements that attack or bolster practical wisdom, virtue, or good will. Practical wisdom 
for this study is defined as competency as leader. Competency is often found in a 
politician's actions. In Uncertainty Reduction Theory people seek to predict an 
individual's actions to lower uncertainty. Virtue is defined, like in Uncertainty Reduction 
Theory, as values. Good will is characterized as trustworthiness. Uncertainty Reduction 
Theory labels it "attitudes." Because the commercial may not isolate a particular sub-
category of ethos, permutations of each sub-category will be assigned. For instance, the 
permutation of sub-categories could be practical wisdom and virtue, practical wisdom 
and good will, virtue and good will, or a configuration of all three. Some commercials do 
not just attack the ethos of a candidate or reinforce the ethos of President Bush, some 
heighten the perception of situational uncertainty. Statements were analyzed and labeled 
PW for practical wisdom, V for virtue, and GW for good will, and any permutation of the 
three sub-categories of ethos that may come. Any statement analyzed and found to 
heighten situational uncertainty, it was labeled "Sit. U." Situational uncertainty-
generating statements were identified as they raised probabilities, confusion, or doubt 
about world events. Four of the five areas of uncertainty code commercials that heighten 
situational uncertainty: political, environmental, societal, and economic uncertainty, and 
permutations of these areas. The three general categories are not mutually exclusive. A 
commercial could attack ethos while bolstering Bush's credibility or generate situational 
uncertainty and bolster Bush's ethos, or attack Kerry's ethos. The final code is 
Miscellaneous. These are Bush-Cheney commercials that do not fall under strategic 
uncertainty. Though these have a rhetorical strategy, they do not further the 
understanding of strategic uncertainty. Those commercials labeled "miscellaneous" will 
be discarded from the sample. 
The third step determines an ad's general overview. Coding evaluated the intent 
of the attack or bolster, expressed in a phrase that sums up the attack's verbal intention. 
Foss (2004) suggested writing a paraphrase, phrase, or label that describes what a 
researcher sees in the passage, quotation, or image, or what it might mean (p. 414). For 
example, in the pilot study the majority of the statements attacked Senator Kerry's 
practical wisdom. The final statement raised uncertainty about Kerry's good will. The 
phrase sums up the attack with: Attacking competency raises uncertainty about Kerry's 
good will. Though the verbal text establishes the use of strategic uncertainty, images also 
play an integral part. 
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Strachan and Kendall (2004) argued that "The use of visual rhetoric has expanded 
as visual symbols that construct meaning can be readily conveyed to a mass audience" (p. 
137). The meaning of the visual symbols used in political television commercials support 
the verbal text (Strachan & Kendall, 2004, p. 137). Therefore, the visuals were sorted by 
how they support the attack, bolster, or generate situational uncertainty. Images can be 
powerful factors in strategic uncertainty. Erickson (2000) suggested that political imagery 
is used to manipulate and misrepresent the political reality of voters. For example, an 
image of a man who wears a mask while shooting an AK-47 is an iconic image of a 
terrorist. Terrorist images manipulate audience's fears. Implied fear of a terrorist attack 
heightens a climate of uncertainty. 
Image analysis was conducted in three stages. The first stage examined whether 
images reinforce the verbal texts or whether they mutually support each other. Each 
statement that coincides with an image was condensed to the basic idea. For example, in 
the commercial Priorities the first image is a white background with a cursor printing out 
blue text that reads: "Leadership Means Choosing Priorities." The voiceover echoes these 
words as the text prints out. The image was coded as "priorities" to coincide with the 
verbal text. In some cases, however, the image does not completely align with specific 
text. When this occurred a general overview of the images was assessed along regarding 
how those images interact with the overall commercial. 
The next step coded an image's rhetorical intention. According to Edelman (1967) 
a condensation symbol is meant to evoke an emotion. Whereas, reference symbols depict 
objective elements like who, what, where, condensation symbols depict ideas and values 
associated with specific images. "Clearly images can be perceived at different levels of 
generality, depending on the context, depending on who the image is for, and what its 
purpose is" (Van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 95). For example, in one commercial the verbal text 
states that Kerry missed a vote to reduce the cost of health care. The verbal text 
corresponds with a black and white image of an elderly woman. The verbal text suggests 
that Kerry's voting record is bad for elderly citizens. The image implies who would be 
affected by Kerry's voting record. While the image of the elderly woman suggests who 
will be affected, the black and white tint is dramatically symbolic. Black and white is 
used as a condensation symbol communicating that voting to reduce health care is a right 
or wrong issue. Kerry had a right or wrong decision to make, and he chose to make the 
wrong decision. Images were coded with a phrase that describes the image's contextual 
and symbolic usage and how it relates to the use of strategic uncertainty. Coding 
consisted of writing a phrase that describes the impression of the image. For instance, in 
the pilot study the image of the black and white elderly lady was coded as "Kerry's 
decisions negatively affect the elderly." 
The final step in analysis of images is the "strategic uncertainty" coding stage. 
The images were assessed regarding how they support the attack or bolster ethos. This 
analysis consisted of assessing the previous steps and the coding of PW, V, and GW for 
each image. For example, if a commercial's verbal text attacks Kerry's virtue the images 
will be assessed for the same effect. 
The third stage of the study formulated an explanatory schema for strategic 
uncertainty as well as answer the research questions. The explanatory schema advanced 
the previous analyses, as after the artifacts were categorized and coded they were 
analyzed for commonalities. The commonalities in the commercials helped isolate 
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specific rhetorical strategies for generating uncertainty. Though prior research exists in 
political communication (Alvarez, 1997; Berelson, Lazarfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Gelman 
& King, 1993; Holbrook, 1996; Joslyn, 1990; Popkin, 1991) none of it explains how 
uncertainty can be used as a rhetorical strategy. According to Foss (2004), rhetorical 
generative criticism maybe beneficial in developing an explanatory schema. "An 
explanatory schema is a framework for organizing your insights about the artifact in a 
coherent and insightful way" (Foss, 2004, p. 419). The explanatory schema for strategic 
uncertainty should emerge from attempts to answer the research question. Generating 
uncertainty about a candidate's ethos and the rhetorical situation would explain how 
perceptions of credibility can be affected in a political campaign. 
To create the explanatory schema Foss (2004) offered three techniques-cutting 
and sorting codes, engaging in a conceptualizing conversation, and brainstorming (pp. 
420-421). To create a more robust analysis two techniques were employed. The first 
technique employed sought to cut and sort codes. Foss (2004) stated that the cutting and 
sorting codes technique requires the researcher to cut up the notes and codes generated 
during the analysis. Once the notes and codes are sorted, categories are subsequently 
created (p. 420). Each commercial was transcribed. Codes and notes were made on the 
transcription, which were subsequently sorted into major categories, (attacking, attacking 
and bolstering, bolstering, miscellaneous). Each coded transcription of a commercial was 
coded if it generated situational uncertainty. Categorized transcripts were sub-divided 
into the following categories, practical wisdom, virtue, and good will. The sub-categories 
coincide with uncertainty reduction actions, beliefs, and values. The categories help 
reveal the commonalities in the commercial to show how strategic uncertainty was 
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rhetorically implemented. The second technique employed was what Foss (2004) referred 
to as questioning that "provides an opportunity to challenge assumptions you might be 
holding about an artifact and to pursue various aspects of it in depth" (p. 424). After the 
strategic uncertainty appeals are coded, a rigorous analysis of the data should create an 
understanding of how strategic uncertainty functions rhetorically. 
A discussion was generated from the explanatory schema that addressed the 
study's research questions. The explanatory schema should reveal the intended rhetorical 
purposes of strategic uncertainty in political campaigns. A discussion section will explain 
the structure, viability and risks of strategic uncertainty. The process of generative 
criticism will help generate a rhetorical appreciation of the television ads used by 
Republicans in the 2004 campaign. Finally, future research implications will be 
discussed. This study built a framework for a theory of strategic uncertainty. Hopefully, 
this framework will help future investigators to construct a theory of strategic 
uncertainty. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to test the viability of the rhetorical methods 
employed. Two Bush-Cheney campaign commercials were analyzed. The method was 
found to be feasible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
The Uncertainty Rhetorical Situation Feedback Loop 
Bitzer (1968) describes a rhetorical situation as "A complex of persons, events, 
objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely 
or partially removed of discourses introduced into the situation, can so constrain human 
decision or action as to bring about significant modification or the exigence" (p. 386). 
Grant-Davie (1997) suggested that Bitzer's definition of the rhetorical situation means, 
"A rhetorical situation is a situation where a speaker or writer sees a need to change 
reality and sees that the change may be effected through rhetorical discourse" (p. 265). 
The use of strategic uncertainty in the 2004 election was augmented by an uncertain 
rhetorical situation. At the same time, it also generated uncertainty in the rhetorical 
situation. In the case of the 2004 election, the atmosphere of uncertainty became the 
exigence for strategic uncertainty. Bitzer (1968) identifies exigence as an imperfection 
marked by urgency, a defect, or obstacle. In the 2004 election, there were two 
identifiable exigencies for an uncertain rhetorical situation. First, one exigence was John 
Kerry's history as a U.S. Senator. The second exigence, and perhaps the most important, 
were the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. 
The uncertain rhetorical situation had established how people were likely to react 
to terrorist attacks. "Events such as the terrorist spectacle attacks in the United States, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Egypt have monumental short-and long 
term impact on agenda setting" (Matsaganis & Payne, 2005, p. 381). Terrorism and the 
subsequent war on terror defined the 2004 election. By making the war on terror the focal 
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point of the 2004 campaign, the Bush-Cheney Campaign not only played to the perceived 
strengths of President Bush, the Bush-Cheney campaign played to the weakness of John 
Kerry. Bush-Cheney campaign highlighted Kerry's inconsistent voting record and his 
inconsistent statements. Edelman (1967) argues that a political actor must create the 
personification of the enemy. In the case of the 2004 election, it would have been 
unproductive to identify Kerry as a terrorist. Instead, the Bush-Cheney campaign 
identified Senator Kerry with the uncertain rhetorical situation. If there is an atmosphere 
of uncertainty, then a person who seems uncertain in his or her own actions and values 
may add more uncertainty. Like in an uncertain market, those perceived as having good 
information may cause others to follow (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). "A leader whose acts, 
suggest that he has a strategy and is pursuing it, finds it easy to attract a loyal and 
enthusiastic following" (Edelman, 1967, p. 82). This attraction becomes more powerful 
in an uncertain rhetorical situation. People knew who Bush was and where he stood and 
what he was likely to do (McKinnon, 2006). 
As argued before, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent international 
actions had created an atmosphere of uncertainty in the United States. This became the 
exigence to discuss the war on terror. However, discussion about the rhetorical situation 
generated uncertainty. By mentioning the uncertainty inherent in the rhetorical situation, 
the rhetor generates additional uncertainty, and thus reinforces the exigence. Ogden and 
Richards (1928) argued that the context will help create interpretations of symbols "The 
peculiarity of interpretation being when a context has affected us in the past the 
recurrence of merely a part of that context will cause us to react in the way in which we 
reacted before" (p. 53). By talking about terrorism, terrorist attacks, a candidate generates 
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uncertainty. That uncertainty in turn will affect how people perceive the "symbols" used 
by campaigns. Ogden and Richards (1928) contended that symbols cause certain 
thoughts, that create the use of particular symbols. If a candidate generates uncertainty 
using certainty symbols, the audience will, according to Berger and Calabrese (1975) 
seek to lower it. To lower that uncertainty people will look to a leader who will use 
"symbols" of certainty (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Edelman, 1967). That search for a 
leader, due to an uncertain situation, creates a need for a leader. 
Strategic uncertainty was used in a variety of ways in the 2004 election, to attack 
Senator Kerry. First, it disrupted the political reality of Senator Kerry. Acceptance of a 
candidate's political reality is important for a voter to identify with and vote for a 
candidate. Strategic uncertainty alters that reality. Second, because strategic uncertainty 
creates a need for a leader, strategic uncertainty disassociates a candidate from the mythic 
presidency. However, those effects are encouraged through one important aspect of 
strategic uncertainty; it creates an opportunity for rhetoric. 
Strategic Uncertainty Creates Opportunity for Rhetoric 
Sorrentino and Roney (1999) argued that "certainty is a desirable state" (p. 15). 
Barilli (1989) argues that, rhetoric finds fertile ground in which a person or audience 
doubts. Bryant (1953) argues that rhetoric exists because there is no certainty in human 
affairs. Strategic uncertainty creates an opportunity for rhetoric, as it did in the 2004 
election. That uncertainty was used to attack ethos through disrupting political reality and 
separating a candidate from the mythic presidency. Strategic uncertainty was also used to 
attack and bolster ethos through political antithesis. Finally, bolstering ethos creates 
certainty in a candidate. 
Strategic Uncertainty Disrupts a Campaign's Political Reality 
Atkins and Heald (1976) defined political knowledge as "an individual's ability to 
recall candidate's names, personal characteristics and qualifications; to identify election 
issues and current campaign developments, and to recognize connections between 
candidates and issue positions" (p. 216). The creation of a candidate's political reality is 
meant to communicate to and affect a voter's political knowledge. Nimmo and Combs 
(1983) asserted, "Campaign propaganda aims at mediating two closely related, 
overlapping fantasies. First, propaganda constructs fantasies about the candidate, his 
qualities, qualifications, program, and destiny" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 63). That 
information lowers uncertainty. With lowered uncertainty about a candidate's qualities, 
qualifications, and programs, a campaign hopes people will perceive the candidate as 
being a credible leader. Their trustworthiness as a leader (good will) is symbolized 
through their qualities (i.e. virtue and beliefs), qualifications and programs (i.e. practical 
wisdom). "Second, propaganda mediates realities about the nature of the world, the array 
of forces, dangers, threats, and enemies that must be confronted and vanquished" 
(Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 63). 
The second fantasy helps define the rhetorical situation for voters. Edelman 
(1988) stated that political reality fits into citizens' rhetorically created social structures, 
and constructs a world of threats and reassurances. In those political realities, crafted by 
the campaign, the first fantasy builds and reinforces a candidate's ethos. It constructs a 
reality where the candidate has the qualities (virtue) and qualifications (practical 
wisdom), to remedy problems faced by the nation. The second fantasy creates those 
problems. "The linkage of the two fantasies is essential, that is, the destiny of the 
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candidate becomes the destiny of the political world" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 63). 
The two fantasies work together to create a reality where a candidate is the right choice as 
a leader. Strategic uncertainty questions political realities by generating uncertainty about 
the candidate's "qualities, qualifications, program, and destiny" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, 
p. 63). Because of the linkage of the two fantasies, uncertainty affects the second reality. 
If there is uncertainty about a candidate's credibility, then there is uncertainty about 
whether he or she can rectify problems. It becomes important for a campaign to 
communicate the proper information to lower uncertainty in the electorate. Nimmo and 
Combs (1983) argued that candidates create their rhetorical visions, and each form of 
communication from the campaign is carefully crafted to portray that vision. For people 
to accept that vision they must accept the ethos of the candidate. 
A major part of the structure of a political reality is the ethos of the candidate. A 
candidate's ethos affirms a large portion of his or her political reality. The threats, 
danger, and issues structure of the political reality may be independent of the rhetorical 
visions of a candidate, but credibility helps voters accept a candidate. First, a candidate's 
credibility is heightened if voters perceive a candidate as addressing issues important to 
them. For example, in the 2004 election Evangelicals were "courted" by the Bush-
Cheney campaign on the issue of homosexual marriage. That issue was important to a 
specific segment of the population and by addressing it President Bush's credibility was 
heightened. Second, voters must perceive that a candidate understands the rhetorical 
situation. For example, President Bush in the 2004 presidential election kept reiterating 
his understanding of the threats posed by terrorists. Third, voters need to believe a 
candidate can handle threats, dangers and issues posed by a campaign. In the 2004 
presidential election President Bush presented himself as a candidate who could handle 
economic threats, danger of terrorism, and homosexual marriage. If voters are uncertain 
of a candidate's ethos, then they may not believe he or she knows what is a threat, 
danger, or a issue. If a candidate does not know the situation then they cannot rectify the 
circumstances (Ball-Rokeach, 1973). On the other hand, if voters are uncertain about a 
candidate's qualities or qualifications, they may be perceived as not having the ability to 
rectify dangers, threats, or issues. If a majority of that political reality is affected by 
uncertainty pertaining to a candidate's ethos, then people are less likely to vote for the 
candidate. Strategic uncertainty becomes a weapon used to disassemble political realities. 
Strategic uncertainty generates uncertainty by attacking the credibility of the candidate 
and in turn disrupting their political reality. Strategic uncertainty attacks the campaign 
narrative four ways. First, it puts a campaign on the defensive. Second, it interjects an 
opponent's political reality into the candidate's political reality. Third, it highlights a 
candidate's inconsistency. Finally, it redefines the candidate. 
Why it is important to be consistent. 
A powerful way to generate uncertainty is to highlight inconsistency. 
"Inconsistency has a negative effect on a candidate's image. Perceptions of a candidate's 
honesty, knowledge, strength, and stability suffered when seen as uncertain of his or her 
stance" (Page, 1978, p. 142). Highlighting inconsistencies is the main strategy in 
disrupting a candidate's political reality. "Contrasting a candidate's past and present 
positions is effective, because it raises doubts about what one can believe about the 
candidate" (Jamieson, 1992, p. 48). Raising doubt creates uncertainty about a candidate's 
virtue and good will. 
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How inconsistencies were highlighted by the Bush-Cheney Campaign. Commercials 
by the Bush-Cheney campaign attempted to highlight Senator Kerry's inconsistencies. 
"With John Kerry we were going to argue 'unsteady' as in 'not consistent politically'" 
(McKinnon, 2006, p. 40). The "not consistent politically" was highlighted through 
Kerry's words and actions. 
To understand the attacks on Kerry's ethos, virtue and practical wisdom, the 
Bush-Cheney campaign commercials were separated into two categories: Domestic and 
International. Domestic issues were ascribed to commercials that dealt mainly with 
domestic issues. International dealt with issues that mainly pertained to foreign policy. 
Two patterns began to emerge in highlighting inconsistencies. The first pattern 
found was the "set-up and refutation. The second pattern was the "flip-flop." The first 
strategy consisted of three main parts of the commercial. The "set-up" was a direct quote 
or citation of Senator Kerry's words. The "inconsistency" followed with a list of media 
citations. Media citations add credibility (Jamieson, 1992) to the commercials. Another 
way to highlight inconsistency in the set-up was to cite directly from Senator Kerry's 
voting record. The conclusion summed up the inconsistency. For example, in the 
commercial Unprincipled, a video of Kerry was played on a computer screen. In the 
video John Kerry stated, in the set-up, "I have a message for the influence peddlers and 
the special interests. We're coming. You're going." Shot at eye-level with no actor, the 
commercial creates involvement (Jewitt & Oyama, 2003) with the commercial. Though 
not visible an actor talks through the internet search. The commercial continues with the 
"actor" running an internet search on John Kerry and special interests. This second part, 
the "inconsistencies" provides the citations that refute the statement by Senator Kerry. 
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The search provides a Washington Post article stating "Kerry Leads in Lobby Money. 
More special interest money than any other senator." The use of media outlets provided 
hard evidence that Kerry is inconsistent, and thus citizens should be uncertain about 
Kerry's virtue. If he says one thing and does another, it is implied that voters cannot 
predict his actions. This kind of attack on ethos targets Senator Kerry's virtue and 
practical wisdom, which in turn attacks his ability to lead the people. 
Again, in the commercial Kerry's Yucca the announcer provides the set up by 
attributing words to Kerry then proceeds, with the help of visual text, highlights the 
inconsistencies. The ad ends with a memorable phrase highlighting inconsistency. 
Title of TV advertisement: Kerry's Yucca 
Announcer: "Listening to John Kerry you'd think he'd be 
against Yucca Mountain his entire career." 
Image: Background of dark clouds. In the middle left a 
green and black image of Kerry. A new image appears, 
brownish and white, of Kerry talking in front of a crowd. A 
blue and white image of a headshot of Kerry appears. 
Announcer: "But Kerry voted to establish the nuclear 
repository." 
Image: Background is dark clouds. Green image again. 
Picture of "Yucca mountain" slides in from the right. Text 
appears: Kerry voted to establish nuclear repository. 
Announcer: "Kerry voted seven times to make it easier to 
dump waste at Yucca and said "A repository for nuclear 
waste could be established there and be made functional by 
2015." 
Image: Green image slides off to the left. Yucca shrinks to 
the left side. Image text: Gray white top: The Record 
Courier. Black text prints up. "Kerry voted for the 1987 
Screw Nevada bill, which made Yucca Mountain the only 
site under study" for the storage of nuclear waste." - The 
Record Courier 8/11/04. At the bottom of the screen, Text: 
Kerry voted 7 times to dump waste. 
Announcer: "He even tried to speed waste from 
Massachusetts to Yucca." 
Image: Slides of blue Kerry appear on the right side. Image 
of United States Senate letterhead. Moves down letter head 
to John Kerry's signature. A red glow circles around John 
Kerry. Text: Kerry: Ship nuclear waste. 
Announcer: "There's what Kerry says and there's what 
Kerry does." 
Image: Blue Kerry slides to the left. Big: KERRY under it. 
There's what Kerry says. There's what he does. 
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The opening to the commercial is the "set-up." The announcer attributes words to 
Senator Kerry that are later refuted. Three images of Senator Kerry appear, symbolizing 
this multiple positions. 
The commercial begins by highlighting Senator Kerry's inconsistent voting 
record, and what he said on in his presidential campaign. The text supports the accusation 
of inconsistency. The image of storm clouds symbolize trouble brewing. When 
discussing radioactivity, the color green suggests radioactivity. The commercial 
continues refute Kerry's remarks. This creates the perception of inconsistency. 
A conclusion attaches a "memorable" phrase and image to a candidate. The 
phrase boils down as to inconsistency, and is attached to the candidate through the use of 
his or her image. The visuals for the commercial are a monochromic image of Senator 
Kerry talking to a crowd. Initially the image is identifiable as Senator Kerry, but the use 
of it gives the impression to voters that Kerry is saying what the narrator is attributing to 
him. This builds the idea that Senator Kerry has stated that he is opposed to dumping 
nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. The second image has the presence of dark clouds 
giving an ominous, trouble ahead sense. Text in the commercial from The Record 
Courier 8/11/04 showed Kerry Voting for storage of nuclear waste in the Yucca 
Mountain. That support is followed by other Kerry votes. The final visual text image is 
stated by the Announcer: "There is what Kerry says and there is what Kerry does." Page 
(1978) pointed out that inconsistencies tend to make voters uncertain about a candidate. 
By presenting a candidate's own words and systematically refuting them with either the 
candidate's own voting record or "authorities" creates a sense of inconsistency. 
Inconsistency undermines a candidate's ethos. 
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Highlighting inconsistencies on international issues. 
A 2004 presidential election issue was whether a candidate had the qualities and 
qualifications to deal with terrorism. The Bush-Cheney campaign attacked Senator 
Kerry's ethos with a set-up refutation 
Title of TV advertisement: Intelligence. 
Announcer: "John Kerry promises." 
Image 1: A television screen to the right with an image of 
John Kerry at the Democratic convention. To the left text: 
John Kerry promises. 
Video of John Kerry: "I will immediately reform the 
intelligence system." 
Announcer: "Oh really? As a member of the intelligence 
committee Senator Kerry was absent for seventy-five 
percent of the committees hearings." 
Image 2: Close up of John Kerry speaking. The text fades 
out and the video stops. Text: John Kerry.. .Absent. The 
word absent is presented in a box. More text fades in: 75% 
of public Senate Intelligence Committee Hearings. Fades to 
a far shot of the Democratic convention. Fades back to 
Kerry speaking. 
Announcer: "In a year after the first terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center, was absent for every single one." 
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Image 1: Image of Kerry speaking. New text fades in: John 
Kerry...Absent. Every single public Senate Intelligence 
Committee Hearing. 
Announcer: "That same year he proposed slashing 
America's intelligence budget by six billion dollars." 
Image 2: Head shot of Kerry smiling and waving. Text: 
John Kerry.. .Proposed slashing intelligence budget 6 
Billion Dollars. 
Announcer: "There's what Kerry says. And then there's 
what Kerry does." 
Image 1: Kerry nodding in slow motion. Text: There's what 
Kerry says. There's what Kerry does. 
Intelligence opens with an announcer preparing the audience for the set up. 
Senator Kerry provides the set-up himself with a video recording of his statement "I will 
immediately reform the intelligence system." The announcer refutes the set up statement, 
by listing his voting record towards previous intelligence votes. Each suggests a lack of 
practical wisdom for the current rhetorical situation. It signals to the audience that if 
Kerry's past actions are any indication, he would not handle the war on terror correctly. 
The commercial goes directly to his good will, which is highlighted in the concluding 
statement: "There's what Kerry says. And what Kerry does." 
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The Bush-Cheney campaign kept attacking Kerry's ethos into the fall. The 
commercial, Windsurfing, a commercial McKinnon (2006) called an "iconic ad" (p. 46) 
used images and verbal means to highlight Kerry's inconsistency. The commercial was 
built around Kerry's inconsistent statements and voting record. His inconsistency and 
uncertain good will was symbolized by images of Kerry's windsurfing back and forth. 
The commercial worked on two levels. The commercial highlighted not only Senator 
Kerry's inconsistent statements, but how he changed positions. It also disassociated 
Senator Kerry from voters. "There are not a whole lot of people in Iowa and Wisconsin 
who are windsurfers" (McKinnon, 2006, p. 46). The strategy was to make the audience 
not only uncertain about Kerry's practical wisdom, but identify Kerry as uncertain. The 
commercial follows the "flip-flop" strategy. This strategy relies on highlighting 
inconsistency through a series of changes of position, or "flip-flops." 
Title of TV advertisement: Windsurfing 
Constant image: John Kerry windsurfing. 
Announcer: "In which direction would John Kerry lead?" 
Image: John Kerry torso up wearing a wetsuit and 
sunglasses windsurfing on the water. 
Announcer: "Kerry voted for the Iraq war." 
Image 2: Kerry windsurfing. Text at the top: Iraq War. Text 
on the left: Supported. As he sails to the right. 
Announcer: "Opposed it." 
Image 1: Kerry sails left. Supported disappears and new 
text on the right appears on the right of the screen: 
Opposed. 
Announcer: "Supported it." 
Image 2: Kerry sails right. Text: Supported it. 
Announcer: "And now opposes it again." 
Image 1: Sailing to the left. Text: Opposed it. 
Announcer: "He bragged about voting for the eighty-seven 
billion to support our troops..." 
Image 2: Sailing to the right. Black text on the top: $87 
Billion for our troops. Text Supported. Kerry sails past a 
ferry. 
Announcer: ".. .before he voted against it." 
Image 1: Sails to the left past the ferry. Text: Opposed 
Announcer: "He voted for education reform..." 
Image 2: Sailing right. Text at the top: Education Reform. 
Text: Supported. 
Announcer: ".. .and now opposes it." 
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Image 1: Sailing to the left. Text: Opposed. 
Announcer: "He claims he's against Medicare premiums 
but voted five times to do so." 
Image 2: Sailing to the right. Text at top: Increasing 
Medicare Premiums. Text to the side: Opposed. 
Announcer: "John Kerry..." 
Image 1: A close up shot of Senator Kerry wearing 
sunglasses and wet suit, walking and looking off to the left 
screen. 
Announcer: ".. .whichever way the wind blows." 
Image: Back and forth, image of John Kerry windsurfing. 
Through imagery, text, and speech, the commercial highlights Senator Kerry's changing 
positions as one of the more important issues in the 2004 election. The highlighting of 
inconsistency goes directly to attacking Senator Kerry's practical wisdom and good will. 
It creates uncertainty whether Kerry could execute a war on terror. Thus, it casts 
uncertainty on his leadership, and questions whether he has the best intentions for the 
American people. 
Emergent patterns of strategic uncertainty. Two strategies emerge in highlighting 
inconsistencies. The first strategy is the "set-up and refutation." A second strategy is 
listing a series of "flip-flops." The "set-up and refutation" has a statement directly quoted 
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from or attributed to what a candidate said in the present or past. The set-up is followed 
by a series of citations or statements that refute that statement. The ads rely upon an 
announcer listing the refutations along with visual images of the citations. A series of 
"flip-flops" relies upon a candidate's voting record or statements to show a constant 
changing of positions. 
As with the domestic issue commercial, the international issues commercial relied 
on Kerry's voting record to highlight inconsistencies. The commercial No Limits used 
both linguistic and visual texts to highlight inconsistency. The prior two commercials, 
Intelligence and Windsurfing used texts to support the verbal text, but it is not supported 
through citation. Highlighting inconsistency was a tactic used throughout the 2004 
presidential election. It was rhetorically designed to put Senator Kerry on the defensive, 
which was another tactic of strategic uncertainty. 
Putting a Candidate on the Defensive 
When generating uncertainty about a candidate's political reality, support is 
needed. In order to lower uncertainty, a candidate must inform the public regarding the 
subject about which they are uncertain. For example, prior to meeting with veterans in 
West Virginia the Bush-Cheney campaign produced a commercial generating uncertainty 
surrounding Kerry's support for troops in Iraq. When confronted by that uncertainty at 
his meeting, Senator Kerry had to address that issue. That puts a campaign on the 
defensive. When people are uncertain, they participate in increased information-seeking 
behavior (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Yet, in a campaign, information is tightly 
controlled (Nimmo & Combs, 1983; Trent & Friedenberg, 2004). It is hard for a citizen 
to find exact information or to open dialogue with a candidate. Therefore, in order to 
lower uncertainty, a candidate must address messages created by an opposing campaign. 
How it works. Like previously highlighted inconsistencies, "putting on the defensive" 
was broken into two categories, domestic and international issues. For domestic issues, 
analysis of a commercial determined whether it dealt mainly with domestic issues. 
International commercials that dealt mainly with foreign policy (even if they impacted 
domestic issues) were designated as such. 
Domestic. It is a commonly held perception that Democrats raise taxes and spend 
money recklessly (Montegomery, 2007). The accusation works on two levels. The first 
level generates economic uncertainty about the raising of taxes. People worry about how 
their spending power will be affected. They are not sure how much will be withheld. In 
short, their financial future becomes uncertain. Second, a candidate is forced to address 
the issue. Senator Kerry was forced to address accusations of raising taxes and the 
inconsistencies of his statements and voting record. "Trying to counter Bush's charges he 
is a free-spending liberal, Kerry looked into a television camera and promised if he is 
elected, he would not raise taxes" (Fornek, 2004, p. 14). 
Title of TV advertisement: Taxing our Economy 
Announcer: "Now Kerry promises." 
Kerry at Convention: "We won't raise taxes on the middle 
class." 
Image: Senator Kerry speaking. 
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Announcer: "Really? John Kerry has voted to raise gas 
taxes on the middle class.. .Ten times. He supported a fifty 
cent a gallon gas tax increase. Higher taxes on middle class 
parents.. .eighteen times. He voted to raise taxes on social 
security benefits. Ninety eight votes for tax increases. 
There's what Kerry says and there what Kerry does." 
Though this commercial would be categorized under highlighting inconsistency, the 
subject matter puts it in the area of putting the candidate on the defensive because of the 
perception of a "Tax and Spend" Democrat. By playing the video of Kerry promising no 
new taxes for the middle class the Bush-Cheney campaign follows the "set-up refutation" 
pattern. It begins with the set-up, Kerry in his own words. It then follows with refutation 
of those words by highlighting his voting record, which contradicts his statement. It ends 
with the conclusion, an easy to remember statement that highlights the uncertainty. The 
statement creates the impression that one cannot predict what Kerry will do, and therefore 
people should be uncertain. This strategy was also used in commercials about 
international issues. 
International. The Bush-Cheney campaign put Kerry on the defensive with respect to 
the war in Iraq. The Bush-Cheney campaign had early-on branded President Bush as a 
war president (BBC, February 8, 2004). The war on terror was the focal point in the 
election. "9/11 always was the defining event of the race, giving the president the 
advantage. Voters felt as though they had a relationship with him coming from 9/11. The 
vision and the image they had of him were very fixed as a strong leader" (Cahill, 2006, p. 
31). The Bush-Cheney campaign had to generate uncertainty about Kerry's ability to lead 
in the war on terror. So the campaign attacked him putting Kerry on the defensive. 
An appropriation for $87 billion dollars in the congress 
became a very topical issue.... we discovered John Kerry 
was going to West Virginia to talk to an audience of 
veterans. We believe there was a high likelihood that the 
subject would be the 87 billion. He had been actually 
articulating a negative message against the president on 
arming the troops in battle... We immediately produced an 
ad on the 87 billion dollar vote. (McKinnon, 2006, pp. 42-
43) 
Title of TV advertisement: Troops-Fog 
Announcer: "Few votes in Congress are as important as 
funding our troops at war. Though John Kerry voted in 
October 2002 for military action in Iraq, he later voted 
against funding our soldiers." 
Senate Clerk: "Mr. Kerry." 
Announcer: "No." 
Announcer: "Body armor and higher combat pay for 
troops?" 
Senate Clerk: "Mr. Kerry." 
Announcer: "No." 
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Announcer: "Better health care for reservists?" 
Announcer: "Mr. Kerry:" 
Announcer: "No." 
Though it put Senator Kerry on the defensive, the commercial followed the "set-
up refutation" pattern. The use of strategic uncertainty forced Kerry to defend his "new" 
position. The commercial was played prior to Senator Kerry speaking to the group. The 
commercial followed the highlighting of inconsistencies pattern of point-counter-point. It 
directly attacked his voting record by suggesting Kerry had voted for the war, but was not 
willing to vote for the safety of the troops. The use of strategic uncertainty put Senator 
Kerry on the defensive, when asked about it. Kerry responded with what McKinnon 
(2006) referred to as one of the most iconic moments in the campaign: "I actually did 
vote for the $87 billion before I voted against." By putting Kerry on the defensive, the 
Bush-Campaign was able get Kerry to respond to their accusations. He managed to 
generate more uncertainty about himself. His confusing statement, or variations of it, was 
used in future ads. In the 2004 campaign, Senator Kerry was on the defensive about how 
he would conduct the war on terror. The war on terror was a Bush-Cheney strong point, 
thus by addressing the issue, Senator Kerry was discussing the Bush-Cheney strong point. 
By discussing the war on terror, he was also reasserting that Bush was perceived as more 
knowledgeable with the war on terror (McKinnon, 2006). Thus, Senator Kerry was 
interjecting the Bush-Cheney campaign political reality into his own political reality. 
Interjecting the Opponent's Political Reality 
Generally, U.S. presidential elections are essentially dualistic. A Democrat faces 
off against a Republican for the presidency. Campaigns use dualism on a symbolic level. 
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Jamieson (1992) asserted that a simplistic duality has existed in presidential elections: 
friend against enemy, saint against Satan, patriot against the traitor. In the 2004 election, 
the duality was the "known" and the "uncertain." The "known" in the election was 
President Bush, as someone "you knew where he stood" (McKinnon, 2006). The 
"uncertain" being Senator Kerry, someone a voter did not know and whose actions, 
values, or leadership traits could not be predicted. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, that 
uncertainty becomes a liability. In essence a U.S. presidential election, for voters, is an 
either/or argument. 
Each campaign uses communication strategies to establish its political reality. The 
opposing campaign does the same. This is where strategic uncertainty works. In the 
duality structure of presidential election campaigns, where one candidate is portrayed as 
"Satan," it is implied the other is a "saint." When the Bush-Cheney campaign generates 
uncertainty about Senator Kerry, they also imply that Bush is consistent, and the 
population knows where he stands. When Kerry goes off script and makes remarks that 
appear to be inconsistent, he not only generates uncertainty about himself he also 
reasserts President Bush's "certainty." When Kerry suggests that the war on terror should 
be executed in a different manner, through law enforcement, he is going against a 
"known." The population already knows the "war on terror" to be a military operation. 
Therefore, by asserting that the war on terror should be handled differently, Senator 
Kerry suggests changing to an uncertain tactic. 
Title of TV advertisement - World View 
Announcer: "First, John Kerry said defeating..." 
Image 1: Blue background. Text: First, John Kerry said... 
image pulls out to reveal a television screen. 
Announcer: ".. .terrorism was really more about law 
enforcement and intelligence than a strong military 
operation." 
Image 2: Still shot of John Kerry in front of rows and 
columns of blue screens. Cheap outline of word balloon 
appears with Kerry quote: "Terrorism.. .more about law 
enforcement.. .than a strong military." Text: Des Moines, 
IA 1/11/04 
Announcer: "More about law enforcement than a strong 
military?" 
Image 1: Zoom in on a screen with text: More about law 
enforcement than a strong military? 
Announcer: "Now Kerry says: "We have to get..." 
Image 2: Blue screen text: Now Kerry says... 
Announcer: ".. .back to a place where terrorists are a 
nuisance like gambling and prostitution. We're never going 
to end them." 
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Image 1: Still image of Kerry, situated left. Four word 
balloons appear: "Terrorists" "Nuisance." "Gambling ." 
"Prostitution." Text cite: New York Times Magazine 
10/10/04 
Announcer: "Terrorism.. .a nuisance?" 
Image 2: Blue background with text: Terrorism.. .a 
nuisance? 
Announcer: "How can Kerry protect us when he doesn't 
understand the threat?" 
Image 1: Blue screen with text: How can Kerry protect us 
when he doesn't understand the threat. 
In interjecting political reality, a different strategic uncertainty emerges, where 
campaigns air straight commercials that generate uncertainty about a candidate's practical 
wisdom. However, when Kerry's expertise is attacked, Bush's expertise is implied. For 
example, the announcer states: "First, John Kerry said defeating terrorism was really 
more about law enforcement and intelligence than a strong military" he followed with, 
"More law enforcement than a strong military?" The questioning suggests that Kerry 
does not know how to properly execute a "war on terror." It implies that President Bush 
does. However, it works on another level. Voters have only known the "war" on terror, 
they do not know how law enforcement would "fight" terrorism. So Senator Kerry's plan, 
his application of practical wisdom for the common good of the nation, is uncertain. The 
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electorate does not have information to draw upon to lower uncertainty about such a plan 
of action. The following attacks further suggest that Senator Kerry does not have the 
practical wisdom to conduct a proper campaign against terrorism, thus a Kerry 
presidency would be wrought with situational uncertainty. In fact, in later commercials, 
the Bush-Cheney campaign suggest that Kerry does not have a goal regarding the war on 
terror. 
McKinnon (2006) stated that in the ad Searching they sought to "capture, as best 
as we could in 25 seconds, Kerry's changing positions in Iraq" (p. 47). Even the name 
Searching implies a goal not yet attained, thus with no clear ending. The future of the war 
on terror becomes uncertain, because Kerry has uncertain practical wisdom. The "flip-
flop" highlighting inconsistency does not have to be a series of flip-flops. It could also 
consist of one major flip-flop that has major ramifications. In the commercial, not only is 
the end result of a war on terror conducted by Senator Kerry uncertain, but so is his 
ability to protect the population. 
Title of TV advertisement: Searching 
Announcer: "He said he'd attack terrorists who'd threaten 
America." 
Image 1: Black background. White text with blue horizon. 
Text: John Kerry on the war on terror. 
Announcer: "But at the debate John Kerry said America 
must pass a global test before we protect ourselves." 
Image 2: Tilted to the right of the screen is a "television" 
screen. In the screen is a video of John Kerry looking off to 
the right. He is talking to someone. 
Announcer: "The Kerry Doctrine: A global test." 
Image 1: Same television screen and black surrounding 
background with yellow images. A distorted headshot of 
John Kerry speaking. 
Announcer: "So we must seek permission from foreign 
governments before protecting America?" 
Image 2: Another headshot of Kerry, slight pulled back to 
show shoulders. He's situated to the left of the "screen." 
Announcer: "So America will be forced to wait while 
threats gather." 
Image 1: Senator Kerry has a microphone and is speaking 
to a crowd. In the background is a white man with a 
mustache watching Kerry speak. 
Announcer: "President Bush believes decisions about 
protecting America should..." 
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Image 2: Headshot of Kerry talking and looking directly 
into the camera. The picture slowly zooms in on the screen. 
Announcer: ".. .be made in the Oval Office not foreign 
capitols." 
Image 1: The whole image is of the screen that showed the 
images. John Kerry is holding a microphone and is 
speaking to a group of veterans (in the background). 
Announcer: "None." 
Image 2: Image fades to black background. Text: How can 
John Kerry protect us.. .when he doesn't' even know where 
he stands? 
The argument suggests that only an American knows what is best for America. Senator 
Kerry's "flip-flop" is found in his statement that he would protect America, yet he is 
willing to cede power to other entities to do so. This flip-flop suggests that Senator Kerry 
would be willing to take the power to protect America away from Americans, and give it 
to an unknown entity that might not have the best interests of American in mind. That 
powerless future generates more situational uncertain and more uncertainty about Senator 
Kerry's practical wisdom. At the end of the commercial, President Bush's political reality 
is not implied but interjected. 
Domestic. With domestic issues the Bush-Campaign attacked Senator Kerry's 
practical wisdom, generating uncertainty about Kerry's qualifications and programs. One 
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of the powerful effects of attacking a candidate's practical wisdom is creating an 
impression citizens will lose power to make choices over their own lives. This becomes a 
powerful form of uncertainty, uncertainty about one's fate. That loss of power is a direct 
result of Senator Kerry's actions. In Don't take chances, the commercial suggests Senator 
Kerry's plans for health care would remove the power to make choices from citizens. The 
title itself suggests there is an uncertain future through the invocation of taking a 
"chance." 
Title of TV advertisement: Don't take chances 
Announcer: "You don't want to take chances with your 
health or your health care." 
Image 1: Crooked shot of a doctor, left, and elderly man in 
bed, right. The elderly man is trying to sit up and move his 
legs in bed. The doctor is holding a clipboard and laying a 
hand on the elderly man's shoulder. 
Announcer: "But John Kerry and Liberals in Congress 
would." 
Image 2: The elderly man sits up and the doctor sits down. 
Text: John Kerry & Liberals in Congress. 
Announcer: "Their big government run health care plan." 
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Image 1: The flow chart from the previous commercial 
appears above blurred image of hospital room. Text: John 
Kerry & Liberals in Congress. 
Announcer: "One point five trillion dollars." 
Image 2: Camera zooms in on $1.5 Trillion Dollar. In the 
bottom left corner: Individual tax payers, a portion of it is 
cut off. 
Announcer: "Washington bureaucrats not doctors, in 
charge." 
Image 1: New image of the flow chart. Dept. of Labor, 
Dept. of Treasury, and IRS all in red boxes. Camera slowly 
pans left to right over the boxes. 
Announcer: "And the federal government not your doctor 
makes the final decision on your health. Rationing." 
Image 2: Camera pans from top to bottom with a side view 
of the flow chart. Text in flow chart boxes: Premium 
Rebate, Pool Agency, Operations, Payment Policy, 
Coverage Policy, Claims Processing, intermediary, 
payment rules, internal appeals, external appeals 
Announcer: "Less access. Fewer choices. Long waits." 
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Image 1: Bottom shot of flow chart with text in boxes: 
Internal Appeals, External Appeals, Federal Courts. 
Announcer: "One more reason we can't..." 
Image 2: Blurred hospital scene with flow chart over it. 
Announcer: ".. .risk the liberals in congress and John 
Kerry." 
Image 1: Flow chart disappears. Still blurred shot of 
hospital room. Text: "We can't risk liberals in Congress 
and John Kerry." 
The conclusion: a phrase, the highlights, the uncertainty suggests there is a risk in 
electing John Kerry. Risk suggests uncertainty, because a risky venture has unknown or 
unpredictable results. Don't take chances also uses disjointed, cluttered images to 
generate a sense of confusion. The images and camera suggest a confusing, risky plan. 
The Bush-Cheney campaign worked to define President Bush as a certainty while 
Senator Kerry was defined as an uncertainty. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, someone 
who cannot be predicted has poor credibility. Jamieson (1992) pointed out that the 
campaign tries to make their candidate's name synonymous which everything the 
electorate cherishes. Strategic uncertainty helps interject an opponent's political reality. 
For example, the commercials World View and Searching, suggest Senator Kerry does 
not understand the war on terror, and does not have a clear plan or goal to fight the war 
on terror. The duality of the U.S. presidential race implies that Bush's reality is the 
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opposite; he has special expertise and knowledge and a plan to fight the war on terror. 
President Bush's plans have clear goals; he has values and leadership that people know. 
On the other hand, Senator Kerry lacks the qualities, qualifications, or plans to be the 
president in times of uncertainty. Kerry is made out to be the epitome of an uncertain 
president. 
Redefines a Candidate 
In a modern character-driven presidential election (Baker, 2007) it is important 
for candidates to define themselves (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004). Definitions help 
establish a base their political reality. For example, early in the election President Bush 
began to define himself as a "war time president," (BBC, 2004, February 8). As a 
wartime president, people knew where he stood (McKinnon, 2006). He had defined 
himself as a certainty in uncertain times. This helped to create and support the main 
issues of his 2004 campaign (Cahill, 2006). It is important for candidates to define 
themselves as well as their opponent. Highlighting inconsistencies, putting a candidate on 
the defensive, and interjecting political reality disrupts political reality. 
Research shows that voters support candidates who are consistent in their 
ideologies and issues (Flanigan & Zingale, 1998). Strategic uncertainty defines a 
candidate as inconsistent with those ideologies and issues. It does this by placing the 
candidate on the defensive. When put on the defensive a candidate must engage in 
uncertainty reduction; he or she must address the issues and lower uncertainty. Focusing 
on uncertainty reduction has two effects; the candidate is no longer defining himself, 
which allows the opponent to define him. It also interjects an opponent's political reality 
into a candidate's political reality. For example, in the 2004 election, President Bush had 
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the benefit of being an incumbent and defining himself as someone the population knew 
(McKinnon, 2006). Once Kerry went on the defensive, he could no longer define either 
President Bush or himself. Advertisements were designed to define Senator Kerry as an 
uncertain commodity and to remind "The American people had come to know him as 
someone who was very credible, who was going to deal straight with them" (Cheney, 
2006, p. 122). The tactics of strategic uncertainty had defined Senator Kerry as uncertain. 
This was fostered by visual images. A common visual effect throughout the campaign 
was the distortion of Senator Kerry's images. Though they are discernable as Senator 
Kerry, the images are often blurred to imply that one can see him but not truly know him. 
If uncertainty is something people avoid, in an atmosphere of exaggerated 
uncertainty, the uncertain candidate becomes problematic. With Kerry's political reality 
in question people became uncertain about Kerry's qualifications and world views. Kerry 
had become an abstract enemy. "Because the evocation of a threatening enemy may win 
political support for its prospective targets people construct enemies who renew their 
commitment and mobilize allies" (Edelman, 1988, p. 66). Kerry was defined as uncertain 
and that was something people were not looking for in a president. By redefining Kerry 
the Bush-Cheney campaign were able to separate him from the mythic presidency. 
Strategic Uncertainty Separates a Candidate from the Mythic Presidency 
Myths help create and support social reality. They accomplish this by helping 
people to arrange, interpret, and make decisions about their world. According to 
Campbell (1972), myths structure meaning. Structuring myths helps create social 
meaning. People use myths to connect their private interests to the public (Delaisi, 1927). 
This connection is advanced by a myth's ability to not only structure meaning but 
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sequence symbolic action. Fisher (1987) explained that myths constitute "symbolic action 
[that] have a sequence and meaning for those who live, create or interpret them" (p. 58). 
The structuring and fostering of social identification, and guiding interpretation make 
myths a powerful factor in the construction of social reality. "If on the whole the picture 
conjured up by the myth resembles reality in some way, there will be nothing to disturb 
the social conscience of the individual" (Delaisi, 1927, p. 12). Myths have the power to 
move publics in particular directions. In helping create and foster social reality myths are 
a central factor in the creation of political reality. One myth in particular is important in a 
presidential election; the mythic presidency. 
Scholars (Erickson, 2000; Neustandt, 1990; Roeloffs, 1992; Rossiter, 1956) have 
identified the mythic presidency as key in public perceptions of a president's 
performance. The mythic presidency is a political myth that invokes a multitude of 
symbols, rituals, and images. The mythic presidency calls up powerful political myths of 
past presidents. Presidential myths create certain expectations of presidents and of those 
who wish to become president. Myths of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln 
create certain expectations. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's leadership after the attacks on 
Pearl Harbor and John F. Kennedy's face-off with Soviet Russia in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, reinforced each president as a mythic leader. The mythic presidency creates a 
perception of a consistent presidential archetype. Felkins and Goldman (1993) asserted 
that myth collects symbols, reinforces values through familiar plots and consistent 
characters which in turn lower uncertainty in the population. With a wealth of 
information to draw upon from the mythic presidency, a population believes they can 
predict a president's values, beliefs, and actions. "Without myth we are 'uprooted' from 
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our past" (Felkins & Goldman, 1993, p. 451). Therefore, myth has much rhetorical 
potential for American presidents (Felkins & Goldman, 1993; Rossiter, 1956), and those 
seeking the presidency. It becomes important for a candidate to use the mythic presidency 
by associating himself or herself with the myth. An association creates a positive 
impression inherent in the mythic presidency. 
A part of the mythic presidency is strong leadership (Misciagno, 1996; Neustadt, 
1990). Stories are told of strong leaders emerging from an uncertain situation and with 
certainty; they lead the people to a better land (i.e. the promised land, redemption, 
freedom, equality, etc.). Leadership, as is the mythic presidency, is affected by the 
rhetorical situation (Felkins & Goldman, 1993; Neustadt, 1990). There are many aspects 
to leadership (Neustadt, 1990; Rositter, 1956). However, in the case of the 2004 election, 
the rhetorical situation heightened the importance of strength. The uncertain rhetorical 
situation heightened a need for a strong leader to lead the people out of uncertain times. It 
is during times of bewilderment and uncertainty that citizens look to a leader (Edelman, 
1967). In the 2004 election, it had become even more important to tie a candidate to the 
mythic presidency. Campaigns worked to create the perception of their candidate as 
being in possession of qualities of strong leadership. 
"The president is viewed larger than life and above all else, as seen as a strong 
leader" (Misciagno, 1996, p. 329). That larger than life leader must be perceived as 
powerful. "The term 'leader' evokes an ideal type which high public officials try to 
construct themselves to fit" (Edelman, 1988, p. 40). Neustadt (1990) stated that we 
measure a president as "weak" or "strong". "Strength is so unquestionably linked to 
leadership that leadership often comes to be perceived synonymous with and reducible to 
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strength" (Misciagno, 1996, p. 331). A president represents almost all aspects of the 
nation, from the economy to politics (Edelman, 1988). The importance of a candidate 
fitting into that role becomes an imperative to a campaign. To help create that image a 
candidate must show signs of strength. 
A presidency relies heavily on symbolism (Hinckley, 1990). Actions taken to 
communicate strong leadership are symbolic. A candidate's leadership is revealed to the 
population through symbolic actions, voting patterns, and recommended policies. Each 
past and future symbolic action reinforces a candidate's practical wisdom. Funk (2004) 
argued that the models of a politician's voting behavior bolster a candidate's image. The 
symbolic action of voting becomes important in constructing the proper image for a 
presidential candidate. Edelman (1988) stated that a leader's policy success and failures 
are constructed for interpretation. That "interpretation" by the voting population is meant 
to be positive. Nimmo (1995) argued that voters find it hard to assess a candidate's 
presidential or legislative performance but easier to assess their competency. It does not 
matter if they voted, but whether the symbolic action had positive results. For example, 
President Bush in the 2004 election discussed the signing of the PATRIOT act. That 
action is meant to give the impression that President Bush was giving the tools to the 
nation, to create security. The Bush-Cheney campaign did not discuss the intricacies of 
the PATRIOT act, but allowed for the impression of security. Therefore, symbolic 
actions of a candidate are meant to be perceived as for the "common good" of citizens. A 
perception of a "common good" symbolic action allows for an assessment of a 
candidate's competency, rather than an assessment of a presidential or legislative 
performance. The common good of voting, shows a presidential candidate "in action." 
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That common good and action is meant to create an impression of a strong leader. That 
strong leadership supported through symbolic action, ties the candidate to the mythic 
presidency. "The myth, an unquestioned belief held in common by a large group of 
people that gives events and actions a particular meaning, is a particularly relevant form 
of symbol in the emergence of mass political movements" (Edelman, 1971, p. 53). 
Voting records and policy support are not the only way candidates associate 
themselves with the mythic presidency. Erickson (2000) argued that presidents, and 
presidential candidates, use images to assume power. Visuals help create the symbolism 
of strength by actions and convictions (Edelman, 1967). An image of a candidate visiting 
a factory to discuss economic plans augments the candidate's plans for the economy. A 
candidate seen attending church or using iconic value images (e.g. the flag) signals to 
citizens the strength of the candidate's convictions. Images can be used to disassociate a 
candidate from the mythic presidency. For example, in a Bush-Cheney commercial titled 
Yakuza, when discussing Senator Kerry's strategy to fight terrorism, a picture of Senator 
Kerry and a video with an iconic image of a "terrorist" are juxtaposed. Those images 
suggested that Senator Kerry's policies did not provide security. 
Images are important to campaigns but they are still steeped in the linguistic. 
Barthes (1972) pointed out that the written and spoken word is still important. "The 
linguistic message is indeed present in every image: as title, caption [and] accompanying 
press article" (p. 38). Barthes (1972) explained the importance of spoken and written 
word for images "Writing, writing and speech continuing to be the full terms of the 
information structure" (p. 38). Voters rely on the linguistic aspects of political 
advertisements to help in the interactive process of managing candidate's images 
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(Nimmo & Savage, 1976). Kendall and Paine (1995) stated "While political images are 
full of implications and the voter can choose among them, the linguistic message helps to 
guide their interpretation" (p. 27). Candidate images help tie a candidate to the mythic 
presidency. That image becomes an important factor in a presidential campaign. It also 
becomes important for the opponent to disassociate a candidate from the mythic 
presidency. If it is important for a candidate to associate himself or herself with the 
mythic presidency, it is just as important for them to disassociate their opponent from the 
mythic presidency. In the 2004 election, the Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically 
disassociated Senator Kerry from the mythic presidency. 
How strategic uncertainty disassociated Senator Kerry in the 2004 Election. Each 
commercial was analyzed to see why and how Senator Kerry's ethos was attacked. A 
trend emerged in the commercials. Attacks on Senator Kerry's practical wisdom were 
used to generate uncertainty about his good will. Since leadership is a very important 
factor in the mythic presidency, the advertisements were placed into a category: 
disassociates candidate from the mythic presidency. The commercials were, like previous 
commercials, separated into domestic issues and international issues. Each commercial 
attacked Senator Kerry's practical wisdom. 
Domestic. Four commercials, dealing with domestic issues, were isolated and placed 
in the category of disassociating Kerry from the mythic presidency. (Two of the 
commercials were nearly identical to each other.) Though each is different in the issues 
handled, they each have a common pattern of attacking Senator Kerry's ethos and 
generating situational uncertainty. To get an understanding of the advertisement Wacky, it 
must be placed in proper context. McKinnon (2006) stated that at the time they produced 
and broadcasted the commercial, the US was going through an oil crisis. The 
advertisement worked to not only attack Senator Kerry's practical wisdom, but to help 
heighten the economic uncertainty generated by a "gasoline crisis." 
Title of TV advertisement: Wacky 
Announcer: "Some people have wacky ideas," 
Image 1: Images from a silent movie. Man in the middle of 
silent movie era cars. The film is in fast motion as the cars 
circle the man. 
Announcer: "like taxing..." 
Image 2: Man in sailor suit was looking away from camera 
looks into camera with astonished look on face. 
Announcer: ".. .gasoline more..." 
Image 1: Old time gas pump's price meter going up. 
Announcer: "...so people drive less." 
Image 2: A sizeable amount of people riding a large tandem 
bike. The camera "rides" past the bike from back to front. 
Announcer: "That's John Kerry, he supported..." 
Image 1: Framed. Kerry speaking. Video of image is 
created to match the silent movie motif. Kerry video put in 
fast motion to match the fast motion of the silent movie 
images. Text: That's John Kerry. 
Announcer: ".. .a fifty cents a gallon gas tax." 
Image 2: Gas attendant. White man in uniform holding onto 
a gas pump. He takes off the gas hose from the pump and 
holds it to the camera. Camera angle looking up at the gas 
attendant. 
Announcer: "If Kerry's gas tax increase were law the 
average family would pay six hundred and fifty seven 
dollars more a year." 
Image 1: Framed. Man waddling away from camera into 
the woods. He stops and pulls out his pockets to reveal they 
are empty. Text: Kerry's Plan: Pay $657 More a Year For 
Gas. 
Announcer: "Raising taxes is a habit of Kerry's. He 
supported higher gasoline taxes eleven times." 
Image 2: Framed. Three images. Left of screen, Kerry. 
Center, digital gas pump price going up. Right, silent movie 
era looking woman with mouth open, looks shocked, 
slowly turns from looking right to left, at the gas pump 
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going up. Text: John Kerry: Supported Higher Gas Taxes 
11 Times. 
Announcer: "Maybe John Kerry just doesn't understand 
what his ideas mean to the rest of us." 
Image 1: Circular wipe to next image. Framed. Silent 
movie era image. Man pushing a car. Text: John Kerry 
Wrong On Taxes. 
The images used in the commercial support the comical or "wacky" idea of 
raising gas taxes. Senator Kerry is identified as the agent of that "wacky" action. The 
cars work as a referential symbol (Edelman, 1967). People both recognize what the 
argument is about and identify with the commercial. Cars signal to viewers that they will 
be affected by Senator Kerry's gas tax. 
The shocked expression on the actor, in relation to the announcer's mention of 
raised gas taxes, is a condensation symbol (Edelman, 1967). A gas pump's meter going 
up signals to an audience that they will be paying more for gas due to a tax increase. 
Juxtaposed to previous images, the images of people riding a bike suggests people will no 
longer be able to afford to drive their automobiles. In other words, it suggested that 
freedom of mobility would be removed from consumers. The automobile is a symbol of 
freedom (Neal, 1985; Netting, 1994). When people can no longer drive they symbolically 
lose their freedom. That loss of freedom can be traced to the "wacky" practical wisdom 
of Senator Kerry and his gas tax hike. 
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To disassociate a candidate from the mythic presidency, whatever power he/she 
wields must be shown to yield negative results. Using Senator Kerry's image in the 
context of a silent movie connects him to "comedic" visuals, making him less respectable 
and making his practical wisdom comical. Those words and actions tie Senator Kerry to 
negative effects. Jewitt and Oyama (2003) stated that images from a high angle represent 
power over the viewer. The gas attendant, thus gas, has power over the viewer. The 
increased gas prices will have power over citizens by reducing their economic power. 
With less money an increase in financial uncertainty results. 
The referential symbol of quantifying how much extra a family would spend in 
gas highlights the condensation symbol of a man pulling out empty pockets. A person 
pulling out empty pockets symbolizes a lack of money. Again, this exaggerates the 
already economic uncertainty of a gas crisis. It also suggests that Senator Kerry's voting 
record, and future actions, will have a negative impact on citizens. 
His commercial argued that Senator Kerry's past actions should foretell his future 
actions. The use of multiple images of Senator Kerry had become a common practice in 
Bush-Cheney campaign commercials. However, the images of Kerry are referential. 
Multiple images of Kerry create an impression that there are many sides to Kerry. 
Numerous sides to Kerry support an argument that Senator Kerry takes multiple positions 
on a single issue. An increase in multiple positions and probabilities means an increase in 
uncertainty. The other images work as condensation symbols signaling to viewers that the 
increase in prices are shocking. The text supports the statements of Kerry voting for 
increases in gas taxes. 
144 
In the conclusion, an image of a man pushing a car suggests that people would not 
be able to afford gas if Senator Kerry were elected. Visual text reinforces the suggestion 
that Kerry, if elected, would raise gas taxes. Again, this fosters situational uncertainty. 
The verbal text creates the impression that Senator Kerry does not understand the average 
American. Through strategic uncertainty Senator Kerry's leadership, is attacked. That 
attack is conducted by highlighting Senator Kerry's voting record of raising gas taxes. 
His voting record, or practical wisdom, is used to suggest that he does not understand the 
average American citizen's need for his/her car. Therefore, he cannot identify with the 
average citizen. If Senator Kerry cannot identify with the average American, then it 
seems likely an average American could not identify with Senator Kerry. When people 
cannot identify with an individual they tend to not see any similarities. Berger and 
Calabrese (1975) stated that when people perceive dissimilarities uncertainty increases. 
Increases in uncertainty levels produce decreasing in liking. 
An inability to identify with the average American became a common theme in 
the disassociation of Kerry with the mythic presidency. In Priorities, the Bush-Cheney 
campaign attacked Kerry's good will by highlighting voting behavior, and suggesting it 
had negative effects. 
Title of TV advertisement: Priorities 
Announcer: "Leadership means choosing priorities." 
Image 1: White background. Cursor prints out in blue text: 
Leadership means choosing priorities. 
Announcer: "While campaigning..." 
Image 2: Picture of John Kerry pulls out to see multiple 
images of original image of Kerry. 
Announcer: ".. John Kerry has missed over two thirds of 
all votes." 
Image 1: A large number of the John Kerry images delete 
to reveal the Capitol building and text: Missed 2/3 of all 
votes. Worst attendance record in the U.S. Senate. Bottom 
right CQ Floor Vote 1/1/03-7/6/04. 
Announcer: "Missed a vote to reduce health care costs by 
reducing frivolous lawsuits against doctors." 
Image 2: Black white image of elderly woman. Cut to 
video of elderly lady talking to someone off camera to the 
right. Upper left hand corner of framed image, Kerry 
haloed in red. Cursor prints out text: Missed a vote to lower 
health care costs. Bottom right $.2207 CQ Vote #66 4/7/04. 
Announcer: "Missed a vote to fund our troops in combat." 
Image 1: Black and white image of head shot of a male 
soldier wearing a helmet and sunglasses as he slowly scans 
over the camera. Image fades to a male American soldier, 
in black and white, with helmet on holding an M-16 in a 
crouching position. He slowly looks left into the camera. 
Upper left hand corner of framed image, Kerry haloed in 
red. Cursor prints out text: Missed vote for funding our 
troops in combat. Bottom right of image: $ .2400 CQ Vote 
#106 6/2/04. 
Announcer: "Yet, Kerry found the time to vote..." 
Image 2: Headshot of Kerry talking. Text: Voted against 
Laci Peterson Law. 
Announcer: ".. .against the Laci Peterson law." 
Image 1: Cut to image of headshot of a woman looking 
down. She is in front of a window. Text: Voted against 
Laci Peterson Law. Bottom right of image: H.R. 1997 CQ 
Vote #53 3/25/04. Kerry voted Nay 
Announcer: "It protects pregnant women from violence." 
Image 2: Image of same woman but she is facing the 
camera. Only her eyes, nose, and top of her mouth are 
visible. 
Announcer: "Kerry has his priorities. Are they yours?" 
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Image 1: Woman facing camera looking off to the side in a 
house. Text: Kerry has his priorities. Are they yours? 
In the introduction, visual and verbal text worked as referential symbols. The 
verbal and visual text sets the situation of the commercial. It identifies for the viewer that 
the commercial is going to be about the qualities of leadership. 
The multiple images of Kerry work as a referential symbol and condensation 
symbol. The referential symbol associates Senator Kerry with what the commercial is 
discussing. As a condensation symbol, the multiple Senator Kerry images symbolize 
multiple positions Senator Kerry has taken on single issues. By suggesting that Kerry 
takes multiple positions on single issues, the commercial generates uncertainty about 
Kerry's ethos. A wavering, or flip-flopping, on a stance removes a candidate from the 
perception of an "unwavering" strong president. To support the statement a citation is 
used as a referential symbol. In Priorities, the citation supports Kerry missing votes. It 
shows he does not take action, and that casts uncertainty on his ability to be a strong 
leader. That lack of "proper" action is highlighted on domestic and international issues. 
However, domestic issues out-number international issues in disassociating Senator 
Kerry from the mythic presidency. 
The commercial continues to attack Senator Kerry's voting record, using images 
of people affected by his lack of understanding. The black and white image of an elderly 
woman evokes emotions about the effects poor health care have upon the elderly. Kerry's 
inability to identify with the public and his lack of competency has negative effects upon 
the nation's elderly. 
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When dealing with international issues Senator Kerry's lack of practical wisdom 
affects citizens. Senator Kerry's lack of voting on funding troops suggested he was not 
competent to execute the war on terror. Indeed, he does not have the troops' best interests 
in mind. 
The verbal text is associated with the referential symbols of Senator Kerry's 
image and visual text. Again, the text points to his voting record, and that he voted 
against a bill designed for the security of women. The referential symbol of a woman 
creates a condensation symbol of who is affected by Senator Kerry's voting behavior. A 
citation is used as support for the statement, he voted against the law. 
In the conclusion, a final statement by the announcer and text, disassociate 
Senator Kerry from the population. After repeatedly highlighting his lack of practical 
wisdom, the final statement suggests that, as a leader Kerry would be incapable of 
identifying with his constituents. If a leader is going to lead and represent a people, he or 
she must be able to understand their needs. He must be there for important decisions, like 
health care, and monetary and technical support for the military. The commercial 
suggests that Senator Kerry lacks insight into people's needs. Like previous commercials, 
Priorities use Senator Kerry's past to generate uncertainty about the future. This lack of 
leadership is not just of his own doing. 
Title of TV advertisement: Tort Reform 
Doctor Interview: 'There is a crisis in health care. There is 
a crisis in women's access to health care in this country.' 
Image 1: Female doctor looking slightly off camera. Text: 
Dr. Patricia Stephenson OB-GYN. 
Announcer: "Maternity wards closing." 
Image 2: Head-shot of a doctor wearing a surgery mask. 
Text: Maternity wards closing. 
Announcer: "OB-GYNs being forced out." 
Image 1: Three actors, two female and one male. One 
female is facing the two others with her back to the camera. 
The man is sitting down, wearing a stethoscope, and seems 
to be examining the woman with her back to the camera. 
The other woman is standing behind the man. 
Announcer: "The reason: Frivolous lawsuits. John Kerry 
and the liberals in congress side with the trial lawyers." 
Image 2: Two men, outside, walking down steps away from 
pillars. Both men are in suits the one to the left is one step 
behind younger and wearing sunglasses. The man one step 
ahead is older with white hair carrying a briefcase. The 
younger one is facing the older one and appears to be 
engaged in talking. Text: Frivolous Lawsuits. New text 
appears: John Kerry & the Liberal in Congress > Side with 
Trial Lawyers. 
Announcer: "They opposed legal reform ten times." 
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Image 1: Close-up of a gavel coming down and hitting a 
table. Text: John Kerry & the Liberal in Congress > 
Opposed Legal Reform 10 Times. 
Dr. Interview: "If Mr. Kerry and his allies were elected I 
don't think there would be any hope for tort reform in this 
country." 
Image 2: Dr. Stephenson again talking to someone off 
camera. 
The commercial opens with what appears to be an interview. The text appears as a 
referential symbol. The mixture of the woman and her position creates a condensation 
symbol creating a symbolic event. She is talking about female health care in the United 
States. Her position and sex build ethos for the commercial. 
In the body of the ad, the image of a doctor works as a referential symbol. It 
shows viewers who will be affected by the refusal to pass tort reform. According to the 
commercial, there appears to be certainty in the closing of maternity wards in the future. 
The result is situational uncertainty. Though it is implied that maternity wards are going 
to close, it does not say what kind of effect it will have on voters. Voters are left without 
enough information to draw a conclusion. What they are left with is a negative outlook 
for an uncertain health care future. 
Images show who will be affected if tort reform is not enacted. This is cause for 
the audience to identify with those affected by lack of tort reform. The verbal text poses 
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imaginary future scenarios that create a "need" for tort reform. That need is Senator 
Kerry's voting record, and his allegiance to trial lawyers. The men in suits symbolize trial 
lawyers in the commercial. The need established earlier is given a cause in both linguistic 
and visual texts. Senator Kerry's virtue is questioned. Senator Kerry's allegiance to trial 
lawyers links him to the possibility of maternity wards being shut down and OB-GYNs 
forced to resign. 
A referential symbol showed how often Senator Kerry voted against tort reform. 
This helped voters to logically understand the situation. It allowed the audience to draw a 
conclusion that if elected, Senator Kerry would still oppose tort reform. That would lead 
to the problems previously listed. Senator Kerry becomes a symbol for possible future 
problems. 
The commercial systematically sets up problems, provides a cause, and links the 
cause to Senator Kerry. Senator Kerry is linked to the cause of possible future problems 
through his voting record or practical wisdom. The linkage to the cause of the problems, 
suggests Senator Kerry does not understand the needs of the population. In fact, it 
suggests that Senator Kerry would rather side with a few special interests than the 
American public. This lack of identification, shown through his voting record, casts 
uncertainty on Senator Kerry's good will. It questions whether Senator Kerry would be a 
leader looking out for the population, or looking out for a small special interest group. 
Domestic use of strategic uncertainty. The domestic issues commercials have three 
emergent tactics that work together. The commercials attack Senator Kerry's practical 
wisdom by questioning his actions and voting records. Kerry's actions and voting records 
show he does not understand the population and its needs. As a leader, a president must 
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represent the people. If that president does not understand the people, he cannot fully 
represent them. Because of this lack of identification with the population, Kerry cannot 
identify with the population. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975), lowered 
identification leads to heightened uncertainty. Heightened uncertainty leads to avoidance. 
International issues. The war on terror and all its components (9/11, Iraq, etc.) were 
the defining issue of the 2004 election (Cahill, 2006; Donilon, 2006; Smith, 2005). 
However, it was more of an asset to the Bush-Cheney incumbency campaign. A part of 
an incumbent's strategy is to convince voters that "despite their doubts about the 
incumbent, the challenger presents greater risks" (Smith, 2005, p. 132). In other words, 
there is uncertainty in political change (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). In an atmosphere of 
heightened uncertainty, people look for a leader with special knowledge (Avery & 
Zemsky, 1998; Edelman, 1967). If they look for a leader with proper expertise, it is safe 
to say people are less likely to take risks. In the 2004 election, a strategy of making 
Senator Kerry appear to be a risk was important. According to Maestas (2003) risk and 
uncertainty tend to be positively correlated so they do move in identical directions. To 
show that the Senator Kerry was a risk President Bush's campaign attacked Senator 
Kerry's ethos not only on domestic issues but international issues. If a challenger is 
perceived as not being a credible leader voters might vote against him. This need for a 
credible leader becomes heightened with a high level of situational uncertainty. If Senator 
Kerry's ethos is attacked with strategic uncertainty, he is less likely to associate his image 
with the mythic presidency. If Kerry cannot associate himself with the mythic presidency, 
he loses access to its inherent credibility. 
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Nimmo and Savage (1976) found voters have an idealized image of what they 
want in a president and compare the candidate to that ideal. On one level, they want 
someone they can identify with through values, someone who has the same values as 
they. On the other hand, they want someone who is competent and fits the mythic 
presidency mold (Kendall & Paine, 1995). If a candidate is perceived as having uncertain 
values, and voters are uncertain about his/her practical wisdom, the candidate's 
competency comes into question. This moves the candidate away from the idealized, 
mythic, presidency. The mythic presidency becomes an even more important symbol in 
an atmosphere of exaggerated uncertainty. During uncertain times, people look to leaders 
with special qualifications to lead them (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Edelman, 1967). The 
mythic president becomes more desirable during times of war and uncertainty. By 
generating uncertainty about Senator Kerry's ethos in international matters, the Bush-
Cheney campaign was able to disassociate him from the mythic presidency, and the 
defining issue of the election. To disassociate Senator Kerry from the mythic presidency, 
the Bush-Cheney campaign had to generate situational uncertainty. This creates the need 
for a competent, strong, resolved leader. Bush-Cheney attacked Senator Kerry's practical 
wisdom to get at the public's perception of Kerry as a strong competent leader. A 
politician's voting record symbolizes his or her actions. By casting uncertainty upon a 
candidate's actions, the candidate can be perceived as "weak." To be associated with the 
mythic presidency, weakness is not a desirable quality. 
Title of TV advertisement: PATRIOT Act. 
Announcer: "President Bush signed the PATRIOT Act..." 
Image 1: Left: President Bush at podium speaking Right: 
Hand signing a paper. Text: PATRIOT Act. Fade in text: 
Fight Terrorism 
Announcer: ".. .giving law enforcement vital tools to fight 
terrorism." 
Image 2: Text: Fight Terrorism. Left camouflage military 
man walking with a rifle slung over his shoulder. Right a 
man with police jacket, with POLICE on back, with back to 
camera is putting a man into a police car. Fade out. 
Announcer: "John Kerry.. .he voted for the PATRIOT 
act..." 
Image 1: White background. Text left to right: John Kerry 
voted for Patriot Act. - H.R. 3162, 10/25/01. Shadow of 
text below text. Right: Headshot of Kerry speaking into a 
microphone at a podium. 
Announcer: ".. .but pressured by fellow liberal he's 
changed his position." 
Image 2: Image shifts Kerry to the left of the screen. Text: 
John Kerry Change Position - Remarks at Iowa State 
University, 12/2/03. 
Announcer: "While wire taps, subpoena powers, and 
surveillance are routinely used against drug dealers and 
organized crime..." 
Image 1: Screen splits into three images. Left coming from 
the bottom up. Middle coming down. Right Coming up 
from bottom. Left: Text: Wire tapes face of phone. Middle: 
Gavel coming down. Text: Subpoena power. Right: Man at 
computer screens. Text: Surveillances. 
Announcer: ".. .Kerry would now repeal the PATRIOT 
Act's use of these tools against terrorists." 
Image 2: Black text on white background. Text: Kerry 
would repeal Patriot Act's use of wire taps, subpoenas, and 
surveillance.... 
Announcer: "John Kerry playing politics with national 
security." 
Image 1: Center on white. Framed picture of Kerry. Text up 
and to the left of the Kerry image: Politics. Under the Kerry 
image: John Kerry. Playing with National Security. 
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The word "politics" at the upper left corner falls into blank 
spot. 
In the opening of the commercial, both the verbal and visual text worked as 
referential symbols. The symbol of "to fight terrorism" set the context of the commercial. 
President Bush, through his practical wisdom for the common good, is symbolically 
fighting terrorism by signing the PATRIOT Act. He is the agent of security. However, 
the commercial reveals Senator Kerry as an agent of uncertainty. Uncertainty that is 
generated by his actions and inaction. 
The PATRIOT Act becomes a condensation symbol for the fight against terrorism 
and a tool for security. President Bush becomes the agent of power and security. The 
PATRIOT Act is conduit for that power and the rhetorical device to "give" tools to fight 
terrorism. The two images work as reassurance to the audience. Through President 
Bush's symbolic action, the people are more secure. 
The commercial revealed there is an agent who at one time supported the tool of 
security. However, due to politics Senator Kerry began to oppose the PATRIOT Act. 
Verbal and visual text, working as referential symbols, established that Senator Kerry 
voted for the PATRIOT Act. This flip-flop created uncertainty regarding Kerry's ethos. 
Senator Kerry's voting for the PATRIOT Act is the referential symbol but it 
becomes a condensation symbol for his uncertainty. Not only did this produce uncertainty 
regarding his support of the PATRIOT Act, but it also suggested that his good will was 
uncertain. If Senator Kerry is willing to change his position due to political pressure, it 
questions his leadership regarding the war on terror. 
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The commercial makes the argument that aspects of the PATRIOT Act have been 
in use prior to the Act having been signed into law. The images used create the 
impression of the PATRIOT Act in action. Since the PATRIOT Act helps in the war on 
terror, the actions of the Act protect the people. The PATRIOT Act becomes a symbol of 
security, a sense of protection that lowered uncertainty. 
At first, Senator Kerry voted for the PATRIOT Act, which symbolizes the war on 
terror, now he would repeal it. Senator Kerry would take away the security of the United 
States for political purposes. This signals to the audience that not only would the U.S. be 
in danger in an uncertain world if Senator Kerry were president, he would also take away 
protection from terrorism. It also signals that Senator Kerry would not be a consistent 
leader, his values and practical wisdom are suspect. Black and white text suggests a black 
and white situation that Kerry does not appear to perceive. 
In the end, the commercial consistently attacks Senator Kerry's practical wisdom 
regarding the war on terror, leadership needed in uncertain times. Senator Kerry does not 
have the qualities, qualifications, or the strength to protect US citizens. Kerry having 
uncertain qualities, qualifications, and strength, affect his perception of the war on terror. 
Title of TV advertisement: Yakuza 
Announcer: "John Kerry says he's author of a strategy to 
win the war on terror..." 
Image 1: Black screen with text: Author of strategy to win 
the war on terror? Upper left corner black and white photo 
of Kerry at a desk with title: THE NEW WAR: Senator 
John Kerry. Image grows and moves center as word 
STRATEGY grows and moves right of picture and 
question mark grows over the word. 
Announcer: ".. .against the Japanese Yakuza." 
Image 2: Yellow and black "Japanese" sun rays. Black and 
white image of Kerry imposed over the rays to left of the 
screen. Right: Cartoon, manga art, of Japanese man holding 
a gun. 
Announcer: "Never mentions Al Qaeda." 
Image 1: On the left of the screen black and white, image 
of John Kerry again. On the right is a question mark over 
video of back of man shooting an AK-47. 
Announcer: "Says nothing about Osama bin Laden." 
Image 2: On the left of the screen black and white, image 
of John Kerry. "Terrorist" image fades out and fades into 
an image of Osama bin Laden sitting in front of a map. Red 
question mark appears over Osama. 
Announcer: "Calls Yasser Arafat a statesman." 
Image 1: On the left of the screen black and white, image 
of John Kerry. The image slowly grows bigger. Image of 
Osama fades out and fades into an image of Yasser Arafat. 
Text: "Statesman" with blue halo appears over Yasser. The 
lower right corner text cites statesman text: "The New 
War" p. 112. 
Announcer: "The New Republic says Kerry's plan misses 
the mark." 
Image 2: On the left of the screen black and white image of 
John Kerry. The image slowly grows bigger. Yasser Arafat 
image fades out as an image of the New Republic magazine 
cover fades in, with an image of Barack Obama on it. Text 
appears over New Republic image: "misses the mark." 
Bottom right, date of New Republic quote: 2/9/04. 
Announcer: "And Kerry's focus? Global crime." 
Image 1: Previous images fade out to black with white text: 
Kerry's focus? White background with moving black 
silhouette images. Male figure looking up to the left 
holding a spinning globe on his index finger. Text: Global 
crime 
Announcer: "Not terrorism. 
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Image 2: Image fades out as the text Not Terrorism fades in 
over an image of Osama again. 
Announcer: "How can John Kerry win a war if he doesn't 
know the enemy?" 
Image 1: Black and white image of Kerry with emerging 
thought bubble with a question mark in it. 
The commercial Yakuza, like the previous commercials, attacked Senator Kerry's 
practical wisdom to generate uncertainty about his leadership, or good will. Like the 
previous and later commercials, Yakazu seeks to create uncertainty about Senator Kerry's 
leadership skills to disassociate him from the mythic presidency, while exaggerating 
situational uncertainty. The commercial works on three levels. The first level, dissects 
Senator Kerry's symbolic actions, and attacks them separately through referential and 
condensation symbols. On another level, those attacks not only criticize Senator Kerry's 
practical wisdom, but some visuals help in exaggerating the sense of situational 
uncertainty. On a broader level, the commercial suggests that Senator Kerry does not 
understand the war on terror. It argues that John Kerry does not recognize the real enemy. 
It creates the perception that Senator Kerry lacks special knowledge or expertise to be a 
leader in times of uncertainty. 
The introduction to the commercial establishes the rhetorical situation. It 
communicates the political reality of a terrorist threat (Nimmo & Combs, 1983). It begins 
by suggesting that Senator Kerry has a strategy to fight the war on terror. It looks at a 
form of Senator Kerry's symbolic action for the war on terror. Images support the fact 
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that Kerry authored the strategy. However, it begins the generation of uncertainty by 
using an image of a question mark over the word strategy. It visually creates doubt about 
Senator Kerry's strategy to fight terrorism. That doubt is created by uncertainty. 
The first attack points out that Senator Kerry's strategy targets the wrong enemy. 
The commercial implies that Senator Kerry does not understand the war on terror and its 
participants. The average citizen knows that Al Qaeda is the main target in the war on 
terror. Yet Senator Kerry does not. It questioned Senator Kerry's qualifications for 
president if he does not understand a basic component of the defining issue of the 2004 
election. An image of Senator Kerry ties him to a cartoon character. Cartoon images 
suggest that Senator Kerry's strategy was childish and should not be taken seriously. 
The images attacked Senator Kerry's practical wisdom by showing that Kerry's 
strategy does not reference the war on terror. The first image of a "terrorist" gives a 
visual to the announcer's mention of Al Qaeda. That image is followed by the iconic 
referential and condensation symbol, Osama Bin Laden. Osama's image is short-hand for 
the attacks of on "9/11," the threat of terrorism and Al Qaeda. The two images present the 
true targets of the war on terror while creating an atmosphere of uncertainty. Osama 
remained free, and terrorism was still a factor in everyone's life. That factor was the lack 
of information of when, where, and how a terrorist attack will happen. Creating 
uncertainty creates a need for a leader with the proper knowledge to defend the people. 
To further cloud Senator Kerry's credibility on conducting the war on terror, the 
announcer cites Kerry referring to Yassir Arafat as a statesman. To draw upon the 
imagery of Yassir as a terrorist the Osama image slowly fades out as the image of Yassir 
Arafat fades in. The end result suggests that Senator Kerry calls a terrorist a statesman. 
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To add credibility to attacks, the New Republic is cited as stating Senator Kerry's 
strategy "misses the mark." Visual texts support verbal texts. It creates an impression that 
Senator Kerry's strategy is flawed. It also creates an impression that an unbiased source 
is making the argument. However, when combined with the previous sections of the 
commercial, it makes an argument that Senator Kerry does not understand the broader 
implications of the war on terror. 
Instead of understanding that the war on terror is about terrorism the commercial 
argues that Senator Kerry's strategy targets organized crime. The black and white 
imagery used puts the war on terror into a rhetorical situation of good versus evil, right 
versus wrong. It implies that there is a right way to execute the war on terror and a wrong 
way to execute the war on terror. The previous attacks clearly positioned Senator Kerry 
as being on the wrong side of conducting the war on terror. 
The second to last image of Osama was used to remind the audience who and 
what the war on terror is about. It also reminds voters that he is out there, and that raises 
the uncertainty of future attacks. 
The final portion poses a rhetorical question: "How can John Kerry win a war if 
he doesn't know the enemy?" This suggests Senator Kerry did not understand the "threats 
and dangers" in the war on terror. It also generated uncertainty about his leadership. If he 
is to be president, how can he protect the people if he targets the wrong people? It also 
works on the perception of voters and their image of a president. Citizens should not have 
a better grasp of international issues than the candidate. It removed Senator Kerry from 
the mythic presidency. 
Title of TV advertisement: Peace 
Announcer: "History's lesson; strength builds peace." 
Image 1: Community clock off to the left of the screen. A 
man in a business suit appears and walks towards and past 
the camera. 
Announcer: "Weakness invites those who would do us 
harm." 
Image 2: Woman jogging down a street pushing her baby in 
an exercise stroller. The image is fast forwarded so that she 
is physically closer to the camera. 
Announcer: "Unfortunately after the first World Trade 
attack..." 
Image 1: A ceiling fan shown spinning on the ceiling. 
Announcer: ".. John Kerry and the Congressional liberals 
tried to slash..." 
Image 2: A man wearing sunglasses hails a taxi. He pulls 
the glasses off and looks at his watch. Text at Bottom: John 
Kerry & Congressional liberals. 
Text appears in a box middle left of screen: Slashed 
intelligence. 
Announcer: ".. .six billion dollars from the intelligence 
budget..." 
Image 2: Kid looking out a window. Light envelopes whole 
face. He turns from the light into partially shadows. 
Announcer: ".. .and tried to cut or eliminate over forty 
weapons now fighting the war on terror...' 
Image 1: Woman opening a refrigerator. Camera is looking 
in a window from outside. Text: John Kerry & 
Congressional Liberals. New text appears in white outlined 
box: Cut Weapons. 
Announcer: ".. .and refused..." 
Image 2: A woman on the phone, she looks at her watch. 
Text: John Kerry & Congressional Liberals. New text 
appears in white outline box: Putting our troops at risk. 
Announcer: ".. .to support our troops in combat with..." 
Image 1: Video in fast forward. Image of mother helping 
children into a minivan. Text: John Kerry & Congressional 
Liberals. Text in white outlined box: Putting Our Troops at 
Risk 
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Announcer: ".. .the latest weapons and body armor." 
Image 2: Clock hands spinning around a clock in fast 
motion. Passing of time. 
Announcer: Ticking noise in the background. 
Image 1: Black background. Text: John Kerry & 
Congressional Liberals. The following text glows into 
vision. Putting our Protection at Risk. 
By systematically attacking a candidate's practical wisdom, his or her symbolic 
strength is lessened. In the opening sequence of Peace the announcer talks about strength 
and weakness. In the background, a sound of a ticking clock sets the mood for the 
commercial, and represents time. An image of a man appears and disappears, 
representing work. The images fade out as the announcer claims weakness. An image of a 
woman jogging with a stroller moves towards the camera. The woman and child work as 
condensation symbols of who is at stake in the war on terror. The ticking clock and the 
actors' motion set the tone that things are in motion and time is running out. Those two 
effects work to create tension in the audience. The sense of tension is heightened by 
listing Senator Kerry's poor voting record. 
The commercial targets Senator Kerry's practical wisdom on two fronts in the war 
on terror, intelligence and the military. The commercial also generates situational 
uncertainty. It accomplishes these two effects through the use of referential and 
condensation symbols of past terrorist attacks, and by invoking the current war on terror. 
The use of the attack on the World Trade Center situates the risk of terrorism in a manner 
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to which voters can relate. The announcer relates how Senator Kerry and the Liberals in 
Congress reacted to the attacks. Indicating that Senator Kerry slashed the intelligence 
funding by six billion dollar, voters get a referential symbol of Kerry's practical wisdom. 
The images of a man in motion looking at his watch suggest energy and time. 
A key component to the war on terror is the United States military. The 
commercial, Peace, attacked Kerry's practical wisdom in conducting the war on terror by 
asserting he would not fund the military. Again, the commercial used the referential 
symbol of numbers to give an exact definition of how Senator Kerry's lack of 
competency will affect the war on terror. The images suggest that both soldiers fighting 
the war and civilians at home will be affected by Kerry's incompetence. 
The conclusion to the commercial keeps the tension up with a ticking clock; the 
test suggests that electing Senator Kerry is a risk. Senator Kerry's practical wisdom in a 
time of uncertainty is cast into doubt. His past indicates what he might do as president. 
Title of TV advertisement: Risk 
Announcer: "After September eleventh..." 
Image 1: The ruins of the World Trade Center with an 
American flag waving to the left. The image is broken up 
into boxes. Text: After September 11th our world changed. 
Announcer: ".. .our world changed. Either we fight 
terrorists..." 
Image 2: Back shot of black capped male shooting an AK-
47 at an unseen target. 
Announcer: ".. .abroad or face them here." 
Image 1: Close up of a male child's face in the boxes. 
Announcer: "John Kerry and liberals in Congress had a 
different view." 
Image 2: Boxes disappear and camera zooms in on child's 
eye. 
Announcer: "They opposed Reagan..." 
Image 1: With a white time line at the bottom, old 
television images are shown as the shot pans from the time 
line. Image of Ronald Reagan walking towards the camera 
holding paper. 
Announcer: ".. .as he won the Cold War." 
Image 2: At top of screen in a box text: John Kerry and his 
Liberal in Allies. Four men standing near a flag shaking 
hands. Text: Opposed Reagan as he won the Cold War. 
Text is underlined and a line points to a point on the time 
line. A ghost image of "The 80s" on the screen. 
Announcer: "Voted against the first Gulf War." 
Image 1: At the top of the screen in a box text: John Kerry 
and his Liberal Allies in Congress. Military coming out of 
the back of a troop air carrier. Fades into sight. A ghost 
image of "The 90s" appears. Text of the time-line: Voted 
against the first Gulf war. A helicopter flies over an 
American flag. 
Announcer: "Voted to slash intelligence after the first 
Trade Center attack." 
Announcer: "Repeatedly opposed weapons vital in winning 
the war on terror." 
Image 2: At the top of the screen in a box text: John Kerry 
and his Liberal Allies in Congress. Ghost text of "Today" 
appears. Time-line text appears: Repeatedly opposed 
weapon vital to the war on terror. Background image of a 
missile being shot into the air from the ground. Image 
scrolls off as a new one scrolls on. A tank rolling through 
the desert. 
Announcer: "John Kerry and his liberal allies, are they a 
risk we can afford to take today?" 
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Image 1: Return to the image of the male child. Text scrolls 
in: John Kerry and his Liberal Allies.. .Are they a risk we 
can afford to take today? 
The commercial Risk begins, like previous commercials, by generating situational 
uncertainty. It accomplished generating uncertainty by using inartistic proofs. That was a 
day (9/11) when everything changed in the United States. Sorrentino & Roney (2000) 
stated that emerging new paradigms cause uncertainty. The invocation of September 11, 
2001 not only created fear in the audience, but reminded citizens to fear change. Senator 
Kerry represents change. By heightening situational uncertainty, the commercial defines 
Senator Kerry as uncertain. However, the commercial also disassociates Senator Kerry 
from the mythic presidency by tracing his lack of competency. A history of poor practical 
wisdom when dealing with enemies of the United States communicates weakness. 
Weakness does not fit the mold of the mythic presidency. 
The commercial traces common historical events of symbolic value through an 
ongoing visual time-line of images and a line denoting time-periods. The time line spans 
the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The time-line gave common experiences of bold decisions 
made by leaders in regards to perceived enemies and threats. For example, one such 
historic event shown was the fall of the Berlin Wall. The fall of the wall symbolizes the 
end of communism. It also explains that Senator Kerry opposed each "bold" decision. 
This accomplishes two things. It affects the perception of the future. If Kerry were 
elected president, he would likely make poor decisions if confronted with threats. Poor 
decisions would cause unknown problems in the United States. That sense of the 
unknown is what people want to avoid. Kerry's history of poor Kerry's history of poor 
decision signals the impression that he would not be a strong president for the common 
good. 
The ad's conclusion suggests that it would place us at resk to elect Senator Kerry. 
That risk creates uncertainty. Change is not always good. Senator Kerry has a history of 
incompetence. That lack of competency signals weakness when strength is needed. 
Title of TV advertisement: Wolves 
Announcer: "In an increasing..." 
Image 1: Above shot of a forest. Fog rises from the forest. 
Announcer: ".. .dangerous world.. .Even..." 
Image 2: Up close shot of a plant. The image blurs out of 
focus as the background forest comes into focus. Forest 
shot darkens out. 
Announcer: ".. .after the first terrorist. 
Image 1: Below shot looking up at trees. Sunlight shines 
down from above. Camera pans down from top towards the 
ground. 
Announcer: ".. .attack on America.. John Kerry and the 
liberals in Congress voted. 
Image 2: Eye-level shot of the forest, in the forest. 
Announcer: "...to slash America's intelligence 
operations..." 
Image 1: A wolf running through the forest. 
Announcer: "Silence from announcer." 
Image 2: A quick pan through the woods. A partial shot of 
a wolf face appears for half a second. 
Announcer: ".. .by six billion dollars..." 
Image 1: Camera pans through the forest. A wolf is seen 
partial through the brush running through the woods. 
Announcer: "Cuts so deep they would have weakened 
America's defenses." 
Image 1: Camera pans outside of the forest. Text: Kerry & 
Liberals in Congress Intelligence cuts 6 Billion. CQ Vote 
#89 '94. 
Announcer: "And weakness attracts those who are waiting 
to..." 
Image 2: Six wolves sitting outside the forest looking at the 
camera. 
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Announcer: ".. .do America harm." 
Image 1: The wolves get up and start heading towards the 
camera. 
Like previous commercials, the introduction establishes an atmosphere of 
uncertainty. The images of fog create a sense of the unseen, the unknown. A forest 
represents nature, something that cannot be controlled and cannot be predicted. In times 
of uncertainty a leader is needed to control uncertainty. A strong leader must possess the 
qualities and qualifications to confront dangers, threats, and enemies. 
The commercial follows the same format of pervious commercials. It reminds the 
audience of the World Trade Center attacks. Senator Kerry shown voting to slash 
America's intelligence operations by six billion dollars. It suggests that cuts in 
intelligence would show weakness. The quick visual, cuts through the obscured forest, 
and the implication of wolves on the move create a perception of threat. That threat 
creates a sense of foreboding and uncertainty. The viewer cannot quite make out the 
wolves. The wolves represent terrorists (McKinnon, 2006) and at the end when the 
wolves are finally shown, they rise and move toward the camera. However, their final 
destination is not shown. The viewer is left with a mystery. Burke (1969) argued humans 
seek to overcome mystery. To not resolve mystery creates uncertainty. The commercial 
attacks Senator Kerry's practical wisdom sufficiently to disassociate him from the mythic 
presidency and to generate uncertainty about his leadership. It does not provide new 
attacks on Kerry's practical wisdom. The final message of the commercial generates 
situational uncertainty. By generating situational uncertainty, the Bush-Cheney campaign 
makes Senator Kerry less desirable. 
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International use of strategic uncertainty. In times of uncertainty, people look to 
leaders with special knowledge and expertise. The mythic presidency helps create a 
perception of "president-as-expert" (Neustadt, 1990). It also creates the perception of 
strength (Misciagno, 1996). It becomes important for candidates in a presidential election 
to associate themselves with certainty. The emergent strategy of strategic uncertainty 
follows three steps. First, the commercials create situational uncertainty, accomplished in 
a variety of ways. One means by which situational uncertainty was evoked through the 
use of verbal and visual texts to recall terrorist attacks on US soil. The attacks of 
February 26, 1993 were most commonly used while September 11, 2001, was used once. 
However, each attack was used in the opening moments of the commercial to set the 
rhetorical situation. The use of terrorist attacks remind people of the unpredictable nature 
of terrorism. Another method of exaggerating situational uncertainty was the invocation 
of the war on terror. War spawns an atmosphere of uncertainty. Once the rhetorical 
situation was set and the topic of the commercial revealed, the next step attacked the 
practical wisdom of Senator Kerry. 
By attacking a candidate's practical wisdom the ads address a candidate's 
symbolic strength. In an atmosphere of exaggerated uncertainty, the attacks also question 
a candidate's leadership. This disassociates a candidate from the mythic presidency. If a 
candidate is perceived as having poor practical wisdom, he or she is not going to work for 
the common good of the population. If in an atmosphere of situational uncertainty the 
electorate does not perceive a candidate as having leadership qualities and qualifications, 
they will seek one who does. 
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The final step in strategic uncertainty is to disassociate Senator Kerry from the 
mythic presidency. Like previous commercials the concluding verbal and visual texts are 
meant to resonate with the audience. The constant attacks on Senator Kerry's practical 
wisdom in a situation of heightened uncertainty generate more uncertainty about Senator 
Kerry's leadership. By attacking his symbolic actions, Senator Kerry is meant to be 
perceived as a weak politician who lacks leadership qualities. For example, in PATRIOT 
Act the ending verbal text states: "John Kerry playing politics with national security." 
That statement after a series of attacks on his lack of consistency suggests that Senator 
Kerry is willing to change his mind simply to become president. It begs the question, 
would he be consistent as president? It suggested that Senator Kerry would rather "play 
politics" than make sure the people were secure and safe. 
Attacking and Bolstering Ethos 
In between attacking and bolstering ethos in strategic uncertainty lies a mixture of 
bolstering a candidate's ethos while at the same time attacking their opponent's ethos. 
Political Antithesis. Burke (1972) identifies a type of rhetorical identification as 
antithesis, an us-versus-them distinction. Political antithesis in strategic uncertainty 
attacks a candidate's ethos while bolstering the uncertainty generator's ethos. It 
juxtaposes contrasting political plans to create a known versus unknown. For example, 
the Bush-Cheney campaign commercial showed Senator Kerry's plan to fight the war on 
terror, which generated uncertainty. The commercial then revealed the Bush-Cheney plan 
to fight the war on terror, which seemed more certain and sensible. In the 2004 election, 
political antithesis was used in two ways. One way was the proven past versus the 
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unknown future. The commercial frames the election to be about President Bush's past 
actions and their benefits, versus Senator Kerry's lack of practical wisdom. The second 
way, was the political equivalent of "vaporware." Vaporware is "a product 
preannouncement that can be timed to steal the momentum from a competitor" 
(Pfaffenberger, 2000, p. 79). The Bush-Cheney campaign presented a vaporware plan as 
it attacked Senator Kerry's plan. 
In the initial analysis, five commercials were identified that bolstered and attacked 
ethos. However, one of the commercials, Forward, was removed from the data set 
because it did not clearly present Senator Kerry antithetically. The remaining 
commercials were placed in separate categories because the bolstering and attacking were 
so clearly defined. Political antithesis commercials make a clear distinction between 
candidates. 
Proven past versus unknown future. The strategy of showing proven past versus the 
unknown future relies on common experiences and quantifiable and unquantifiable events 
(increase of jobs, decisions made) to bolster a candidate's ethos. It also attacks the 
practical wisdom and or values of a candidate. Common experiences can have the added 
benefit of heightening situational uncertainty. For example, the common experience of 
"9/11" or economic recession helped heighten situational uncertainty. This plays to the 
strength of President Bush's expert knowledge about the war on terror, which is 
something people look for in uncertain times (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Edleman, 1967). 
Title of TV advertisement: Pessimism 
George Bush (Looking off to the side of the camera): "I'm 
optimistic about America because I believe in the people of 
America." 
Image 1: George and Laura Bush looking to the side of the 
camera. 
Announcer: "After recession, 9/11..." 
Image 2: Street scene. People on the streets walking away 
from the camera. White man walking away from the 
camera. Text in a white box at the top of the screen: After 
recession, 9-11, and war... 
Announcer: ".. .and war. Now the economy..." 
Image 1: Shoe store. People in background. White male 
walks in front of camera as if he is shopping. 
Announcer: ".. .has been growing for ten straight months." 
Image: Cuts to shoe salesperson sitting on the ground 
pulling a shoe out of a box. Text in white box: Now our 
economy has been growing for ten straight months. 
Announcer: "The largest tax relief in history." 
Image 2: Man in hardhat, in front, pointing to something. 
Black man in hard hat behind the white man. Text: The 
largest tax relief in history 
Announcer: "One point four million jobs added since 
August." 
Image 1: The diner scene from previous commercials. Text: 
The largest tax relief in history fades to new text: 1.4 
million jobs added since August. 
Announcer: "Inflation, interest, and mortgage rates low." 
Image 2: A man wearing a yellow hardhat standing on 
scaffolding surrounded by I-beams. Text: Inflation, interest, 
and mortgage rates low. Cuts to a man in business attire on 
the phone, smiling and spinning in his chair. He pumps his 
hand in the air appearing to be happy. Text: Inflation, 
interest, and mortgage rates low fades out. 
Announcer: "Record homeownership." 
Image 2: A couple with a baby walking into the back of a 
brick house. Text: Record home ownership. 
Announcer: "John Kerry's response, he's talking about the 
Great Depression." 
Image 1: Video of headshot of John Kerry speaking. Text 
John Kerry's Response. Text over face: America's job 
recovery is the worst since the Great Depression. - John 
Kerry for President press release 05.07.04 
Announcer: "One thing is sure, pessimism never created a 
job." 
Image 2: Image bleaches out to white text: One thing is for 
sure. Pessimism never created a job. 
Title of TV advertisement: Global Test 
Constant image: Kerry speaking at a debate. Shoulders and 
head only. Text above: John Kerry. 
Announcer: "He said he'd attack terrorists who'd threaten 
America." 
Image 1: Inside a black frame Kerry speaks. 
Announcer: "But at the debate, John Kerry said America 
must pass a global test before we protect ourselves." 
Image 2: Same image of Kerry speaking in a black frame. 
Text at the top: John Kerry. Lines emerge from the top text 
follow down to the bottom and form a box with text: A 
Global Test? 
Announcer: "The Kerry Doctrine: A global test." 
Image 1: Same image of Kerry speaking in a black frame. 
Text, top: Kerry Doctrine: A Global Test. Lines emerge 
and create new box at bottom. Text, top: Kerry Doctrine: A 
Global Test. 
Announcer: "So we must seek permission from foreign 
governments before protecting America?" 
Image 2: Same image of Kerry speaking in a black frame. 
Text, top: Kerry Doctrine: A Global Test. Lines emerge 
and create new box at bottom. Text, bottom: Permission 
from Foreign Governments Before Protecting America. 
Announcer: "So America will be forced to wait while 
threats gather." 
Image 1: Black frame and Kerry. Text, bottom: Forced To 
Wait While Threat Gathers. 
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Announcer: "President Bush believes decisions about 
protecting America should..." 
Image 2: Image of President Bush standing up at a desk, 
talking on the phone, looking at a piece of paper and in the 
Oval office. Framed by blue edges. 
Announcer: ".. .be made in the Oval Office not foreign 
capitols." 
Image 1: Profile of President Bush sitting and talking on 
the phone. 
Proven past versus unknown future commercials followed a common pattern. 
First, the commercial introduced the main agent. In the two commercials' introductions, 
President Bush and Senator Kerry are introduced as the primary agents. In both 
commercials, situational uncertainty is heightened through the invocation of past events. 
In Pessimism, the attacks of September 11, 2001 along with the economic recession of 
early 2001 are mentioned to heighten social and economic uncertainty. In Global Test, 
the war on terror is mentioned. 
In the main body of the commercial ethos is attacked and bolstered. The proven 
past related to the public's knowledge of President Bush. For example, Global Test 
framed an argument regarding America's ability to make its own decisions. It argued that 
Senator Kerry would take away the United States' sovereignty with respect to making 
decisions to protect itself. The commercial then revealed that President Bush believed 
decisions to go to war should be made by the President. On the surface, it appeared to be 
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a statement about the future of defense. However it invokes the proven past of President 
Bush making decisions to go to war in Iraq. Voters have a collective experience of 
President Bush persuading the nation to go to war to "protect" America. However, there 
is no collective experience of Senator Kerry making such decisions. There is no 
information provided for voters to predict how Senator Kerry would react. With no 
information to draw upon there is only conjecture, and uncertainty. By proposing Senator 
Kerry would hand over decision making to outside forces, the commercial argued that 
Senator Kerry would take away the power of choice from the United States. This 
produced uncertainty of how others would protect the United States. The argument that 
Senator Kerry would put defensive measures to a "global test" is a direct attack on 
Senator Kerry's practical wisdom. By suggesting Kerry would give decision-making 
powers to other nations argues that Senator Kerry would not be able to keep America 
secure. 
Pessimism begins by creating a scene of President Bush's economic plan. Most of 
the positive effects are quantified. For example, to give voters a logical understanding of 
the job market, the announcer stated "1.4 million jobs were added." The list of positive 
effects of President Bush's leadership is juxtaposed against Senator Kerry's lack of 
practical wisdom, beliefs, and values. The commercial stated that Senator Kerry's 
pessimism would not create jobs. Economic uncertainty is insinuated. 
Images used in the commercial are mostly used to bolster President Bush's ethos 
and tie Senator Kerry to his own words. In Pessimism, images of a robust economy are 
used along side a verbal list of President Bush's proven economic record. Images of 
people working and purchasing give a visualization of the idea that President Bush's 
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practical wisdom has helped the economy. Visuals of people walking into a house 
insinuated house ownership. In Global Test images of President Bush in the Oval Office 
are used. Both commercials use images of Senator Kerry when attacking his ethos, thus 
tying Kerry to his bad decisions. 
Political Vaporware. The use of political vaporware presents an ambiguous policy to 
deal with a problem, threat, or danger. The use of political vaporware in the 2004 election 
dealt mainly with domestic issues. This was because as McKinnon (2006) remarked that, 
Democrats were perceived as being stronger on domestic issues. In marketing vaporware 
is used by an organization to recapture a publics' attention away from a new product. 
Jenkins (1988) contends that vaporware persuades consumers that grave risks are 
associated with the adoption of new products. In a political sense, vaporware presents a 
"policy" by a candidate and suggests that an opponent's policies are a risk, an 
uncertainty. 
Title of TV advertisement: Economy Common Sense vs. 
Higher Taxes 
Announcer: "President and our leaders in Congress have a 
common sense plan to grow our economy..." 
Image 1: Blue screen background. Text: 
www.agendaforamerica.com 
Announcer: "...and create jobs. So small businesses can 
expand and hire." 
Image 2: The shot pulls out to a workstation, the blue 
screen is revealed to be in a computer. There is an empty 
desk. 
Image 1: Text appears on computer screen. Shot zooms in. 
Image 2: Full screen shot of text: President Bush & Leaders 
in Congress. Each line of text is highlighted as it is read off 
by the voiceover. Text: Small Business Growth .Text: New 
Skills Through Education. Text: A Fairer, Simpler, Tax 
Code. 
Announcer: "The liberals in Congress..." 
Image 1: Pulls out from screen to see an African American 
woman sitting at the computer and looking at the text. 
Announcer: ".. .and Kerry's plan raises taxes on small 
business..." 
Image 2: New text appears on computer screen. Shot zooms 
in on text: Liberals in Congress & Kerry's plan: Raises 
taxes on 900,000 small business owners. 
Announcer: ".. .nine hundred thousand business owners..." 
Image 1: Quick cut to previous text on screen. A white 
woman at a desk is looking at the text with hands on her 
face, looking distressed. 
Announcer: ".. .would pay higher tax rates than most 
multinational..." 
Image 2: Back to text. Liberals in Congress & Kerry's 
Plan: Raises taxes on 900,000 small business owners. Small 
Businesses pay more taxes than big corporations. 
Announcer: "...corporations." 
Image 1: Far shot. The room is smoky with light beaming 
in through a window. The light illuminates a man at a table 
with hands on chin looking at a lap top. 
Announcer: "Tax increases would hurt jobs. Hurt small 
business and hurt our economy." 
Image 2: Blue screen again with text: Liberals in Congress 
& John Kerry's plan: Higher taxes hurt economy. 
Title of TV advertisement: Health Care practical vs. big 
government 
Announcer: "On health care." 
Image 1: A blue computer screen with 
www.agendaforamerica.com. 
Image 2: Pulls out to empty work space. New text appears 
on screen. 
Announcer: "President Bush and our leaders in Congress 
have a practical plan." 
Image 1: Zooms in on new text: President Bush & 
Congressional Leaders: Small Business Join Together To 
get Lower Rates. 
Announcer: "Allow small businesses to join together to get 
lower insurance rates..." 
Image 2: Pulls out to a woman looking at the computer 
screen at home. 
Announcer: "...big companies get." 
Image 2: Pulls out to a woman looking at the computer 
screen at home. 
Announcer: "Stop frivolous lawsuits against doctors. 
Health coverage you can take with you." 
Image 1: Zooms back in with previous text plus "Stop 
Frivolous Lawsuits." "Health Savings Account - Job to Job 
Coverage." 
Announcer: "The liberals in Congress..." 
Image 2: Back shot of an older couple, male left female 
right, looking at white computer in home work space. 
Announcer: ".. .and Kerry's plan. Washington Bureaucrats 
in control." 
Image 1: Zooms in on computer screen with text: Liberals 
in Congress & Kerry's plan: Big Government - Run 
Healthcare. 
Announcer: "A government run health care plan." 
Image 2: Younger couple looking at computer monitor. 
Woman on right standing up and pointing at screen. Man 
situated left leans in to look. 
Announcer: "One point five trillion dollar..." 
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Image 1: Screen shot again with previous text plus: At a 
Cost of $1.5 Trillion. 
Announcer: ".. .price tag." 
Image 2: Man putting glasses on. Screen reflection in it. 
Just his wrinkled brow. 
Announcer: "Big government in charge, not you, not your 
doctor." 
Image 1: Screen shot of text: Liberals in Congress & 
Kerry's Plan: $1.5 Trillion Government Run healthcare. 
The two domestic issues dealt with in the political vaporware commercials are the 
economy and health care. Each commercial begins by introducing the subject. Both 
commercials stated President Bush and Leaders in Congress have a plan. Each plan was 
separately described as common sense or practical. The use of common sense or the term 
"practical" to describe the plans implied that they were simple and easy to understand. If 
a plan is common sense, it is obvious to everyone and not laden with complicated ideas 
and concepts. The term "practical" created a perception of a plan's feasibility. Both 
descriptions suggest the plans are not risky and therefore not uncertain. 
The Bush-Cheney campaign plans are vague. In Common Sense Vs. Higher Taxes, 
the Bush-Cheney plan is to "grow the economy." In the commercial there is no 
explanation of how it will grow. The end encourages viewers to log onto the Bush-
Cheney website. However, compared to the Kerry plan, which raises taxes, the Bush-
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Cheney plan, no matter how vague, according to the ad, appeared more credible. Senator 
Kerry's practical wisdom is attacked by suggesting that he will raise taxes; it generates 
situational economic uncertainty (Hartman, 1985). The attacks also question whether 
Senator Kerry has the common good in mind. 
In Health Care vs. Big Government, the body is broken into two parts. The first 
part presents the Bush-Cheney plan for health care. The second part, presents the risky 
nature of Senator Kerry's plan. The Bush-Cheney health care plan presents a basic 
understanding of its content. The plan allows for small business to join together to get 
discounts, and allows individuals to take their health care with them. There will not be 
large changes, only slight adjustments. People recognize there would be minimal 
changes. The commercial also takes a plank from the Bush-Cheney platform of tort 
reform. It infers that trial lawyers' lawsuits are a major cause of health care problems. 
However, Senator Kerry's plan is presented as a major change. Change brings risk and 
risk brings uncertainty (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). According to the commercial, Senator 
Kerry's plan also removes power from an individual, by suggesting they will lose the 
ability to choose their doctor. Senator Kerry's health care plan is "risky" because of the 
massive political change that it requires. Most citizens do not know how such a plan 
works. The Bush-Cheney campaign supplied an explanation that generated uncertainty. 
First, they point out that government bureaucrats would run the Kerry health care 
proposal, taking away the individual's power to make decisions. The Bush-Cheney 
campaign also argued that a government plan would cost 1.5 trillion dollars. Though the 
commercial does not say it, it implies that new taxes will be necessary to cover the $1.5 
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trillion price tag. As pointed out earlier, an increase in taxes increases economic 
uncertainty (Hartman, 1985). 
Images that appear in both commercials are similar. Both commercials have 
actors interacting with computers as if they are reading about the Bush-Cheney and Kerry 
plans. Both advertisements cue the audience on how to react. People are seen studiously 
reading the Bush-Cheney plan. By contrast, people appear worried or despondent as they 
react to Kerry's plan. 
In both commercials, the conclusion ends by generating situational uncertainty. 
Common Sense vs. Higher Taxes stated: "Tax increases would hurt jobs. Hurt small 
business and hurt our economy." It left the audience with economic uncertainty. It does 
not say how Kerry's plan will hurt jobs or the economy. It open-endedly allows each 
person to contemplate potential ways of how it would hurt. In Healthcare Practical vs. 
Big Government, the commercial ends reminding citizens they would lose individual 
power to make their own decisions when it comes to healthcare. Both commercials leave 
the audience with a sense of an unknown economic future. 
Strategic uncertainty generates and exaggerates uncertainty while at the same time 
creating perceptions of certainty. A candidate using strategic uncertainty not only attacks 
an opponent's ethos, but they must also bolster their own ethos. In bolstering ethos a 
candidate creates a perception of certainty in an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
Bolstering Ethos 
"Political reality" establishes a candidate's "qualities, qualifications, program, and 
destiny" (Nimmo & Combs, 1983, p. 63). For a candidate to be electable he or she must 
be perceived as credible and competent. A campaign must create qualities, qualifications, 
and policies to support an image of credible and competent leadership. In a presidential 
campaign the mythic presidency becomes a factor in creating a perception of a credible 
and competent candidate. In the 2004 election, due to the war on terror and other 
mitigating circumstances, credibility and competence were supplemented with 
consistency. The consistency and strength in the mythic presidency helped foster a 
political reality of a strong, competent and consistent leader. 
The mythic presidency was important in the 2004 election. According to 
Misciagno (1996), technology has ended the mythic presidency, lessening its strength. In 
an atmosphere of exaggerated uncertainty a perception of strength in a presidential 
candidate is important. To recreate a mythic presidential persona a candidate must be 
credible and competent. Bolstering ethos works in three areas: qualities, qualifications, 
and policies. Qualities reveal a candidate's virtues. Qualifications reveal a candidate's 
practical wisdom. Policies reveal consistency. One of the most important aspects of the 
Bush presidential reelection campaign was the perception of consistency (McKinnon, 
2006). 
Bolstering ethos by elaborating the candidate's qualities was achieved by tying 
President Bush to virtues. For example, faith and freedom are mentioned in several 
commercials, thereby building a perception of a virtuous President Bush. Seven 
advertisements were identified as bolstering ethos through presidential qualities. Each 
commercial followed the same pattern. First, the commercial exaggerated situational 
uncertainty. Two common ways of generating situational uncertainty to conjure up 
terrorism and economic uncertainty were used. After generating situational uncertainty, 
virtues were presented as values that hold true through times of uncertainty. Third, those 
virtues are linked to President Bush and his leadership. 
Title of TV advertisement: Tested. 
Announcer: "The last few years..." 
Image: Black and white image of the back of a young boy 
in a door way looking outside. The boy leans onto the door 
frame. 
Announcer: ".. .have tested America..." 
Image: Fade to the close up of a young girls face. Camera 
is looking down on her as she looks up into the camera. 
Announcer: ".. .in many ways..." 
Image: Fade to home with a flag hanging outside in front of 
the home. The house is black and white while the flag is in 
color. 
Announcer: ".. .Some challenges. 
Image: Fade to a young lady looking through a window 
into the camera. 
Announcer: ".. .we've seen before..." 
Image: Fade to the profile of an elderly man (black and 
white imagery). The man slowly turns towards the camera. 
In the background an American flag, in color, blows in the 
wind. 
Announcer: ".. .and some..." 
Image: Fade to young man slowly looking at camera then 
to the older man in the forefront of the shot. 
Announcer: ".. .were like no others..." 
Image: Fade to a close up of the ruins of the World Trade 
Center with a colored American flag blowing in the wind. 
Announcer: "But America rose to the challenge." 
Image: A man with a young a girl next to a flag pole raising 
the American flag. Camera is looking down on the two as 
they raise the flag. 
Announcer: "What sees us through tough times?" 
Image: Two young girls, wearing backpacks and carrying 
lunch boxes, run past a white building with three open 
windows. The far right window has a globe in it. 
Announcer: "Freedom." 
Image: Fade to school classroom. Shot from the back of the 
room. Students are standing up with their hands over their 
hearts facing the American flag. The teacher, a white 
woman, is facing the class with her hand over her heart. 
Announcer: "Faith." 
Image: Three girls run on the lawn in front of a white 
church. 
Announcer: "Families..." 
Image: A woman, in the background, and a man are lying 
on a bed. They are both smiling at the baby in the hands of 
the man. He is holding the baby up in the air. 
Announcer: ".. .and sacrifice." 
Image: Two men, one in the background and another in the 
foreground. They are wearing fireman helmets and sitting 
on the back of a fire truck. The man has his arm propped up 
on the truck. They both look at the camera. 
Announcer: "President Bush, steady leadership in times of 
change." 
Image: President Bush and Laura Bush are on the left of the 
screen. In the middle is an image of President Bush, in 
profile, at a podium, and right of screen is a close up profile 
of Bush on the phone. Text over the images: PRESIDENT 
BUSH Steady leadership in times of change. 
Title of TV advertisement: Safer Stronger 
Text: President Bush 
Image: George W. Bush being sworn in. Hand on Bible. 
Jenna, Laura, half of a judge with a frame of the American 
flag. 
Text: January 2001, The Challenge. 
Image: Stock market images. Numbers, Tokyo, loss. 
Text: An Economy in Recession. The Challenge fades in 
over the text. 
Image: Stock market numbers. White man with glasses 
lowers his head into his hands and rubs his forehead. A 
woman fades in and out. 
Text: The Challenge: A stock market in decline. 
Image: URL address being typed into Internet Explorer 
browser. 
Text: The challenge: a dot com boom.. .gone bust. 
Image: American flag waving in a close up shot of the 
World Trade Center ruins. 
Text. Then.. .a day of tragedy. 
Image: Reused images. A man with a young girl at the base 
of a flag pole, pulling on the rope. Camera angle looking 
down on the two. Screen right firemen carrying flag draped 
coffin. 
Text: A test for all Americans. 
Image: Left Bush speaking at podium. Right: Two men, a 
one in the background and another in the foreground. They 
are wearing firefighter helmets and sitting on the back of a 
fire truck. A man has his arm propped up on the truck. 
They both look at the camera. 
Image: Left: A man running with younger girl. Right: Close 
up of young girl smiling wearing a flower cap. 
Text: Today. America is turning the corner. 
Image: Comer diner. Female waitress turning on open sign. 
Appears to be dawn. Woman walking around the corner. 
Text: Rising to the challenge. 
Image: Military man with rifle walking in hangar. Trucks in 
the background. F-15 jet taking off fades in. Young girl 
smiling fades in. Older woman fades in smiling. 
Text: Stronger. Safer. 
Image: Ends with flag. President Bush Steady leadership in 
times of change. 
Title of TV advertisement: Changing World 
Announcer: "The world is changing." 
Image 1: White wall, white door, very young boy in yellow 
pajamas. Holding his Teddy bear, he opens a door to a 
bright light on the other side. In that doorway appears an 
image of Asian woman looking at the camera away from a 
microscope. 
Announcer: "Some times in ways..." 
Image 2: The image of the a woman changes to 
Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. 
Announcer: ".. .that astound." 
Image 1: Image of Hamid changes to a bicycle race. 
Announcer: "And others..." 
Image 2: Camera moves, at a rapid rate, past the young boy 
holding the door open. An image of a tank coming around a 
corner towards the camera. In the background is a building. 
Announcer: ".. .that terrify." 
Image 1: The man shooting an AK-47 from previous 
commercials. An American tank rolling down a street past 
a man. 
Announcer: "We depend more than ever on our..." 
Image 1: The images go to color. A shot from in a garage to 
four men in firefighter gear standing outside the garage in 
the sunlight. 
Announcer: "...values." 
Image 2: President Bush partially turned away from camera 
leans over, grabs the hand of a young girl. In the 
background a man takes a picture. 
Announcer: "Family." 
Image 1: Young girl with a young boy behind her. Half his 
face is covered by the grinning face of the girl. 
Announcer: "Faith. The freedom we celebrate." 
Image 2: Elderly man, young boy, young girl. Man and girl 
are doing the hoola hoop while the young boy watches. Far 
shot of President Bush leaning against a column with arm 
around Laura. The image is up close to them. 
Announcer: "In today's changing world..." 
Image 2: Woman and man in back with five kids in front. 
Two boys and three girls are smiling. 
Announcer: ".. .the answers aren't easy." 
Image 1: Kids jumping out of a yellow school bus. 
Announcer: "We need a sense of purpose. A vision for the 
future." 
Image 2: Girl running away from the camera. She runs up a 
hill covered in green grass. Text: A vision_for the future. 
Announcer: "The conviction to do what's right." 
Image 1: President Bush at a podium speaking and smiling 
with a giant American flag. Text: Conviction to do what's 
right. People hugging. Back through the door from the 
beginning. The younger boy is replaced with an older boy 
standing in the door way. 
Title of TV advertisement: Together 
Announcer: "The last..." 
Image 1: Black and white video of a male and female 
couple standing under an umbrella. Next to them is a For 
Sale sign. Trees line the background. 
Announcer: ".. .few years..." 
Image 2: Quick shot of the World Trade Center ruins. The 
American flag is waving in the wind. 
Announcer: ".. .have tested..." 
Image 1: A man is looking up with his chin jutted out. 
Announcer: America... 
Image 2: Close up then a quick cut to a far shot of fireman 
gear hanging on a wall. Shot in black and white. 
Announcer: ".. .in many ways." 
Image 1: A woman slowly looks directly into the camera. 
Announcer: "But together..." 
Image 2: Far shot of a pastoral field. There is a tree in front 
and on top of the hill. A silhouette of a man walks to a 
woman. Quick cut to the two figures holding hands. The 
man points to the sky up to the right of the screen. 
Announcer: ".. .we're rising to..." 
Image 1: Four firemen. Two on the outside are in uniform 
while the two in the middle wear Bush for President shirts. 
Announcer: "...the challenge." 
Image 2: Two men smiling. The man to the left has a dark 
complexion and is smiling. To the right is a man with his 
arm around another man. 
Announcer: "Standing up against terrorism..." 
Image 1: Male soldier in camouflage is walking away from 
camera. He has an M-16 slung over his shoulder. He is 
walking in what appears to be a shipping yard. 
Announcer: ".. .and working to..." 
Image 2: The same image of a diner opening in the 
morning as shown in other commercials. 
Announcer: ".. .grow our economy." 
Image 1: A man in yellow outfit in a factory is grinding on 
some metal as sparks fly. In the background a man wearing 
a yellow hard hat looks up. 
Announcer: [Silence] 
Image 2: A family of seven. The male and female parents 
are in the back, the mom is to the left while the father is to 
the right. The four kids are in front. Three boys and two 
girls. 
Announcer: "What gives us optimism..." 
Image 1: Kids jumping out of a yellow school bus. 
Announcer: ".. .and hope?" 
Image 2: Headshot of a child looking to the left while 
smiling. 
Announcer: "Freedom." 
Image 1: Camera pans from behind a wooden chair to a 
family sitting on a couch. Two kids lick ice cream. One girl 
sits on the father's lap, the other sits on the mother's lap. 
There is a flag in the background. 
Announcer: "Faith." 
Image 2: A family around a dinner table with their heads 
bowed and hands folded. 
Announcer: "Families." 
Image 1: Family in a photo-like pose. Two kids, two 
parents smiling into the camera. Adult male, "dad" stands 
behind the family with his arms around the daughter (to the 
left) and the mother (to the right). Only the smiling head of 
the boy appears from below the frame. 
Announcer: "And sacrifice." 
Image 2: The two firefighters, one standing up one sitting 
on the back of the fire truck, from previous commercial. 
Announcer: "President Bush moving America forward." 
Image 1: Man with a mustache is finishing putting up an 
American flag sticker on a glass door. Shot from inside the 
building. 
Title of TV advertisement: Ownership 
President Bush: "One of the most important parts of a 
reform agenda is to encourage people to own something." 
Image 1: Head shot of President Bush talking to someone 
off camera. 
President Bush: "Own their own home." 
Image 2: A house with an American flag hanging out front. 
President Bush: "Own their own business." 
Image 1: Image of the waitress turning on the lights of the 
diner, again. 
President Bush: "Own their own health care plan." 
Image 2: Two elderly people talking. We only see a partial 
profile of an elderly man's right ear and his glasses. The 
elderly woman's face is in full view. They are conversing. 
President Bush: [Silence] 
Image 1: Older man sits between two white kids. In the 
forefront is a young girl, in the background a young boy. 
The man appears to be reading to them. No narration. 
President Bush: "Or own a piece of their retirement." 
Image: George Bush profile head shot. George is speaking 
to "someone" off camera. 
President Bush: "Reforms that..." 
Image 1: A woman is holding up from a book, and smiles 
directly into the camera. 
President Bush: ".. .trust the people." 
Image 2: Two men smiling. The man to the left has a dark 
complexion and is smiling. To the right is a man with his 
arm around another man. 
President Bush: "Reforms that say government must stand 
on the side of people." 
Image 2: George Bush, profile head shot. He is speaking to 
"someone" off camera. 
President Bush: '"cause I understand if you own 
something..." 
Image 2: A man in yellow outfit in a factory is grinding on 
some metal as sparks fly. In the background a man wearing 
a yellow hard hat looks up. Fades to three men standing. 
All are wearing white hard hats. The middle man is holding 
a clip board and pointing to something. The other two look 
at the sparks flying in the background. 
President Bush: ".. .you have a vital stake in the future of 
America." 
Image 2: George Bush profile head shot. George is 
speaking to "someone" off camera. 
Title of TV advertisement: Rock 
No voiceover. 
Image 1. A rock at the edge of the sea. Water batters the 
rock. Text: Strength never wavers. 
Image 2: Waves continue to beat against the rock. Text: 
Strength builds peace. 
Image 1: Image goes blurry. Text: A "W" fades in and 
fades out. 
Image 2: American flag. Text: President Bush and the 
Leaders of Congress. 
Title of TV advertisement: Time 
Announcer: "It is a time for unwavering strength." 
Image 1: From Rock commercial, sea washing up on a 
rock. Text: It is time. 
Announcer: "Leaders we know." 
Image 2: Roses in the forefront, in the back President 
Bush's head as he talks on the telephone. 
Announcer: "In times that challenge the world. A time for 
conviction..." 
Image 1: World Trade Center ruins with flag waving. 
Announcer: ".. .born in the soul." 
Image 2: Crowd of camouflaged soldiers and Bush with 
bowed heads. 
Announcer: "Time to continue..." 
Image 1: The capital building framed by two trees. 
Announcer: "...strengthening America." 
Image 2: A shot of firefighters walking away from the 
camera kicking up dust from the WTC. 
Announcer: "Keeping families safe." 
Image 1: Ground shot of woman in the background, man in 
the middle pushing a young boy in a tire swing. The child 
swings towards the camera. A house is in the background. 
Announcer: "Rebuilding our economy and work force." 
Image 2: Silhouette of construction worker standing on two 
I-beams, with two I-beams slowly moving towards him. 
Announcer: "Today our children..." 
Image 1: An older hand sticks out. A younger hand clasps 
the older hand. 
Announcer: ".. .and our country needs that strong 
leadership..." 
Image 2: Laura and George Bush lean on a wooden fence at 
a ranch. Fade to a close-up profile of George W. Bush 
smiling. 
Announcer: ".. .more than ever before." 
Image 2: An evening view of the Capitol from the 
reflecting pond. Text: It is time. 
Title of TV advertisement: Whatever it Takes 
President Bush (Accepting Party Nomination): "These four 
years have brought moments I could not foresee and will 
not forget." 
Image 1: Black background with white text: President Bush 
President Bush: "I've learned firsthand that ordering 
Americans into battle is the hardest, even when it is right. I 
have returned the salute..." 
Image 2: President Bush at the Republican National 
Committee nomination convention. Bush is standing in 
front of a classical column and American flag. 
President Bush: ".. .of wounded soldiers who say they were 
just doing their job." 
Image 1: Lone man with military cap and three mini-
American flags, waving them. 
President Bush: "I have held the children of the fallen who 
are told their mom or dad is a hero but would rather have 
their mom or dad. I've met with the parents and wives and 
husbands..." 
Image 2: President Bush speaking again. 
President Bush: ".. .who have received a folded flag." 
Image 1: Lone woman in crowd. All faces are looking up. 
President Bush: "And in those military families..." 
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Image 2: President Bush speaking. 
President Bush: "I have seen the character of a great 
nation..." 
Image 1: President Bush speaking. Background fades away 
to cheering crowd outside. President Bush fades out of 
picture. 
President Bush: "Because of your service and sacrifice, we 
are defeating the terrorists..." 
Image 1: Man in military hat is back. 
President Bush: ".. .where they live and plan and you're 
making America safer." 
Image 2: Lone boy's back to camera looking at military 
group. 
President Bush: "I will never relax in defending America, 
whatever it takes." 
Image 1: President Bush speaking again. 
Though the pattern had slight variations to it, each commercial presented 
situational uncertainty and tied values to President Bush's leadership. The use of 
situational uncertainty accomplished two things. One, it exaggerated uncertainty. Two, it 
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highlighted President Bush's consistency. That consistency is represented in American 
virtues. In uncertain times, people seek certainty (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). The 
commercials proposed consistency it found in American values. The President of the 
United States stands for American ideals and values (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004). Each 
commercial sought to create an impression that President Bush embodies those values. 
They did so by evoking President Bush's leadership. It suggested that his leadership 
helped lead Americans through uncertain times. For example, in the commercial What 
Ever It Takes President Bush discussed decisions he had made, and some negative 
results. By admitting negative consequences, he created an impression of certainty. Bush 
also stressed his experience at handling those decisions and results, thus reinforcing his 
special knowledge. Situational uncertainty created a need for special knowledge (Avery 
& Zemsky, 1998; Edelman, 1967). In the commercials, President Bush fulfilled that 
need. 
There are three types of images used in the "qualities" commercials. The first type 
establishes the situational uncertainty. For example, images of Osama bin Laden, 
terrorists, and rubble from the September 11, 2001, attacks create uncertainty. Economic 
uncertainty was generated with the use of iconic economic images. For example, people 
at work, factories, and construction. The second type of image is the "average" American 
image. Images of American citizens representing American values. Those images of 
average Americans representing American values are associated with President Bush. In 
the commercial Together, after the uncertainty generating images, images of firefighters 
are shown. In one visual, two firefighters wear Bush-Cheney 2004 shirts. It associates 
"heroes" with President Bush. 
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Qualifications. Qualification commercials seek to bolster presidential practical 
wisdom. They explain a candidate's expertise and past policies. The expertise and 
policies are portrayed as seeking the common good. For the 2004 election the common 
good was identified as social and economic security. Security on a social level was 
identified as safety from terrorist attacks. Economic security was identified as job 
production, home ownership, and economic growth. President Bush's expertise and past 
policies were portrayed as what stood between the population and chaos. It created an 
impression that President Bush would provide security. 
Two things identified qualification commercials. First, each commercial stressed 
President Bush's experience, his special knowledge and expertise. Second, past and 
future policies championed by President Bush were highlighted. Past policies had been 
enacted, and therefore referenced as having achieved positive results. Future policies 
constitute political vaporware. Both forms of policies, past and vaporware, infer that a 
voter can expect positive results from President Bush. 
Three commercials were identified and categorized as expertise. Each 
qualification commercial was categorized according to its main topics: Two expertise 
commercials dealt with international issues and one dealt with domestic issues. 
Title of TV advertisement: Lead 
President Bush: "One of the things that must never change 
is the entrepreneur spirit of America." 
Image: Opens with a diner. Female server is turning on 
open sign. It appears to be dawn. A woman walking around 
the corner. 
President Bush: "This country needs a president that clearly 
sees that." 
Images: Fades out and into President Bush and Laura Bush. 
Laura Bush: "The strength, the focus, the characteristics..." 
Image: Fades to President Bush on the phone in office. 
Quick cut to President Bush opening presidential notebook. 
Laura Bush: ".. .that these times demand." 
Image: President Bush and Laura Bush, headshots. Laura is 
talking to someone off camera. 
Announcer: [Silence]. 
Image: Shift to long shot with people walking in front of 
storefront. Man is shown dialing a cell phone 
President Bush: "And as the economy grows, the job base 
grows..." 
Image: Image of a woman at a meeting. Close up of woman 
nodding. She holds up a pen and talks. 
President Bush: ".. .and somebody looking for work..." 
Image: Male construction laborer carrying wood, wearing a 
hardhat, and tool belt. As he puts down the wood, a man 
passes behind him. 
President Bush: ".. .will be more likely to find a job." 
Image: Someone wearing a welder's mask is doing 
metalwork. Sparks are flying. 
President Bush: "I know exactly where I want to lead this 
country." 
Image: President Bush and Laura Bush. President Bush is 
talking to someone off camera. He holds up his hand to the 
camera when stating "Where I want to lead this country." 
President Bush: "I know what to do to make the world..." 
Image: Silhouette of person pulling rope. 
President Bush: ".. .more free and more peaceful." 
Image: Fade to a woman in camouflage and black beret 
holding a baby. Out of frame is man's leg and finger. 
President Bush: "I know what we need to do to make 
sure..." 
Image: Two men in suits talking to each other, one with a 
briefcase and a ticket in hand. 
President Bush: ".. .that every person has a chance..." 
Image: Woman is sitting in front of computer talking on 
phone in an office. Smiles hangs up the phone, photos of 
people in the background. 
President Bush: ".. .to realize the American dream." 
Image: "Family" in the back of a vehicle all facing camera 
smiling. While man's with glasses and gray hair has arm 
around young woman with long brown hair. Two blond 
kids, one girl one boy, sit and smile. 
President Bush: "I know what we need to do to continue 
economic growth so people can find work." 
Image: President Bush and Laura Bush. President Bush is 
talking to someone off camera. 
President Bush: "To raise the standards of schools..." 
Image: A female teacher in a classroom. 
President Bush: ".. .so children can learn." 
Image: Boys answering question. 
President Bush: "To fulfill the promise to America's 
seniors." 
Image: Two women. One in the background young the 
other in the forefront of the shot, elderly. Both are smiling 
and looking off screen left. 
President Bush: "Americans are 
hardworking.. .decent.. .generous people. " 
Image: A "family" around a table. Young girl is cleaning 
off the table. Youthful looking male "dad" smiles. Long 
shot of family, boy and older male at table. Young girl 
walks right to left carrying plate. Older woman walks into 
room from left. 
Woman is standing over man. Man places arm around hip 
of woman and smiles up at her. She looks down at him and 
smiles. Camera pans left to reveal blond hair of young boy. 
President Bush: "I'm optimistic about America because I 
believe in the people of America." 
Image: Bush is looking up to right of the screen. Text on 
lower left corner: www.georgewbush.com 
Title of TV advertisement: First Choice 
Senator John McCain: "It's a big thing, this war." 
Image 1: John McCain at a podium, looking to the right of 
the screen. Background: Various people in casual and 
business dress. 
Senator John McCain: "It's a fight between right and 
wrong, good and evil." 
Image 2: White background with bleached out gray figures 
of the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue. Text: Senator 
McCain on the war on terror and President Bush. Text 
fades out and full image of the Saddam statue being 
dragged fades in and fades out. 
Senator John McCain: "And should our enemies acquire for 
their arsenal..." 
Image 1: Fades in from Saddam statue. Black and white 
image of the back of a man in a shooting stance, shooting 
an AK-47. On the walls before him is Arabic graffiti. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .the chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons they seek..." 
Image 2: McCain, in color, speaking. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .this war will become an even 
bigger thing." 
Image 1: Black and white image of a male American 
soldier wearing a helmet and holding an M-16 in a 
crouching position. He slowly looks left into the camera. 
Senator John McCain: "It will become a fight for our 
survival." 
Image 2: Black and white image of the combat boots of a 
soldier walking away from the camera as the camera 
follows. Fades to the head shot of a white male soldier 
wearing a helmet and sunglasses as he slowly scans over 
the camera. 
Senator John McCain: "America is under attack by..." 
Image 1: Senator McCain speaking. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .depraved enemies..." 
Image 2: Close up of Osama bin Laden's face. A map in 
the background to the left of Osama's head. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .who oppose our every interest 
and..." 
Image 1: US soldier walking way. Mountains in 
background. A hand-held rocket lays in front of the camera. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .hate every value we hold dear." 
Image 2: McCain speaking at the podium. 
Senator John McCain: "It is the great test of our 
generation..." 
Image 1: In color the American flag, hooked to a house, 
blowing in the wind. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .and he has lead with..." 
Image 2: A crowd of people waving the American flag. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .great moral clarity and firm 
resolve." 
Image 1: Shot from below looking up at a head shot of 
George W. Bush who is holding the podium, his lips are 
moving. 
Senator John McCain: "He has not wavered. He has not 
flinched from the hard choices." 
Image 2: Senator McCain speaking. 
Senator John McCain: "He was determined and remains 
determined to make this world a better, safer, freer place." 
Image 1: Shot from below looking up at George W. Bush. 
President Bush is talking on the phone. Fades to a far below 
up shot of Bush speaking at a podium. The shot pulls back 
to get a full shot of Bush. Bush and McCain together at a 
rally. Bush is in the forefront waving and smiling. McCain 
is a bit back blending into the crowd applauding. 
Senator John McCain: "He deserves not only our support 
but our admiration." 
Image 1: Camera pans from photos of Laura Bush, father 
George H.S. Bush, and an elderly woman, to a head shot of 
President Bush speaking, nodding his head, and smiling. 
Senator John McCain: "That's why I'm honored to 
introduce to you..." 
Image 2: Descending shot from down to Bush talking in 
front of a painting. 
Senator John McCain: ".. .the President of the United 
States, George W. Bush." 
Image 1: McCain walking towards Bush. The two hug. 
Title of TV advertisement: Solemn Duty 
President Bush: "My most solemn duty is to lead our 
nation..." 
Image 1: George and Laura Bush look off to the side of the 
camera. They are sitting. They are on the left side looking 
off to the right. Background consists of a home looking 
interior. 
President Bush: ".. .to protect ourselves. I can't imagine..." 
Image 2: Close up of George touching his chest over his 
heart with his hand. 
President Bush: ".. .the great agony of a mom or dad 
having..." 
Image 1: Close up, profile of George and Laura. George is 
talking while Laura is looking off to the right. 
President Bush: ".. .to make the decision about which child 
to pick up first on September 11." 
Image 2: Camera shot pulls out to show head and torso shot 
of George and Laura Bush sitting. Laura has her hands laid 
upon her lap. George's hands are off to the side. 
President Bush: "We can not hesitate. We cannot yield. 
Image 1: Head shot profile of George and Laura looking off 
to the right. 
President Bush: "We must do everything in our power to 
bring an enemy to justice before they hurt us again." 
Image 2: Head and shoulders shot of George and Laura. 
George is talking, Laura looks to George, then looks down 
and back to the right. 
Image 1: George Bush quits speaking. Blue background 
with white text slowing grows "closer" to the screen. Text: 
President Bush: Moving America Forward 
Unlike previous commercials, the expertise commercials did not employ an 
announcer. Instead, each commercial used an excerpt from a speech by either President 
Bush or Senator John McCain. The commercials bolstered President Bush's practical 
wisdom through expertise by explaining how President Bush understands America and 
his duty as president. By contrast, Senator Kerry's "flip-flops" suggest he does not 
understand the duty of the Presidency. Each commercial supported Bush's experience in 
a different way. 
One commercial, First Choice, worked on two levels establishing President 
Bush's special knowledge. On one level, the speaker Senator John McCain listed 
President Bush's decisions in past uncertainty generating situations. The listing of 
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decisions showed that President Bush had experience in decision-making. It inferred that 
President Bush would take that special knowledge into the next term. The advertisement 
worked on another level, using Senator McCain's war experience. Senator McCain's 
experience in a war gave him special knowledge. Supporting President Bush by lauding 
his decisions during wartime symbolically transfers Senator McCain's special knowledge 
to President Bush. 
The other commercials used speeches by President Bush. In each commercial 
President Bush outlined his expertise. He demonstrated special knowledge in two ways. 
In Lead, President Bush repeatedly stated, "I know..." He suggests that he "knows" 
where he wants to lead the country. He "knows" what to do to make the world free. He 
"knows" how to handle the U.S. economy. By repeating, "I know" he not only shows his 
special knowledge, he also created a perception of consistency. Voters vote for him 
because they know he comprehends what to do. 
In Solemn Duty, a speech by President Bush establishes his expertise. In it he 
discusses his duty as leader. He transitions to using "we" in referencing what the nation 
must do to fight terrorism. 
Four main images were used in the commercials to establish practical wisdom. 
The first image is of a speaker or referent (President Bush). The commercials use 
speeches by Senator McCain and President Bush. Images are used to generate uncertainty 
and to support verbal text. For example, images of Osama bin Laden, terrorists, the war 
in Iraq, and economic images are used. A third image type was Americans. Because a 
large part of the presidential campaign is voter identification, multicultural Americans are 
used in the imagery. Many images supported the verbal text. If positive economic results 
were mentioned Americans were shown benefiting from the results. Examples include, 
construction workers and people working in an office. 
Two commercials were categorized as past policy commercials. Both 
commercials dealt with domestic issues. Because Democrats were polling higher with 
domestic issues the Bush-Cheney campaign had to establish President Bush's ethos with 
domestic issues (Donilon, 2006). The commercials either present a policy and its 
achievements or render implied results. 
Title of TV advertisement: Key to Success 
Announcer: "As Governor, George Bush enacted..." 
Image 1: All framed with white and at bottom 
www.georgew.bush.com. President Bush, in profile, is on 
the phone. 
Announcer: ".. .reform that produced..." 
Image 2: Children are getting into a school bus. 
Announcer: "...dramatic results." 
Image 1: Blond girl looking at paper. Blonde woman sitting 
at desk instructing young girl. 
Announcer: "As president, he signed the most significant 
education reforms in thirty-five years." 
Image 2: Washed-out outside shot of pervious school (with 
globe). Two blond white girls crouch outside. One stands. 
The image fades out. The girls are no longer to the left but 
to the right. Then they run from right to left. Text: No child 
Left Behind. 
Announcer: "Because accountability..." 
Image 1: Older woman reading a book to two kids. Boy and 
girl. Two kids in the background. Text: Accountability. 
Announcer: ".. .and high standards are..." 
Image 2: Two boys running up stairs. Flash - The kids are 
at the top of the stairs and sitting through the rail. The other 
kid is standing looking down, leaning over the rail. Text: 
High Standards.. .Accountability. 
Announcer: ".. .the keys to quality schools." 
Image 1: Silhouette of girl and boy in library. Girl takes 
down book. 
Announcer: "The president's reforms give parents the tools 
needed..." 
Image 2: Older man writing while young man with a pen in 
hand looks on. Flash - to a close up of a boy. 
Announcer: ".. .to measure a child's progress." 
Image 1: A young girl sitting against wall with knees up, 
writing in a book. 
Announcer: "Today public schools require raised 
standards..." 
Image 2: Woman sitting at table nods to young man with a 
dark complexion whose back is to the camera. In the 
background a young girl looks out a window. A woman 
sitting at table points to a book. A boy is reading the book 
and nodding. Young teen male looking up at a face whose 
arm is leaning on the table. 
Announcer: ".. .well qualified teacher..." 
Image 1: A woman in blue shirt from previous images lone 
shot with kids in the background. 
Announcer: "...accountability to parents." 
Image 2: Far shot of "study" father sitting in chair holding 
papers. Young boy facing camera looks on. 
Announcer: "Because no child in America should be left 
behind." 
Image 1: A boy looking into camera with flag in 
background. Three stripes, red, white and red. 
Title: Nearly 2 Million Reasons 
Announcer: "There are many reasons to be hopeful about 
America's future." 
Image 1: Horizontal split screen. Top: A man in the middle 
of two kids. The front kid is a girl, in the back is a boy. 
Text in the middle: America Has Reasons to be Hopeful. 
Bottom: Girls running in front of a white building. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million new jobs in just over a 
year." 
Image 2: Horizontal split screen. Top: Head-shots of two 
men smiling. One man is looking at the other man. Text in 
the middle: Nearly Two Million New Jobs. Bottom: A man, 
only his forehead and eyes are visible. His face is looking 
off screen to the right but his eyes are looking into the 
camera. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million more people back 
working." 
Image 1: Top: A woman smiling and looking at camera in 
front of a row of clocks. Middle text: Nearly Two Million 
More People back Working. Bottom: A woman slowly 
looks at the camera, smiling. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million more people with wages." 
Image 2: Top: A man, woman and four children are 
smiling. The father has his arms around them. Middle text: 
Nearly Two Million More People With Wages. Bottom: 
Two women working in a diner. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million more people with 
security." 
Image 1: Top: A low shot framed by two chairs. Two adults 
and two kids. Woman on the left with a young boy on her 
lap, both are eating ice cream. On the right the man with a 
girl on his lap. They are also eating ice cream. Middle text: 
Nearly Two Million More People with Security. Bottom: 
Head shot profile of a boy looking at something. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million more people able to 
provide for their families." 
Image 2: Close up head shot of a man and woman. The 
woman is looking at the man who is in profile to the 
camera. Middle text: Nearly Two Million more People able 
to Provide for their families. Bottom: A young boy in 
profile, smiling at something off camera. 
Announcer: "Nearly two million more reasons why 
Americans are..." 
Image 1: Top: A far shot of a man in a clean hardware 
store. Middle text: Nearly Two Million More Reasons to 
Be Optimistic. Bottom: A man, to the left, and a young girl, 
to the right, in a yard. 
Announcer: ".. .optimistic about our future." 
Image 2: White background with text to the left of framed 
image of a man looking at the camera smiling. Text: Nearly 
Two Million Reasons. Voice-over ends. Image shifts to a 
woman standing in front of clocks, shifts to two men 
smiling, shifts to a woman smiling, and ends with a family 
smiling. 
Both commercials present President Bush's policies and results, which provides 
evidence of Bush's qualifications. That evidence bolster's President Bush's practical 
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wisdom. The ad shows how Bush's policies benefit the American people, thus benefiting 
the common good. 
Past policy commercials rely on revealing positive results as examples of practical 
wisdom. Those examples are visualized through images of Americans working and iconic 
images of the economy. In the opening of Key to Success images are used in alignment 
with the verbal text explaining how as Governor, Bush enacted reform. An image of 
President Bush on the telephones is used to suggest symbolic action. Images used 
throughout are various condensation symbols of teachers and children reacting in positive 
ways. In Two Million Reasons, two main images were used to reinforce the verbal text. 
First were condensation symbols of family. Families were consistently shown in positive 
emotional reactions. For example, a family would be shown with each other smiling or 
enjoying some activity. Other condensation symbols were economic benefits. Americans 
were shown in various forms of work, and reacting positively to that work. Both 
commercials created a positive perception of President Bush's past policies. Examples of 
President Bush's practical wisdom suggest to voters he is a trustworthy leader. 
Inherent in humankind is a need to control uncertainty (Maslow, 1943). The 
Bush-Cheney campaign enacted this sense of control through President Bush's expertise 
and policies. Bush's expertise is presented as the line between order and social economic 
chaos. President Bush's policies are portrayed as symbolic actions that give order to U.S. 
society. That order created a common good. Therefore, President Bush had sufficient 
credibility to secure votes. 
Political vaporware. Whereas qualities and qualifications deal with the past and 
present, vaporware policies deal with the future. Candidate's identify problems and 
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provide solutions. In the 2004 election, Kerry was polling higher on domestic issues. The 
Bush-Cheney campaign had to create a perception of having "plans" for domestic issues. 
However, to do that they had to create a perception "that problems can be solved without 
a basic restructuring of social institutions, and without the threat of a radical reordering 
poses both to the contended and to the anxious" (Edelman, 1974, p. 171). Political 
vaporware creates the perception that it addresses issues with solutions requiring minimal 
change. For example, in the 2004 election the Kerry campaign was suggesting a radical 
change in health care. The Bush-Cheney campaign implied that their plan would cause 
more uncertainty, and take away individual choice. The Bush-Cheney campaign offered a 
counter plan that would not significantly change the current system. 
For the commercials, presenting political vaporware, three categories were 
identified: homeland security, economy, and healthcare. The ad dealing with homeland 
security discussed the war on terror and how Bush would protect citizens. Commercials 
dealing with economic factors dealt with jobs, taxes, insurance, and the economic impact 
of education. Healthcare, dealt mainly with high costs, taxes, tort reform, and family 
healthcare. 
Two tactics of strategic uncertainty emerged during the analysis of the 
advertisements. First, each commercial used an appeal to the leadership and expertise of 
President Bush. The second appeal was to create policy support through voter 
identification. For example, President Bush in Agenda uses "we" to create what Burke 
(1972) referred to as "unseen" identification. Commercials were categorized by their 
appeals. 
Title of TV advertisement: War on Terror Agenda 
Constant Images: Background consists of orange blurry 
squares. Green border around scrolling images with iconic 
symbols at bottom: Camera, American Flag, Tank. 
Announcer: "President Bush and our Leaders in Congress 
have a plan." 
Image 1: Present Bush & Congressional Leaders in a box. 
Announcer: "Enhance border and port security." 
Image 2: Background consists of orange blurry squares. 
Green border around scrolling images with iconic symbols 
at bottom: Camera, American Flag, Tank. 
Announcer: "Increase homeland..." 
Image 2: Trucks driving by to a border patrol stop point. 
Text: 1 > Border and Port Security 
2 > Homeland Security 
Announcer: ".. .security measures." 
Announcer: "Reform and strengthen intelligence services.' 
Announcer: "Renew PATRIOT Act giving law 
enforcement tools against terrorists." 
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Image 1: Law enforcement light bar. 
Text: 3 > Reform and Strengthen Intelligence 
4 > Renew PATRIOT Act 
Announcer: "Create a national counter terrorism center." 
Image 2: Troop helicopter with troops repelling from it. 
Other troops seen on the ground. 
Text: 5 > Tools Against Terrorists 
6 > Counter-Terrorism Center 
Announcer: "Transform our military." 
Announcer: "Give the military all it needs." 
Announcer: "Find terrorists where they train and hide." 
Image 1: Front shot of a grounded stealth bomber. 
Text: 7 > Transform Military 
8 > Find Terrorists 
Announcer: "Learn more..." 
Image 2: Military ground vehicle. 
Announcer: ".. .at agenda for America dot com." 
Image 1: American flag with Agenda for America cover 
framed. 
Title of TV advertisement; Health Agenda 
Constant Images: Background, shades of blue squares. 
Scrolling images go from right to left. At the bottom iconic 
images of people, Rx, and caduceus symbol. 
Announcer: "President Bush and our leaders in Congress 
have a plan." 
Image 1: Text: President Bush & Congressional leaders. In 
a box. 
Announcer: "Lower health care costs." 
Image 2: Male and female medical professionals, dressed in 
scrubs with stethoscopes, looking at each other. As that 
image scrolls off text appears: 1 > Small Business Better 
Rates. 
Announcer: "Allow small businesses to band together to 
get insurance rates big..." 
Image 1: Medical professional wearing white lab coat. As 
image scrolls text 1 > Small Business Better Rates scrolls 
off as a line draws across the screen to the next text: 2 > 
Health Savings Account. 
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Announcer: ".. .companies get." 
Announcer: Tax free health savings account families own. 
Image 2: Previous image along with Health Savings 
Account text scrolls off. Line draws from text to next text 
as new image scrolls on. The image is a group of people in 
surgical gowns standing over a body. Text: 3 > Stop Junk 
Lawsuits. 
Announcer: "Stop junk lawsuits against doctors and 
hospitals." 
Image 1: Image and text scroll off. Line draws from text to 
new text. New image of the back of a man's head and the 
profile of a woman. Man is shaking the hand of another 
man, who is smiling. Text: 4 > Keep Doctors. Lines draws 
to new text. 5 > Health Centers. Image scrolls off new text 
appears Text: 6 > Every Child Covered. 
Announcer: "Keep doctors in their communities." 
Announcer: health centers in every poor county. 
Image: Man with a beard smiling and nodding his head. 
Announcer: "Every eligible child with health coverage." 
Image 2: Images of children smiling scrolls on with text 6 > 
Every Child Covered. 
Announcer: "Learn more... at agenda for America dot 
com." 
Image 1: Line draws to a box that forms and Bush's 
Agenda For America: A Plan for a Safer World and more 
Hopeful America appears. Background is a flowing 
American flag. 
Title of TV advertisement: Economic Agenda 
Constant Image: Green background with Ben Franklin one 
hundred dollar bill. Iconic signs down and to the right of 
the frame: hammer, farm equipment, people. 
Announcer: "President Bush and our leaders in Congress 
have a plan..." 
Image 1: President Bush & Congressional leaders in a box. 
Announcer: "Strengthen our economy..." 
Image 2: People building a house. 
Announcer: "Life long learning..." 
Image: Scrolls from People building a house to a woman 
sitting in front of a computer. 
Text: 1 > Life long learning 
Announcer: "Invest in education..." 
Image: Still woman in front of computer 
Text: 2 > Invest in Education. 
Announcer: New skills for better jobs... 
Image: "Scrolls from woman in front of computer to a man 
smiling and nodding his head." 
Text: 3 > New Skills for Better Jobs 
Announcer: A fairer simpler tax plan... 
Image 2: Man smiling at camera. 
Text: 4 > Fairer Simpler Tax Code 
Announcer: "Reduced dependency on foreign energy." 
Image 1: Global background. 
Text: 5 > Reduce Foreign Energy 
Announcer: "Freer fairer trade." 
Image: Global background. 
Text: 6 > Fairer trade 
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Announcer: "Incentives to create jobs." 
Image Global background scrolls to people standing 
around. 
Text: 7 > Job Incentives 
Announcer: "Comp and flex time for working families." 
Image: People standing around. 
Text: 8 > Comp and Flex Time 
Announcer: "Strengthen Social Security." 
Image: People standing around. 
Text: 9 > Strengthening Social Security 
Announcer: "Legal reform." 
Image 1: Two women working with plants. 
Text: 10 > Legal Reform 
Announcer: "Permanent tax reform." 
Image 1: Two women working with plants. 
Text 11: Permanent Tax Relief 
Announcer: "Learn more..." 
Announcer: ".. .at Agenda for America Dot Com." 
Image 2: Line draws to a box that forms and Bush's 
Agenda For America: A Plan for a Safer World and more 
Hopeful America appears. Background is a flowing 
American flag. 
An appeal to leadership in political vaporware commercials relies on the 
President's "authority" to make the plans appealing. Authority appeals tend to be at the 
heart of an introduction (Richards, 2003, p. 185). Each commercial begins by asserting 
President Bush and the leaders in Congress have a plan. The warrants of the vaporware 
"Affirms the reliability of the source from which they are derived" (Brockriede & 
Ehninger, 1960, p. 51). The appeal to authority establishes the hierarchy of power and 
provides President Bush with bolstered practical wisdom. The presidency stands for 
power (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004). Verbal text used in the commercials reinforces that 
perception of power. When the announcer states that President Bush's plans "allow," 
"give," "create," and "stop" it suggests that President Bush's policies will exert power 
over the problems cited. There are three commercials and each ad dealt with one 
problem. However, with each problem President Bush's plan would create multiple 
positive results. For example, in Economic Agenda, the economy is presented as an issue. 
President Bush's plan would address that issue in a variety of ways. By listing the variety 
of ways of dealing with the issue the commercial signals there is a plan. The plan has 
been thought through enough to know how and what it would do to handle the economic 
issue. 
The listing of each plan also creates an impression that each plan would provide 
positive results of security. That security is mostly found in security from uncertainty of 
terrorism, economic fluctuations, and healthcare costs. The uncertainty is reinforced 
through terrorism, outsourcing of jobs, and rising health care costs. That creation of 
security reigns in the atmosphere of uncertainty caused by those issues. This controlling 
of situation uncertainty accomplishes two things. First, it bolsters President Bush's 
practical wisdom. His plans are fully thought through, and would work for the common 
good of society. The second effect bolstered Bush's practical wisdom; it reinforced 
Bush's good will. 
Images in leadership commercials worked on different levels of political 
symbolization. What the announcer stated in the verbal text was repeated in the visual 
text. For example, in Economic Agenda, when the announcer states "Invest in education" 
printed text "Invest in education" appears on the screen. The repetition of the verbal and 
visual text produced amplification. The condensation symbols used were of Americans in 
various actions providing visualization for the main thrust of each commercial. For 
example, in War on Terror Agenda, to signal enhanced border and security for seaports, 
images of border guards and security guards at the seaports are shown. Later in the 
commercial, military personnel are seen, images that reinforce the idea that the military 
provides security. In Economic Agenda, various images of economic development are 
shown. Homes being built, a woman working at a computer, and people at work 
communicate a thriving economy. 
Presidential candidates attempt to foster identification with voters (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 2004). To bolster good will a candidate presents plans in ways that promote 
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identification with the larger population. The Bush-Cheney campaign commercials 
Agenda and Twenty First Century create a perception of participation in decision-making, 
that perception, which fosters identification. 
Title of TV advertisement: 21- Century 
President Bush: "We're in changing times and..." 
Image 1: Opens with a panning shot of a smoke filled bar. 
The people in it are in silhouette. 
President Bush: ".. .the economy is changing." 
Image 2: Head shot of George and Laura Bush. George is 
looking up and off screen while talking. Laura is looking at 
George while he talks. 
President Bush: [Silence]. 
Image 1: A man with an apron on, framed by green wooden 
and glass door. Turns sign from closed to open and unlocks 
door. 
President Bush: "We need new small business owners." 
Image 2: Images of two workers. One man is in jump suit 
grinding metal with sparks flying. Another man in the 
background wears yellow hard hat. Holds something as he 
looks up. 
President Bush: "That's why the policies..." 
Image 1: A woman in blue apron, hand on pink roses. 
Another woman looks up from white apron looks and looks 
at the other woman's roses. 
President Bush: ".. .1 put forth help. 
Image 2: Hazy diner. Sun shining in the windows as people 
arrive through the front door. People are sitting in the 
booths and a waitress is bringing them food. 
President Bush: "...small business." 
Image 1: A man leans over a table to shake the hand of 
someone off camera. A woman sitting next to the man 
standing up is smiling. It appears to be a business situation. 
President Bush: "We've got tax cuts in place..." 
Image 2: A man is sitting in a chair at a desk. He is talking 
on the telephone smiling and throws up his hand as he talks 
on the phone. He appears to be happy. 
President Bush: ".. .that will help the economy grow. 
We've also got plans..." 
Image 2: Head shot of George and Laura Bush. George is 
looking up and off screen while talking. Laura is looking at 
George while he talks. 
President Bush: ".. .to help people get..." 
Image 2: Woman typing on a Mac computer. 
President Bush: "...the skills necessary to fill the new jobs 
of the..." 
Image 1: A person wearing a welders mask as he/she 
welds. Sparks are flying. 
President Bush: "...twenty-first century." 
Image 2: A woman wearing goggles looking through a 
beaker as she slowly looks away from the camera. 
President Bush: "I'm optimistic about America because I 
believe in the people of America." 
Image 1: George and Laura Bush head shots. George is 
talking as Laura looks where George is looking, up and 
away. 
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Title of TV advertisement: Agenda 
Constant Image: Yellow and black distortion of images 
except President Bush. 
President Bush: "We have come through a lot..." 
Image 1: American flag waving. Image scroll by. 
President Bush: ".. .together." 
Image 2: The diner with the woman turning on the open 
sign. 
President Bush: "During the next four years we'll 
spread..." 
Image 1: President Bush, in a white shirt, speaking at a 
podium. 
Text: Ownership...Opportunity. 
President Bush: "...ownership and opportunity." 
Image 2: Men working in a factory. 
Text: Opportunity.. .More jobs. 
President Bush: "We need to make our economy more job 
friendly..." 
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Image 1: A man wearing an apron walks through some 
items. 
Text: Keep Jobs in America. 
President Bush: ".. .to keep American jobs here in 
America." 
Image 2: President Bush speaking at a podium. 
President Bush: "We must allow small employers to..." 
Image 1: A man is on the phone and smiling. 
Text: Insurance...Small Business 
President Bush: ".. .join together to purchase insurance." 
Image 2: Back of a man wearing a hard hat pointing at 
something. 
President Bush: "We must end..." 
Image 1: President Bush at podium speaking. 
President Bush: ".. .the junk lawsuits and enact tort 
reform." 
Image 2: People sitting and standing around table. 
Text: End Junk Lawsuits.. .Enact Tort Reform. 
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President Bush: "We go to make sure our workers..." 
Image 1: Woman sitting talking to man who is shuffling 
papers. 
President Bush: ".. .have the skills necessary to fill the jobs 
of the twenty-first century." 
Image 2: Clear image of Agenda for America with flag 
rippling in the background. 
To accomplish identification the word "We" is used to associate President Bush 
with the people. Burke (1972) argued identification "derives from situations in which it 
goes unnoticed" (p. 28). The use of "we" in the commercials is an example of that 
unnoticed identification. It unites voters in policy making. When individuals perceive 
identification, uncertainty is lowered (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). The commercial 
Twenty First Century uses the identification strategy, while at the same time generating 
situational uncertainty. The calling to mind of change in an atmosphere of uncertainty 
exaggerated the risk of change. By exaggerating uncertainty and risk, the commercial 
amplified President Bush's practical wisdom. It amplifies it by listing what the plan will 
do, which provides voters information regarding how President Bush would lead in 
uncertain times. Information regarding President Bush's practical wisdom enables voters 
to feel more comfortable about his leadership. 
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Like previous commercials, the images used were referential and condensation 
symbols. In Agenda images of people working are used to signal job growth and growth 
in the economy. 
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Table 1 
A Model of Strategic Uncertainty 
Model 
Attack Ethos 
Highlight inconsistency 
The "Set-up-Refutation" 
The "Flip-Flop" 
Putting a candidate on the defensive 
Raise uncertainty causes a candidate to lower uncertainty. 
Interject the opponent's political reality 
When a candidate is on the defensive they address issues of significance to 
the opposing campaign. Thus, they remind the audience about the 
opponent's strong points. 
Redefines candidate 
Creates perception of candidate as contributing to situational uncertainty 
and an uncertainty quantity 
Separate candidate from mythic presidency 
When a candidate is redefined as uncertain, the perception of strong 
leadership is affected. It becomes harder for a candidate to attach their 
image to the mythic presidency. 
Attack and bolster ethos 
Political antithesis 
Proven past vs. unknown future 
Political vaporware 
Bolstering ethos 
Exaggerate situational uncertainty 
Provide candidate as solution to that atmosphere of uncertainty 
Highlight and elaborates a candidate's ethos. 
CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
Kennedy, in Aristotle (1991), defines rhetoric as "the energy inherent in emotion 
and thought, transmitted through system of signs including language, to others to 
influence their decisions or actions" (p. 7). A presidential campaign is the use of 
information transmitted through a system of signs including language and images to 
influence voting behavior. Berger & Calabrese (1975) and Shannon & Weaver (1949) 
argue that uncertainty is the absence of information that facilitates prediction. As a 
rhetorical stratagem, uncertainty rhetorically manipulates information in order to lessen 
voter predictions. Strategic uncertainty obscures information that influences voting 
behavior. Strategic uncertainty works best in an atmosphere of heightened uncertainty. In 
times of stability, change and uncertainty may be perceived as less risky. Uncertain 
rhetorical situations create a "need" for certainty. To keep that "need" in the forefront of 
voters' minds a candidate must create a political reality that accomplishes three things. 
First, it must feed uncertainty. Second, it must present an opponent as contributing to 
"problems." Finally, the candidate is presented as a "solution" to the "problems," a 
certainty in uncertain times. In the 2004 election, the Bush-Cheney campaign followed 
these three guidelines when employing strategic uncertainty. 
A common way to describe a campaign is a "platform" metaphor. A platform is 
made up of "planks." Each plank is an issue defined by a campaign as important to the 
American public. For example, in the 2004 campaign the war in Iraq was a plank in both 
campaign platforms. To extend that metaphor, if each issue is a plank, a candidate (and 
his or her campaign) is the carpenter for a platform. A candidate builds the platform. For 
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a candidate to assemble the planks he or she must be perceived as credible. A candidate's 
ethos is the "nails" that hold the planks together. Each "nail" represents a candidate's 
qualities or virtues, qualifications of practical wisdom and good will, and their policies. 
Situational uncertainty is a factor in the extended metaphor. Situational uncertainty is a 
wind that shakes the platform, testing its strength. Situational uncertainty becomes a 
"test" for a candidate's virtue, good will, and practical wisdom. 
A campaign seeks to get voters to adopt a candidate's political reality. The 
adoption of it should positively affect voting behavior. A campaign does not just build 
political reality, it attacks it. A campaign attacks an opponent's political reality so that 
voters will not identify with it. Strategic uncertainty is one way to attack a candidate's 
political reality. Strategic uncertainty systematically casts uncertainty on a candidate by 
undermining ethos. Strategic uncertainty also bolsters a candidate's ethos. Strategic 
uncertainty removes or weakens one candidate's platform while strengthening another's. 
As seen in a large selection of commercials, the Bush-Cheney campaign refers to 
situations that generate uncertainty regarding Senator Kerry's ethos. However, there are 
many areas of situational uncertainty, including social, economic, and political. 
Social uncertainty was generated in voters through fear of terrorism and the lack 
of security. The exigence for those fears was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
Fear of future attacks along with the subsequent war on terror had become the focal point 
of the election (Cahill, 2006; Kenski & Kenski, 2005). Verbal and visual texts in the 
Bush-Cheney commercials analyzed suggest that terrorism and its byproducts (i.e., war in 
Afghanistan, terror alerts, etc.) were used to create uncertainty. The fear of another 
terrorist attack partially stemmed from a lack of information of when, where, and how. 
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Lack of information increases uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). The only thing 
assured was the "who." The "who" was revealed through Osama bin Laden images. 
Though not as important to the 2004 campaign as the war on terror another area 
of social uncertainty was healthcare. The uncertainty of not having healthcare as well as 
its cost of healthcare became an issue. However, the most powerful rhetorical issue to 
generate situational uncertainty was economic uncertainty. "A number of events 
contributed to a climate of uncertainty... including terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, corporate governance and accounting scandals, and geopolitical tensions 
surrounding the war in Iraq" (United States Congress, 2004, p. 234). An important factor 
in a presidential election is the condition of the economy (Erikson, 1989). The economy, 
war on terror, and war in Iraq were all large factors in the 2004 election (Kenski & 
Kenski, 2005). All generated uncertainty in the population (United States Congress, 
2004). 
After an economic recession and corporate scandals in 2001, voters found they 
were directly affected by the uncertain economy, especially job creation and loss. "The 
rise of long-term unemployment is one of the most troublesome features of recession" 
(United States Congress, 2003, p. 45). The rise of unemployment raised uncertainty in the 
public. This is the reason the government sought to control uncertainty (United States 
Congress, 2003). By feeding situational uncertainty, it created a need for certainty. 
Situational uncertainty created a need for people to "know" that a potential leader has the 
courage to lead. The Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically manipulated information to 
generate uncertainty about Senator Kerry. In the 2004 election strategic uncertainty 
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rhetorically manipulated information to create a specific perception of Senator Kerry, his 
ethos. 
Senator Kerry's ethos was attacked by commercials that highlighted his past 
inconsistencies. Krauthammer (2004) stated that Bush campaign spent months of 
advertising portraying Kerry as inconsistent, weak, and uncertain. To keep that in the 
forefront of the campaign, the term "flip-flopper" was attached to Kerry. The political 
symbol "flip-flop" was a main tactic of the Bush-Cheney campaign. Highlighting Senator 
Kerry's inconsistencies created an enthymeme for the term "flip-flop." Any time "flip-
flop" or its variations was evoked voters were primed to think of Senator Kerry. 
Highlighting inconsistency with the help of a highly charged political symbol like "flip-
flop" was a powerful tactic. 
The use of flip-flop and inconsistency has been used in other elections (Kern, 
1989), but not to the success and degree of the 2004 presidential election. Highlighting 
inconsistency, though accomplished in a variety of ways had two main results. Strategic 
uncertainty in the 2004 presidential election influenced undecided voters. Kenski and 
Kenski (2005) pointed to Karl Rove, President Bush's chief political advisor, who 
depicted John Kerry as a "'flip-flopper,' not as a man who says what he believes, but as a 
man who says what he believes people want to hear" (p. 303). That uncertainty is an 
example of what other scholars (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Katona, 1975; Knight, 1921) 
suggest make people back away from a candidate. Highlighting inconsistency, creating a 
perception of a "flip-flopper," should make undecided voters think, "I don't know John 
Kerry." "I don't know his values." "I don't know if he can conduct a war on terror." 
Polled voters did not know where Senator Kerry stood on the campaign issues (Morin & 
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Deane, 2004). At the same time, it should make undecided voters think, "I do know 
President Bush. I may not agree with him, but I do know where he stands." Highlighting 
inconsistencies attacked all three levels of ethos. Kern (1989) stated that flip-flops "also 
concern the candidate serving his or her own interest" (p. 105). It created a view that 
Senator Kerry is not looking out for the common good of the electorate. Kenski & Kenski 
(2005) found that voters considered President Bush more honest and trustworthy than 
Senator Kerry. The strategic uncertainty tactic of highlighting inconsistency created a 
chain reaction. By creating a perception of Kerry as a "flip-flopper," he had to clarify the 
manipulated information. 
The uncertainty-generating candidate is generally perceived as credible. For 
example, Kenski & Kenski (2005) found the voters perceived Bush more credible in 
conducting the war on terror. Kerry's ethos was consistently attacked with regard to the 
war on terror. Once he began to address the Bush-Cheney campaign strong point, Kerry 
moved off script. Senator Kerry moved away from domestic issues (Donilon, 2006). 
Voters' perception of Kerry's ethos was rhetorically manipulated by strategic uncertainty. 
Senator Kerry's tattered ethos in turn caused an uncertainty chain reaction that 
disassociated him from the mythic presidency. 
In the 2004 election, strategic uncertainty was used to attack each aspect of 
Senator Kerry's ethos, virtue, practical wisdom, and good will. Strategic uncertainty was 
used to attack Senator Kerry's virtue and practical wisdom to generate more uncertainty 
about his ability to lead. The perception of leadership ability is important to an image of a 
president (Misciagno, 1996). This was why Senator Kerry was disassociated from the 
mythic presidency. Voters did not perceive Kerry as fitting a presidential image. By 
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contrast, Kenski & Kenski (2005) found that Bush was perceived as being a strong 
leader. Thus, strategic uncertainty disassociated Senator Kerry from the mythic 
presidency. 
Strategic uncertainty was used to create uncertainty. One result of strategic 
uncertainty was the suppression of voters who identified with the Democratic Party in as 
much people abhor uncertainty (Katona, 1975). Morin & Dean (2004) reported that 
"Nearly half of all Democrats — 46 percent — and a majority of political independents say 
they are not sure what Kerry stands for" (p. A01). After the election, the numbers showed 
there was a suppression or defection of Democratic Party voters. Kenski & Kenski (2005) 
showed "Kerry lost two of the seventeen Democratic states" (p. 317). Kenski & Kenski 
(2005) also showed that "Kerry.. .lost three of the Democratic competitive states" (p. 
317). Strategic uncertainty, which highlighted inconsistency, placed Kerry on the 
defensive. 
Strategic uncertainty also affect undecided voters. Strategic uncertainty was 
meant to make undecided voters move away from Senator Kerry and "herd" towards 
President Bush. With fostering situational uncertainty, people are more likely to seek 
certainty (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Maslow, 1943). In the 2004 election President Bush 
was presented as that certainty. A candidate using strategic uncertainty simultaneously 
attacks an opponent's ethos while bolstering his or her own ethos. They depict 
themselves as the certainty people seek. This perception is fabricated through two 
methods. First, commercials that both attack Kerry's ethos while bolstering Bush's ethos. 
Second, strategic uncertainty can be used in a commercial to just bolster Bush's ethos. 
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The tactic of attacking ethos amplifies both the uncertainty of an opponent and the 
certainty of a candidate. Commercials using strategic uncertainty attack an opponent's 
ethos to generate uncertainty. They then provide a solution a candidate portrayed as 
consistent. The Bush-Cheney campaign commercials accomplished this two ways: (1) 
political antithesis, and (2) a candidate is defined as unpredictable and the other candidate 
is defined as predictable. In the case of the 2004 election, this played to what Dowd 
(2006) described as voters feeling like they knew President Bush. They knew where he 
stood even if they did not agree with him. Many voters believed they had a relationship 
with President Bush because they had "been through" the attacks of September 11 with 
him (Cahill, 2006). 
The other way to generate uncertainty was to steal mindshare from Senator 
Kerry's proposed policies. The theft of audience attention is accomplished through the 
use of political policies. For the 2004 election, Senator Kerry was perceived as stronger 
on domestic issues (Donilon, 2006). In order to lessen that perception, the Bush-Cheney 
campaign presented policies dealing with the economy and healthcare. They cast Senator 
Kerry's plans as taking away personal decision-making from voters. This was a powerful 
persuasive device because the removal of control over one's own life heightens 
uncertainty (Weitz, 1989). Attacking and bolstering ethos commercials heightened the 
tension between uncertainty and certainty regarding Senator Kerry's actions and voting 
record. However, President Bush and his policies were presented certainties. The Bush-
Cheney campaign exaggerated situational uncertainty. The commercials provided 
guideposts for short term herding in situations of exaggerated uncertainty (Avery & 
Zemsky, 1998). The guideposts in an atmosphere of uncertainty point to President Bush 
255 
as having special knowledge. When perceived as having special knowledge it is sufficient 
to induce all others to follow (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). The end result is to bolster the 
ethos of President Bush. However, because of time limits they are not able to fully 
elaborate President Bush's qualities, qualifications, and policies. Thus, when using 
strategic uncertainty a campaign runs commercials that specifically bolster ethos. 
To create a perception of presidential timber a campaign using strategic 
uncertainty both questions a candidate's ethos while bolstering their own. A campaign 
must create a perception that a candidate has the qualities, qualifications, and policies to 
lead (Nimmo & Combs, 1983). After generating situational uncertainty, and defining 
Senator Kerry as uncertain, the Bush-Cheney campaign presented President Bush as the 
solution to uncertainty. 
Bolstering ethos in the 2004 election relied on three factors. First, it relied on the 
voter's perception of President Bush as consistent (Dowd, 2006). Voters have prior 
experience and information about a president (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004). Having been 
president during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush was seen as 
having first hand knowledge regarding prosecuting the war on terror. He was also 
perceived as having gone through the experience (Cahill, 2006). "Voters were reminded 
of 9/11 through Bush ads that, without over claiming, recalled our shared experience and 
evoked a sense of how different the world is now because of this experience" (Kenski & 
Kenski, 2005, p. 339). Because of the terrorist attacks and the subsequent war on terror, 
President Bush had special knowledge and identification with voters. Second, the 
campaign relied on how in an atmosphere of exaggerated uncertainty, amplified through 
strategic uncertainty, people are attracted to an individual with special knowledge (Avery 
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& Zemsky, 1998). Finally, the Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically used the notion of 
security (Kenski & Kenski, 2005). Security was used to hold at bay what Kern (1989) 
referred to as "the harsh reality" (p. 106). With harsh reality comes uncertainty (Kern, 
1989). Security provides control from harsh reality and uncertainty. The Bush-Cheney 
campaign bolstered ethos by revealing President Bush's qualities, qualifications, and 
policies. Each factored in the public's notions of consistency, special knowledge, 
experience, and security. 
President Bush's virtues and qualities were portrayed as consistent. This virtue 
was presented as consistent with American values, which lowers uncertainty and raises 
identification (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). "Despite misgivings about the war or unease 
about the economy, they said, it was Mr. Bush, not Senator John Kerry, who shared their 
beliefs and understood their way of life" (Zernike & Broder, 2004, p. 3). "He also 
benefited from a large percentage of voters who associated him with traditional values" 
(Kenski & Kenski, 2005, p. 339). President Bush was presented as both consistent and 
sharing values that get people through uncertain times. President Bush was perceived as 
consistent in uncertain times. A part of that consistency came from a shared sense of 
history. 
The incumbent in any campaign has more name recognition (Trent & 
Friedenberg, 2004). The Bush-Cheney campaign reinforced President Bush's special 
knowledge and qualifications to lead and conduct a war on terror. George W. Bush 
having been President during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 fostered the 
impression a strong leadership, which translated into expertise. War is one of the major 
contributors to uncertainty (Liesman, 2005), and special knowledge being a contributor to 
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certainty. That perception led to people wanting to elect an individual with special 
knowledge (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). By bolstering President Bush's qualifications in a 
time of uncertainty people were "herded" toward him. Past policies provided examples of 
President Bush's practical wisdom, virtue, and good will. Future policies created a 
perception of consistency in times of change. 
Policies enacted in President Bush's first four years were offered as evidence that 
he provided security for the common good. The policies protected citizens' safety, 
families, and jobs. Security was often presented as controlling external situations beyond 
voters' control. To signal that control the Bush-Cheney campaign commercials used the 
language of control. For example, in commercials President Bush's policies controlled 
situations by using the language of "allowed," "create," and "permit." President Bush's 
policies would provide security by controlling situational uncertainty. "President Bush 
believes decisions about protecting America should be made in the Oval Office not 
foreign capitols." Bush's policies, along with qualifications and qualities created a 
perception of trustworthiness. When asked whom they trusted more to do a better job 
handling the U.S. war on terrorism, Bush or Kerry, 54% percent said Bush and 36% said 
Kerry" (Kenski & Kenski, 2005, p. 330). However, Bush's policies were not just to 
create control, they were meant to discredit Kerry's policies. 
Policies were also meant to steal "mindshare" from Senator Kerry. According to 
Jenkins (1988) when stealing mindshare a campaign successfully persuades an audience 
that grave risks await those who switch to a competitor. This tactic relied upon the 
perceptions of certainty and uncertainty developed around President Bush and Senator 
Kerry. Bush-Cheney Political Vaporware commercials used the language of control and 
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suggested that President Bush's policies would give people control over their own lives. 
They also suggested that Bush's policies would control situational uncertainty. When 
faced with uncertainty people want to feel in control of their lives (Weitz, 1989). 
However, Senator Kerry's policies were presented as taking control away from voters. 
The use of uncertainty in the 2004 presidential election elucidated a new area of 
research, strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty relied upon a perception of the world 
as uncertain, a perception of a "harsh reality" (Kern, 1989). That worldview is amplified 
through the use of strategic uncertainty. Situational uncertainty permeated the Bush-
Cheney 2004 campaign. Many of the commercials fed the situational uncertainty by 
reminding voters of uncertainty of terrorism and an uncertain economic future. That 
situational uncertainty set the rhetorical situation for the three other tactics of strategic 
uncertainty: Attacking ethos, attacking and bolstering ethos, and bolstering ethos. Each 
relied on voters being fearful of the unknown. That unknown was augmented through 
rhetorical means by evoking past events that remind voters of the uncertain nature of the 
world. To further the strategy of strategic uncertainty an opponent must be portrayed as a 
major contributor and or a part of that uncertainty. 
The Bush-Cheney campaign rhetorically manipulated information about Senator 
Kerry to create a perception of a leader whose actions revealed an unpredictable flip-
flopper. A lack of prediction caused two effects. One, people wanted a sense of certainty 
and consistency in a leader during uncertain times. A lack of prediction increases 
uncertainty, an increase in uncertainty causes a decrease in identification. A lack of 
identification could likewise affect voting behavior. By defining Senator Kerry as a flip-
flopper, he became a part of the problem. By contrast, President Bush was presented as 
someone with whom voters could identity (Denton, 2005; Kenski & Kenski, 2005). 
Identification through similar values and beliefs fostered a perception of consistency. 
President Bush was also presented as having policies that would control for an 
encroaching "harsh reality." His policies would provide security, protection from an 
uncertain world. 
Strategic uncertainty was a powerful factor in the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign 
strategy and it showed on November 3, 2004. "Jon Meacham, Newsweek managing 
editor, observed that "because the President got his 52 percent he did talk about the 
culture of life, he talked about wanting to stand for something amid an ocean of chaos. 
And more people voted for order than voted for what they thought might be a more 
chaotic culture under the democrats" (Denton, 2005, p. 275). President Bush represented 
certainty. Voters were uncertain about Senator Kerry, and thus did not vote for him. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion 
After the 2004 election, 48.3% of the population voted for Senator Kerry; 50.7% 
voted for President Bush. It was considered the highest voter turnout since 1968 (Faler, 
2005, p. A05). Strategic uncertainty predicted that Senator Kerry would receive fewer 
votes due to uncertainty regarding undecided and suppressed voters. The high turnout of 
voters question's strategic uncertainty's ability to suppress voter turnout. However, Karl 
Rove, Chief Bush strategist stated in regards to President Bush and Senator Kerry: "At 
the end of the day, people voted for him for two reasons. One, they thought he could do 
the job, and two, they had deep doubts about the other guy" (Bumiller, 2004, p. 2). That 
doubt spawned from uncertainty generated about Senator Kerry. "Other factors, 
Republicans said, were Mr. Bush's gamble to run on terrorism and his repeated use of a 
clear, concise message. And Bush campaign officials said they were helped by the man 
they called a dream opponent, Senator John Kerry, whose nuanced statements about Iraq 
gave them an opening, day after day, to attack him as a 'flip-flopper'" (Bumiller, 2004, p. 
1). The 2004 Bush-Cheney campaign use of strategic uncertainty illuminates the need to 
further study it. 
The study of uncertainty in communication has been investigated empirically 
(Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Gudykunst, 2005; Potthoff & Munger, 
2005; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000). However, strategic uncertainty is a logical fit with 
rhetorical theory. For example, politicians and economists rhetorically manage 
uncertainty. Thus, the rhetorical use of uncertainty in political communication is a subject 
open to research. Recommendations for future studies include the analysis of verbal and 
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visual tropes that generate uncertainty. For example, in the Bush-Cheney commercial 
Wolves, visuals of nature are used to produce a perception of uncertainty. Perhaps nature 
is a verbal or visual trope that generates uncertainty. Viewers do not have enough 
information to know when and where the wolves/terrorists will strike. In the Bush-
Cheney commercial Safer Stronger, an announcer states, "America is turning a corner." 
A corner connotes a visual image of a path with an unforeseeable future; the corner hides 
information of what lies ahead. Those traveling on the path have a lack of information to 
predict future actions. A corner creates what Gudykunst (2005) described as the "feeling 
of being uneasy, tense, worried, or apprehensive about what might happen" (p. 13). Thus, 
a corner may work as a trope to generate uncertainty. In many of the Bush-Cheney 
commercials visuals of Senator Kerry moving from one side of the screen to another 
could be construed as a visual "flip-flop." Rhetorical critiques of visual and verbal tropes 
that generate uncertainty may spawn future research. 
The use of "flip-flop" was a campaign strategy in the 2004 election. Political 
inconsistency's acceptance into popular culture creates an opportunity for further 
research. In a political system that appears to demand consistency from representatives, 
what are the rhetorical implications of rhetorically strategic "flip-flops?" Why is it not 
acceptable for politicians to change their stance on issues? The rhetorical use of 
uncertainty could build a foundation for further research. 
Presently, no social scientific research examines strategic uncertainty in political 
communication. This study hopefully lays the groundwork for future empirical research 
regarding strategic uncertainty. Once verbal and visual tropes are better understood, a 
quantitative analysis of uncertainty may add to the knowledge base of political 
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communication. For example, the camera work and use of nature in Wolves could yield 
insight. Quantitative research into the effects generated by strategic uncertainty may 
provide the discipline a better understanding of how verbal and visual texts work, and 
how they affect voter decision-making. In addition, how does situational uncertainty play 
in the generation of uncertainty? For example, situational uncertainty played a major role 
in the 2004 election. In times of stability, there is a social need for change; voters are not 
as risk averse and therefore more comfortable with uncertainty. An energy crisis factored 
into situational uncertainty during the 1980 election; voters felt it was time for a change. 
However, during the 1992 election, the political climate was stable. In a time of stability, 
change appears to be less risky. 
Although the findings of this study add to our understanding of the function and 
importance of strategic uncertain, there are limitations to its generalizability. This study 
analyzed only the 2004 presidential election. Election years are filled with multiple 
elections ranging from Federal congressional elections to local city council 
representatives. These various elections may or may not be affected by strategic 
uncertainty. This requires future investigation regarding how strategic uncertainty works 
at various levels of elections. 
Second, Kellerman and Reynolds (1990) conducted studies testing motivation in 
uncertainty reduction and found that "wanting knowledge rather than lacking is what 
promotes information-seeking" (p. 7). One of the axioms of uncertainty reduction theory 
suggests that people seek information when confronted with uncertainty. That axiom 
helps explain information seeking in campaigns and more importantly, it questions Avery 
& Zemsky's (1998) herding behavior in an atmosphere of exaggerated uncertainty. 
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Perhaps people are not so easily herded in a political election, especially in the absence of 
motivation. Motivation of individual voters is a variable requiring additional inquiry. 
A final limitation of this study is its scope. Television has a powerful impact on 
voters (NPR, October 31, 2006). However, there are multiple mediums used in 
presidential elections. Direct mailing, radio, print media, and word of mouth all play 
important parts in political communication. The expansion of the use of the internet in the 
2004 election and future elections require further research. For example, a television 
commercial may be used to rhetorically manipulate uncertainty. A motivated voter may 
log onto a candidate's website to view a digital video response to an ad, thus lowering 
uncertainty. In addition, the interjection of political symbols into the political/cultural 
landscape requires study. The concept of "flip-flop" spread through the political 
landscape, helping to generate uncertainty. Though fostered by various mediums, "flip-
flopper" behavior may have generated and reinforced uncertainty. Future research needs 
to analyze the relationship between strategic uncertainty and various channels of 
communication. 
The rhetorical use of uncertainty in political communication (and other areas) has 
multiple implications. The study of uncertainty as a tool of rhetoric could open up myriad 
areas of research. In society, we see uncertainty in the competition for power and 
legitimacy among various ethnicities, mainly between dominant and subordinate groups. 
In the economy, there is a plethora of areas to study. In addition, the political world is rife 
with possibilities. Strategic uncertainty has the potential to create new areas of rhetorical 
research as well as empirical research. 
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Carl Hovland appropriated Aristotle's artistic proofs and empirically tested them. 
This scholarship fostered modern persuasion research. Perhaps this study lays the 
groundwork for strategic uncertainty research. Strategic uncertainty appears to have 
untapped potential as a research field. 
Aristotle (1991) saw the function of rhetoric as the discovery of "the available 
means of persuasion" (p. 36). In the 2004, presidential election strategic uncertainty 
appears to have been a means of persuasion. Uncertainty permeates life; it surrounds us. 
Uncertainty exists in nature and natural events, in people, nations, governments, 
economies, politics, and communications. It holds one of the keys to explaining the 
success or failure of political campaigns. The 2004 presidential election presented an 
opportunity to study components of the rhetorical manipulation of uncertainty. The Bush-
Cheney campaign affected the public's perceptions regarding Senator Kerry's ethos Their 
ads created "uncertainty" about the Kerry's trustworthiness, competence, and moral 
character. The successful rhetorical campaign of the Bush-Cheney team set the stage for 
even more complex advertising, designed to build the public's apprehension for the 
uncertainty involved in voting for Senator Kerry. 
The shift toward campaigns built around the "uncertainty" of supporting a 
candidate, musters the growth of rhetorical research and analysis of the people and 
institutions of the 2008 presidential election. There should be ample opportunity to 
create a clearer and more useful understanding of the roles rhetoric plays in an advanced 
democracy. 
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